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Humans are social beings. We rely on group membership for our well-being, health,
and ultimately for our survival. But we are not always successful in staying within
the group. It is safe to assume that no one has ever escaped the occasional feeling
of not quite fitting in. For most people this is an unsettling experience. Social sci-
entists have therefore become increasingly interested in the consequences of being
socially rejected, and many studies report on the adverse impact of being rejected
or ostracized on people’s psychological needs, their emotions, their cognitions and
their behaviour (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006;
Williams, 2007a, 2007b).
In the past 15 years the field of social psychology has acquired many insights in
the human response to social rejection. The method of research has been mainly
focussed on comparing the impact of a non-specific rejection experience to an in-
clusion, or non-rejection experience in controlled experimental settings. In the
current thesis I adopt a different approach and argue that we should specify and
compare different forms of rejection. My main argument is that the experience of
being rejected is not a uniform experience, but may vary with the distinct percep-
tions that people can have about the reason of why they are rejected. Afterall,
there is no instance of social rejection that occurs without some form of social
motivation or social judgment. The act of rejecting or ignoring someone is basi-
cally an act of social control to make an individual change the unwanted aspects of
his behaviour or personality. Moreover, even when an instance of rejection is not
intentional – for example when in a group discussion one of the group members
is incidentally ignored more than others – that person may still think that it was
intentional and that there was a specific reason. It goes without saying that people
are highly responsive to cues of social rejection and to the social motivations that
underlie a rejection. I argue that to understand the full range of responses towards
social rejection, we need to take into account that rejections have different social
motivations, and that people will always impose meaning on a rejection episode.
Until now there has been no research or theorizing within the social rejection
literature concerning the potential underlying social motivations that drive people
to reject others. Based on literature and research from the field of person percep-
tion and group processes (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Levine & Kerr, 2007), I
differentiate between rejections motivated by a perception of lack of warmth in the
target, and rejections motivated by a perception of lack of competence in the tar-
get. That is, people can be rejected because they behaved in ways that betrayed
others’ trust in them, or they can be rejected because they are not competent
enough. The goal of the present thesis is to demonstrate that rejected individuals
indeed differentiate between these two forms of rejection and that the reason of
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the rejection matters for subsequent outcomes.
In the remainder of this introduction I first provide an overview on social rejec-
tion research and I discuss several existing research topics and theoretical models.
Next, I follow up with a short review on the literature regarding the distinction
between warmth and competence evaluations in person perception. I conclude this
introduction with describing my approach to investigating the warmth-competence
distinction in relation to social rejection, and provide an overview of my studies.
Social rejection in the literature
Research shows that the experience of rejection – being excluded or ignored – is
an exceptionally painful social experience. Studies show that rejection elicits an
immediate and unmitigated social pain response. There are studies suggesting
that humans respond to rejection with some of the same neuronal networks in the
brain that respond to physical pain (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger,
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; McDonald & Leary, 2005). From a functionalist
perspective, the social pain is thought to have evolved because of the high survival
value of group membership. In line with this idea, many studies suggest that the
social pain of rejection is not easily mitigated by social factors (Gonsalkorale &
Williams, 2007; Van Beest, Carter-Sowell, Van Dijk, & Williams, 2012; Lelieveld,
Moor, Crone, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2013; Van Beest & Williams, 2006;
Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). Other studies showed that the shock of rejection
can even lead to physical and emotional numbness (Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, &
Baumeister, 2009; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Baumeister, DeWall, & Vohs, 2009).
Finally, other studies suggests that social rejection impairs self-regulation and
cognitive functioning (Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002; Baumeister, DeWall,
Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2002). Because of
these adverse outcomes of rejection, after a recent rejection experience, people are
often motivated to strengthen their connections with others, or engage in new con-
nections – more so than people who have not recently experienced a rejection. This
motivation seems in part automatic. For example, compared to non-rejected indi-
viduals, recently rejected individuals engage in more social mimicry and demon-
strate heightened sensitivity to cues of social acceptance (Pickett, Gardner, &
Knowles, 2004; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister,
& Schaller, 2007; Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci, & Van Lange, 2005; Williams &
Sommer, 1997; Williams et al., 2000). But social rejection can also elicit antiso-
cial behaviour, especially when it is a disproportionate threat to personal control
(Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Cia-
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rocco, & Bartels, 2007; Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2006).
Importantly, in a majority of social rejection studies participants do not obtain
a reason for the rejection. This means that we do not know how the perceived
reason of the rejection might have impacted the responses to rejection in these
studies. Most paradigms use a technique in which participants are rejected out
of the blue without a seeming reason, and participants are also not asked about
their subjective construals of why they thought they were rejected. For example,
in many studies participants are led to believe that no one wants to continue inter-
acting with them after initial contact or information exchange (The get-acquainted
paradigm; Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary, Blevins, & Holgate, 1997), or that they will
lead a lonely life without friends (The life- alone-prognosis paradigm; Baumeister
et al., 2002). Another technique is ignoring the participant in a joint activity,
for example a group conversation (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2005), or in a
real or digital game of ball toss (“Cyberball”; Williams & Jarvis, 2006). These
techniques are not designed to differentiate between different reasons for rejec-
tion; they aim to compare the impact of rejection with non-rejection, or inclusion.
In the same vein, existing theoretical models distinguish between different styles
of rejection (fairness, expectedness or severity), different implications of rejection
(costs of the rejection, threatened psychological needs), or differences in charac-
teristics of the source and context of the rejection, but they do not elaborate on
possible social motives behind rejections.
For example, the notion of the Implicit social bargain (Baumeister et al., 2005)
proposes that group membership motivates individuals to behave in socially appro-
priate and non-selfish ways. Baumeister et al. (2005) propose that human social
life contains an implicit bargain between the individual and his or her social en-
vironment. This bargain holds that in order to be accepted by others, individuals
need to regulate their selfish needs and impulses, such as for example stealing a
colleague’s iPad, listening to loud music in the middle of the night, or not respect-
ing others’ opinions. Normally, people are willing to sacrifice their selfish needs
because belonging to a group has psychological and practical benefits. However,
if the group does not adhere to the bargain and does not provide in the individ-
ual’s needs, or chooses to reject the individual, the individual will feel no need any
more to self-regulate and behave in antisocial ways. For example, the life-alone
paradigm (Twenge et al., 2001, 2007) and the get-acquainted paradigm (Nezlek
et al., 1997; Twenge et al., 2001) seem to elicit more aggression than the often
used Cyberball paradigm (Williams & Jarvis, 2006). It could be that the former
manipulations are experienced as an especially rough breach of the social contract.
The implicit bargain explanation however, does not elaborate on what the reasons
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might be for a breach of the social contract.
The Multi-motive model by Richman and Leary (2009) explains why rejection
leads to a variety of behaviours, ranging from social withdrawal, to antisocial and
prosocial behaviour. Different from the implicit bargain model, the multi-motive
model specifies parameters in the social environment, and describes the source and
the implications of the rejection as predictors of different responses to a rejection.
More specifically, the multi-motive model differentiates between the perceived costs
of the rejection, the feasibility of restoring acceptance, the importance of the rela-
tionship, the possibility of alternate relationships, the pervasiveness of the rejection
and the (un)fairness of the rejection. The model predicts that prosocial responses
are prevalent when the relationship is seen as valuable, when rejection is costly,
and when repair of the relationship is feasible; antisocial responses are prevalent
when the relationship is of low value, the cost of rejection is low, the rejection
is perceived as unfair, and when repair of the relationship is unfeasible. Finally,
social withdrawal is thought to be the result of pervasive rejection that ultimately
leads to feelings of helplessness and depression. For example, a study reported by
Lawson and Williams (1998) showed that being rejected by a friendship pair in a
face-to-face ball-tossing game caused participants to behave more antisocially over
a newly arriving naive participant, than being rejected by two individuals who
were strangers to each other. Possibly, being rejected by a friendship pair or close
knit group is a greater sign of unfeasibility of obtaining inclusion, which causes
antisocial behaviour. The multi-motive model indirectly implies that rejections
can have different social reasons, but it does not elaborate on what these reasons
could be.
Finally, the Needs threat model by Williams (1997, 2001) differentiates be-
tween rejections that thwart belongingness needs and rejections that thwart con-
trol needs. The model proposes that rejected individuals feel and act in accordance
with the psychological needs that are mostly threatened. According to this model
rejection threatens four basic psychological needs: belongingness, self-esteem, con-
trol and meaningful existence. The Need fortification hypothesis then states that
after a rejection people are motivated to fortify the most saliently threatened
need(s). The hypothesis then distinguishes between an inclusionary need cluster,
and a power and control need cluster. The inclusionary need cluster consists of the
need to belong and the need for self-esteem, with self-esteem being considered as
a socio-meter of social inclusion (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). When
belongingness needs are threatened, thoughts, feelings, perceptions and behaviour
arise that are directed at increasing the likelihood that the individual feels con-
nected again. According to Williams (2007a, 2007b), the need for control can be
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a priority above belongingness and self-esteem needs when the individual sees no
chance for inclusion. When this happens, people are more motivated to overpower
others and force them to recognize their existence. Thus, when rejection threat-
ens control to an overly large extent people are more likely to behave aggressively
rather than prosocially. The role of control threat was demonstrated in a study
conducted by Warburton et al. (2006). In their study participants were either ex-
cluded or not excluded in a game of face-to-face ball-tossing in the waiting room.
Then, ‘the actual’ experiment began in which participants had to listen to a series
of loud blasts of sound. Half of the participants were given control over the onset
of the blasts of noise, whereas the other half was subjected to a random uncontrol-
lable sequence of noise. In the next phase of the experiment, participants’ level
of aggression was assessed by measuring the amount of the hot-sauce (Lieberman,
Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor, 1999) that participants allocated to another
individual. The results of this study supported the control (via aggression) fortifi-
cation hypothesis; participants who were excluded in the game and later deprived
of control over the onset of each blast of noise, displayed higher levels of aggres-
sion, than participants who were excluded and then given control over the noise
sequence. The latter group of participants had aggression levels similar to included
participants. Williams (2007a, 2007b) argues that when reconnection is possible
and when the rejection does not pose an extreme threat to personal control, the
default response toward rejection is restoring belongingness. Only when recon-
nection is deemed impossible, individuals will revert to aggression as an ultimate
attempt to restore the only thing that is left, control. The needs threat model
however does not elaborate on the reasons why sometimes rejections are a threat
to control, and whether different reasons might evoke different a different response.
In sum, the theoretical models described above do not take into account the
social motivations that often precede rejections in daily life. Taking into account
that rejections have different reasons could give a more differentiated perspective
on how specific responses to rejection emerge. In the present thesis I investigate
the role of perceptions of low competence and low warmth as motivators of social
rejection. Differentiating between competence and warmth could be relevant for
social rejection research for two reasons. First, because being perceived as com-
petent and warm by others is important for humans to feel an optimal sense of
belongingness and acceptance. Second, because competence and warmth are ba-
sic requirements for any cooperative social bond, and people who are negatively
evaluated on either dimension are more likely to get rejected (Levine & Kerr,
2007).
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Competence and warmth in the service of belongingness
The need for belongingness has been described in the literature as one of the
driving forces of human behavior. It is one of our core needs (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995), and perhaps even the most important one, seeing its connection
with group living which promotes physical survival, access to food (Rofe, 1984),
and opportunities for sexual reproduction (Ainsworth, 1989; Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981; Bowlby, 1969; Buss, 1990, 1991; Moreland, 1987). Yet, for an optimal sense
of belonging merely being part of a group is not enough. All the more, because
physical survival normally is a relatively distal goal. People have more proximate
social psychological needs as well, that when thwarted, alert the individual to check
the quality of their social relationships (Leary et al., 1995; Kenrick, Griskevicius,
Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010). We can easily imagine ourselves being part of a social
group, yet at the same time not feeling entirely accepted – for example because
we feel not trusted, liked or loved, or because we feel not valued for our abilities
and skills. In the same manner, groups and individuals can criticize, reject or
ostracize individuals who are seen as untrustable (i.e. as having hostile intentions)
or incompetent. This shows that the experience of belongingness and rejection is
a multifaceted phenomenon.
Sifting through the literature I found that trust, warmth and competence are
frequently described psychological needs within social relationships. For example,
Maslow (1943, 1970) writes about the need for affiliation, status and mastery; Deci
and Ryan (1985, 2008) write about the need for relatedness, competence and au-
tonomy and, within the social rejection literature, Williams (2007a, 2007b) writes
about the needs for belongingness, meaningful existence, self-esteem and control.
The needs for affiliation, relatedness, belongingness and meaningful existence seem
to refer to the need for being valued for one’s companionship and warmth, whereas
the needs for status, competence, autonomy, mastery, and control seem to refer
to the need for being valued for one’s skills and competences. In other words,
individuals desire to be loved, liked and trusted for their friendly and caring side,
but they also want to be respected for their intellectual and practical (i.e. problem
solving, leadership) abilities. That people have these needs is perhaps most evi-
dent from the typical questions that they ask themselves (and others) when they
feel rejected: “Do they not like me?“ or “Am I not good enough?”
In the past, several theoretical models (Asch, 1997; Bales, 1970; Leary, 1957)
have proposed that personality, interpersonal relations and person perception can
be described along two primary dimensions: dominance and affiliation. According
to Leary’s Interpersonal circumplex model (Leary, 1957) relationships between
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people consist of vertical and horizontal elements. In this model the vertical axe
ranges from submissiveness on one pole, to dominance on the other pole, and the
horizontal axe ranges from hate on one pole, to love on the other pole.
Brewer’s Optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1993) suggests a similar dis-
tinction and proposes that people have competing needs for assimilation and dif-
ferentiation; that is, people have respectively the need for feeling included and
accepted by members of one’s group, but also for feeling distinctive from members
of one’s group. One could contend that the strive for assimilation is horizontal
in nature and consists of behaviours that are aimed at attaining love, liking and
trust from others, whereas the strive for differentiation is vertical in nature and
consists of behaviours aimed at attaining status, respect and acknowledgement for
one’s competencies.
Similarly, the Dual pathway model of interpersonal acceptance (Huo, Binning,
& Molina, 2010) posits that gaining interpersonal value within social groups is
specifically obtained by seeking liking and status (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer,
Spataro, & Chatman, 2006; Frank, 1985). The model describes the need for liking
as resulting from the individuals’ perception of the degree to which the group feels
warmly to them. The need for status, on the other hand, is described as resulting
from the individual’s perception of his or her reputational self within the group
(i.e. the degree to which others respect the individual) (Tyler & Smith, 1999).
According to this model both liking and respect ensure one a place in the group.
Finally, the Stereotype content model by Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2008) pro-
poses similar ideas. According to the stereotype content model humans evaluate
each other on two primary characteristics: warmth and competence. According
to the model warmth and competence are core and universal components of in-
terpersonal perception (Fiske et al., 2007). When people evaluate individuals on
competence they rely on characteristics such as skill, creativity, intelligence, fore-
sight and competitiveness, whereas when they evaluate individuals on warmth
they rely on characteristics such as friendliness, sincerity, helpfulness, trustwor-
thiness and cooperativeness. Thus an individual who is evaluated high on the
warmth (horizontal) dimension will attain love and trust, whereas an individual
that is evaluated high on the competence (vertical dimension) will attain respect
and status.
From the above I infer that humans can experience two distinct types of re-
jection: rejection based on a lack of warmth, which is essentially a withdrawal of




The aim of this dissertation is to show that the distinction between these two
types of rejection is warranted. More specifically, I aim to show that targets of a
rejection recognize warmth and competence rejections as different types of rejec-
tion and respond to them in distinct ways. In most of my studies I mainly rely on
emotional responses as dependent variables. This is because I view emotions as
facilitators of appropriate responding in social interactions. Tooby and Cosmides
(2008) for example, argue that emotions help coordinate an individual’s behaviour
and responses in social situations. Research among primates highlights the im-
portance of emotions in guiding physiological, motivational and cognitive systems
that together increase the chances for survival. According to the Social brain hy-
pothesis primates and humans have evolved a large neocortex and specific areas in
the brain that facilitate emotion communication and recognition in order to cope
with complex group living (Parr, Waller, & Fugate, 2005). Because of the specific
social functions of emotions, I argue that if competence and warmth rejections are
indeed distinct forms of rejection, they should lead to distinct socially adaptive
emotional reactions. A warmth rejection after all, conveys a different social mes-
sage, and therefore requires different coping, than a competence rejection. Warmth
and competence rejections should therefore elicit different emotional responses.
In social rejection literature emotions are commonly viewed as a pain signal.
At the same time there is also some debate as to whether social rejection leads
to lowered mood or not. Although some studies find that rejection indeed leads
to negative emotions like hurt feelings, anger and sadness (Buckley, Winkel, &
Leary, 2004; Williams et al., 2000, 2002), other researchers have not found such
an effect (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006; Twenge et al., 2007; Twenge, Catanese,
& Baumeister, 2003). There is also the question whether emotions play at all a
role in the link between rejection and behavioural reactions. Many studies suggest
that behavioural responses to rejection do not follow from the emotional reactions
to the rejection (Buckley et al., 2004; Twenge et al., 2001, 2002, 2003). A study
conducted by Chow, Tiedens, and Govan (2008), on the other hand, showed that
antisocial responses following an episode of rejection in an online ball-tossing game
were predicted by anger, but not by sadness.
The approach in the current thesis somewhat diverges from the above litera-
ture. Although I agree that we can infer from the intensity of emotions how much
a rejection hurts, and that sometimes being rejected can hurt so much that it
may actually lead to emotional numbness (Blackhart et al., 2009), I approach the
function of emotions as first and foremost social in nature – emotions ready the
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individual for social action and elicit social behaviours from others (Frijda, 1987).
In my studies I focus on the emotions of sadness and anger because they are the
most commonly reported emotions in response to social rejection (Buckley et al.,
2004; Chow et al., 2008; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). I argue that by examining the
emergence of these emotions more closely we can learn more about the complex
nature of social rejection.
Overview of studies
In the first three empirical chapters I investigate whether depending on individual
differences in personality and the reason of the rejection – warmth or competence –
people show distinct emotional responses to rejection that make sense from a func-
tional perspective. In the last empirical chapter the focus is not on demonstrating
the competence-warmth distinction anymore, but on dysfunctional responses to re-
jection among individuals diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder. These
individuals are interesting in relation to the warmth-competence distinction as
they represent a group that is especially low in warmth and affiliation needs.
Chapter 2. Because I aimed to rely on sadness and anger to demonstrate that
people experience competence and warmth as two distinct forms of rejection, I
first wanted to test whether these emotions are indeed differentially impacted by
rejection. In the social rejection literature sad and angry responses to rejection are
usually not distinguished from each other, and are often put under the common
denominator of negative and unpleasant emotions. In this chapter I investigated
whether the same unspecific rejection manipulation (i.e. without a given reason)
can cause different levels of sadness and anger, depending on individual differences
in need for affiliation, as measured with sensitivity to others in intersonal relation-
ships. More specifically, I hypothesized that individuals with a high sensitivity to
others would suppress their anger, and mainly respond with sadness to a rejection,
while individuals with a low sensitivity to others would mainly respond with anger
to a rejection.
Chapter 3. In the next chapter I investigated how subjective interpretations of
ambiguous warmth and competence reasons, and actual warmth and competence
reasons impacted sadness and anger in response to rejection. I inferred targets’
subjective interpretations of the reason for the rejection from their memory for
ambiguous feedback that they received from their ostensible rejecter. Then, in the
next two experiments I manipulated the reason of the rejection; first, by provid-
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ing participants with unambiguous negative feedback about their competence or
warmth, and second by using a recall technique. I hypothesized that (interpreta-
tions of) competence rejections, would mainly elicit anger and less sadness, while
(interpretations of) warmth rejections would mainly elicit sadness and less anger.
Chapter 4. In this chapter I focussed on the non-verbal expressions of com-
petence and warmth appraisals that precede a rejection. I reasoned that because
conveying and understanding the reason of the rejection is important, subjective
appraisals of lack of competence (or lack of warmth) should seep through the non-
verbal behavior of the person who engages in the rejection, and rejected individuals
should be especially sensitive to pick this up. In two experiments I attempted to
simulate real life in which people often have their private reasons for ignoring
or rejecting someone, and targets have no information other than the non-verbal
behaviour of the person who engages in the rejection. In a face-to-face selection
situation, selectors (who were real participants) were privately instructed to make
a selection among a group of individuals either based on their subjective evaluation
of their competence, or on their subjective evaluation of their warmth. I expected
that the instruction to select on competence, compared to the instruction to select
on warmth, would lead to stronger non-verbal expressions of dominance in the se-
lectors, whereas the instruction to select on warmth, compared to the instruction
to select on dominance, would lead to stronger non-verbal expressions of coldness.
Moreover, I expected that rejected targets, compared to included targets, would be
especially sensitive in picking up dominance and coldness in the selectors. In ad-
dition, I investigated whether the same emotional response patterns as in Chapter
3 would arise among rejected individuals – even when the reason of the rejection
is not verbalized and only clear to the selector.
Chapter 5. In the final empirical chapter, I investigated reactions to social
rejection among an extreme group of individuals: violent offenders diagnosed with
anti-social personality disorder (ASPD). The characteristics of this disorder sug-
gest that these individuals might be especially controlling in their need to be
respected as a competent individual. Using a ball tossing game (Cyberball) I
investigated how giving these individuals the opportunity to exert social control
over the other players in the game might impact their reaction to being excluded
in the game, and compared this to individuals from a normal population without
a known history of violence, or diagnosis of ASPD. I expected that, because of
their sensitivity for control, a relatively short opportunity to exert social control
would serve as a buffer against the impact of ostracism for individuals diagnosed
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with ASPD, and that this would consequently weaken their normal response to
ostracism, compared to the response of a normal population.
After these empirical chapters, Chapter 6 contains a general conclusion and
discussion. In it, I discuss the implications of the findings in this thesis for existing
theory. A summary of the empirical findings can be found in the Summary and
Samenvatting (Dutch version) sections of this thesis.
Conclusion
This dissertation introduces a new framework for social rejection that distinguishes
between the different social motivations underlying social rejection. I report on
several studies that are designed to show distinct emotional reactions to warmth
and competence rejection. This framework will hopefully pave the way for a new
line of research in the field of social rejection in which the subjective experience
of rejection, the act of rejection, and their interactions are more closely inspected
in light of basic social motives. Note that some empirical chapters are based on
individual research papers and as such can be read independently from each other.
This also means that there will be some overlap between the different chapters.
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Chapter 2
Individual differences in emotional responses to
social rejection
This chapter investigates rejected and not rejected individuals’ anticipated emotional
responses to hypothetical threatening social scenarios. In the social rejection literature
anger and sadness are commonly considered emotions that signal social pain. In the
present chapter I argue that considering these emotions’ distinct social functions they
need not always be elicited with the same intensity in response to a rejection. We
hypothesized that after a rejection experience, participants who are more sensitive to
others would anticipate higher feelings of sadness and lower feelings of anger in response to
subsequent social threat. For participants who are less sensitive to others we hypothesized
that they would primarily enhance their anger response. The results showed that, as
expected, rejected participants with a high sensitivity to others anticipated less anger
and more sadness in response to social threat scenarios, compared to their non-rejected
counterparts, and compared to rejected participants with a low sensitivity to others.
Participants with a low sensitivity to others anticipated equal levels of anger and sadness,
regardless of whether they were rejected or not.
This chapter is adapted from:
Çelik, P., Van Beest, I., Lammers, J., & Bekker, M. H. J. (2014). Individual





In the literature anger and sadness are the most commonly named emotions that
constitute the concept of social pain in response to rejection (Chow et al., 2008;
Richman & Leary, 2009; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Van Beest, Williams, &
Van Dijk, 2011; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). To our knowledge there are no prior
studies that investigated the nature and function of these emotions in response to a
rejection. In most studies, anger and sadness are merely considered as expressions
of social pain. But if they are just pain signals, why do people distinguish between
anger and sadness? In some people the primary response to being rejected seems
mostly sadness, while in others it seems mostly anger. In the present chapter we
argue that anger and sadness are not only pain signals, but also functional emotions
that individuals habitually deploy to regain inclusion. As a first step in showing
the feasibility of our idea, we investigate whether it is possible to differentiate
between people who primarily respond with sadness, and people who primarily
respond with anger to rejection.
Anger and sadness in response to rejection
Sadness and anger are often placed under the common denominator of negative
and unpleasant emotions. Yet, from a functional perspective they are quite differ-
ent from each other, each with different antecedents and behavioral consequences
(Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989; Keltner & Gross,
1999; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans,
& Pieters, 2008). Sadness primarily signals helplessness, elicits nurturance from
others, and motivates the individual to actively reach out to others (Gray, Ishii,
& Ambady, 2011; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 2001; Vingerhoets, Cor-
nelius, Van Heck, & Becht, 2000). Anger on the other hand, signals dominance
and toughness, causing others to concede more quickly (Knutson, 1996; Sinaceur
& Tiedens, 2006; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). Anger is an energiz-
ing emotion that motivates the individual to reassert power and status through
competition, or frightening others into compliance (Kassinove, Roth, Owens, &
Fuller, 2002; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef,
2012; Shaver et al., 2001; Van Kleef, 2010). Moreover, people expressing anger are
often perceived as being of higher status than people expressing sadness (Tiedens,
Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). Stated differently, these emotions distinguish be-
tween the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ aspects of relationships. Sadness is an emo-
tion that is typically part of a horizontal managing of interpersonal relationships.
Within relationships sadness – compared to anger – is more functional in achiev-
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ing a feeling of mutual trust (i.e. a mutual understanding of friendly intentions),
warmth and affiliation. Anger on the other hand, is typically part of a vertical
managing of interpersonal relationships. More than sadness, anger is especially
functional in achieving status (and if possible respect) through competition or
even force. Recently, Huo et al. (2010) have argued that to obtain interpersonal
acceptance within social groups people seek liking and status.
The idea that sadness and anger are two distinct strategies in managing social
relationships, suggests that these emotions might also be crucial in dealing with
social rejection. Indeed, sadness and anger are the two most commonly reported
emotions in the social rejection literature (Chow et al., 2008; Gerber & Wheeler,
2009; Richman & Leary, 2009; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Van Beest et al., 2011).
Considering the functional characteristics of anger and sadness, we propose that
the intensity of these emotions in response to rejection should be related to the
extent that individuals value and need trust and liking in their relationships with
others. In support of our idea, the commonly reported prosocial and aggressive
pathways in response to rejection (Williams, 2007a, 2007b), appear to be linked
to anger and sadness. More specifically, the anger instigated by social rejection
appears to be linked to aggression (Chow et al., 2008), while sadness instigated by
social loss appears to be linked to increased attention to nonverbal cues and the
desire for social connectedness (Gray et al., 2011),
In sum, the main idea put forward in this chapter is that – assuming after a
rejection people desire reinclusion – to the extent that people differ in how much
they need mutual trust and liking in their relationships (i.e. affiliation), some will
be more likely to show sadness in response to a rejection, while others will be
more likely to show anger in response to the same rejection. Our underlying idea
is that being liked and trusted, is easier to obtain with sadness, because sadness
shows others one’s warmth, and elicits caring and nurturance. But when one is less
concerned with being liked or trusted, one may go for the quicker route, which is to
express anger in an attempt to intimidate others into recognizing one’s existence.
Present study and hypotheses
Following this reasoning the occurrence of anger and sadness in response to re-
jection should be predicted by individual differences in managing interpersonal
relationships, more specifically by individual differences in the need for affiliation.
We assessed participants’ need for affiliation with the Sensitivity to others (SO)
subscale of the autonomy-connectedness scale (ACS; Bekker & Van Assen, 2006).
SO is defined as the sensitivity to the opinions, wishes, and needs of other peo-
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ple, and the need for intimacy and affiliation with others. Recent studies suggest
that specifically SO as an individual difference variable is related to internaliz-
ing emotional response patterns; response patterns in which sadness predominates
and anger is suppressed. Additionally, we also administered the attachment style
questionnaire (ASQ; Feeney, Noller, & Hanrahan, 1994). The attachment style
questionnaire measures the level of insecure (avoidant and fearful) attachment.
We consider insecure attachment as a form of sensitivity to others too, charac-
terized by conflicting affiliation needs and an unhealthy preoccupation with, or
detachment from others. We added this measure for exploratory reasons and had
no a priori hypotheses.
We reason that the higher an individual’s sensitivity to others, the more he or
she should desire mutual trust, liking and affiliation; hence we expect heightened
sadness and lowered anger in response to being rejected. For individuals with a
lower sensitivity to others, we reason that their desire for mutual trust, liking and
affiliation is lower; hence we expect only heightened anger in response to rejection,
and no effect on sadness.
Experiment 1
We used a paradigm in which participants were rejected or not, and follow-
ing this experience we asked them to anticipate how sad and angry they would
feel in ambiguously threatening hypothetical social situations. We reasoned that
especially in situations that are ambiguous, habitual response styles should dom-
inate behaviour the most. Note that we did not measure participants’ emotional
reactions in response to the rejection experience itself, as we aimed to show that
people deploy anger and sadness as coping strategies after they have been rejected,
in response to new threatening situations.
We expected that compared to a control condition, after a rejection experience,
individuals with a high sensitivity to others would anticipate higher sadness and
lower anger, while individuals with a low sensitivity to others would anticipate
mostly higher anger (not higher sadness). In parallel, we expected that among
rejected participants sensitivity to others would be positively associated with sad-
ness, and negatively associated with anger. Among non-rejected participants we





One hundred-thirteen subjects (76 female; Mage= 20.27, SDage= 3.44) partici-
pated for course credit. All participants were first year students at the psychology
department at Tilburg University, except for three who were 3rd year students.
Participants were randomply assigned to a rejection or a non-rejection control
condition.
Measures
We measured participants’ need for affiliation with the Sensitivity to others (SO)
subscale of the autonomy-connectedness scale (ACS; Bekker & Van Assen, 2006)
and with the Attachment Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Feeney et al., 1994). The
SO subscale consists of 15 items rated a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly
disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Examples are “I hate detachment”; “Usually I
can dismiss another person’s misery from my mind” (reverse coded) (α=.81). The
ASQ consists of 5 subscales (1 measuring secure attachment, and 4 measuring
different aspects of insecure attachment), with items rated on a 6-point Likert
scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). Examples of the
subscales are “I am confident that others will always be there for me” (Confidence
in self and others; 4 items, α= .57), “I sometimes wonder why others would want to
get to know me” (Need for approval; 6 items, α= .72), “I am worried that others
care less about me than I care about them” (Preoccupation with relationships;
5 items, α= .40), “I have mixed feelings about close relationships with others”
(Discomfort with closeness; 9 items, α= .73), “For me achieving things is more
important than having relationships with people” (Relationships as secondary; 6
items, α= .63).
Procedure
Participants were led to individual cubicles were they filled in the questionnaires1
on a laptop. They were told that afterwards they would meet another student
for an interview. In reality there was no other student. Ostensibly to prepare
participants for the interview they were asked to write a short description about
1Next to SO and attachment style we also measured self-awareness & capacity to manage with
new situations (the two other subscales of the ACS-30), depression (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson,
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), self-expression and self-control (SECS; Van Elderen, Maes, Komproe,
& Van Der Kamp, 1997), personality organisation (IPO; Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Kernberg, &
Foelsch, 2001), anti-social personality (VKP; Duijsens, Eurelings-Bontekoe, & Diekstra, 1996),
the big-five personality dimensions (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and sex-role (BSRI; Bem,
1974). Controlling for these measures in our analyses did not alter the main results.
27
themselves, which the experimenter would deliver to the ‘other student’. After
writing for 5 minutes, participants received a fake description from their future
conversation partner. After participants read this description, which contained
neutral and general information, the experimenter told the participants that con-
trary to what they had heard earlier, they would not meet the student. Crucially,
the reason why this was the case depended on experimental condition. Specifically,
in the rejection condition they were told that the other participant changed his
mind and did not want to meet the participant anymore, while in the control con-
dition they were told that the other participant had to leave unexpectedly because
of a phone call, and had apologized for not being able to do the interview (for a
similar procedure see, Nezlek et al., 1997).
In both conditions the experimenter apologized for the inconvenience and asked
whether the participant was willing to take part in another study. All participants
agreed to continue with this next study. In fact this other study was our dependent
measure. The dependent measure consisted of questions regarding 8 different sce-
narios of ambiguously negative social situations. These scenarios are derived from
the hostile attribution bias scale (HABS; Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Davis, 2011).
This is a self-report measure to assess individuals’ tendencies to exhibit the hostile
attribution bias in response to descriptions of ambiguous social provocations. The
original measure consists of 14 short vignettes. We made a shortened adaptation
of the HABS consisting of 8 scenarios. An example of a scenario is the following:
It’s Saturday afternoon and your neighbour is listening to his radio.
The volume is very loud and you are bothered by this a lot. When you
ask your neighbour to turn down the volume, he says: “Yeah, I’ll do it
in a minute!”, but in the end he does not do it.
We assessed anticipated sadness with the items “sad” and “insecure” and an-
ticipated anger with the items “angry” and “annoyed”. Participants were asked
to read each scenario (presented on a laptop screen) and indicate the likelihood
that they would feel these emotions in on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from not
at all (1) to very much (7). Within each scenario the two measures of each emo-
tion had a good correlation. Pearson’s correlations between the items “sad” and
“insecure” ranged between .32 and .80, (all p’s< .001), and correlations between
the items “angry” and “annoyed” ranged between .40 and .79 (all p’s< .001). We
therefore averaged the items sad/ insecure and the items angry/annoyed for each
scenario. Next, we conducted reliability analyses for sadness across the whole set
of scenario’s and one for anger across the whole set of scenario’s. These analyses
showed that across the whole set of scenarios both emotions have excellent reli-
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ability with Cronbach’s α’s of .86 (sadness) and .97 (anger). This allowed us to
compute an average variable of sadness and an average variable of anger across
the whole set of scenario’s.
Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed about the real purpose of the
study.
Results
Table 2.1 shows all relevant correlations. It appeared that female participants re-
ported higher sensitivity to others (SO), need for approval and anticipated sadness,
than male participants. Furthermore, SO was negatively related to relationships
as secondary and positively related to preoccupation with relationships, need for
approval, and both anticipated sadness and anger. Anticipated sadness and anger
in turn were both positively related to need for approval and preoccupation with
relationships, while only sadness was negatively related to confidence. Finally,
both emotions were positively related to each other.
We conducted two sets of regression analyses, one with sadness as the depen-
dent variable and one with anger as the dependent variable. In both analyses
predictors were Condition (dummy coded: rejection= 0.5; control= -0.5), Sex
(dummy coded: female= 0.5; male= -0.5), all personality variables (Sensitivity to
others, Confidence, Need for approval, Preoccupation with relationships, Discom-
fort with closeness, and Relationships as secondary) and the two-way interaction
terms between condition and each of the personality variables. We controlled for
sex because it was correlated with sensitivity to others and anticipated sadness.
Finally, because of the high correlation between anticipated sadness and anger,
we controlled for anticipated sadness in the analyses with anticipated anger as the
dependent variable, and vice versa.
Following Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990), the scores on the continuous vari-
ables were standardized before computing the interaction terms with condition to
facilitate the interpretation of regression coefficients and to reduce multicollinear-
ity (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). For subsequent simple slope analyses we created new
variables for each continuous variable at one 1 standard deviation above, and 1
standard deviation below their respective means.
Effects on sadness
The analysis with sadness as the dependent variable revealed main effects of condi-
tion, sex, anger, need for approval, and a condition × SO effect (see Table 2.2, left
column). Simple slope analyses testing the effect of the rejection manipulation on
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anticipated sadness separately for participants high and low in SO, revealed only
an effect among participants with high SO, B= 0.66, SE= 0.20, t= 3.28, p= .001.
Among participants with low SO there was no effect of the rejection manipulation,
B= -0.02, SE= 0.23, t= -0.10, p= .920. Thus, as expected, rejected participants
with high SO anticipated higher sadness compared to their non-rejected counter-
parts. Participants with low SO, on the other hand, did not seem to be affected






Figure 2.1: Anticipated sadness to threat scenarios among rejected and non-
rejected participants with high and low levels of Sensitivity to others (+/- 1 stan-
dard deviation from the group mean).
We also conducted simple slope analyses testing the effect of SO separately
within the rejection and control conditions. These analyses revealed no significant
effect of SO in the control condition, B= -0.04, SE= 0.13, t= -0.28, p= .779.
But, as expected, within the rejection condition SO was positively related with
sadness, B= 0.30, SE= 0.12, t= 2.57, p= .012. This suggests that among rejected
participants the ones with high SO anticipated higher sadness than participants
with low SO.
Effects on anger
The analysis with anger as the dependent variable also revealed a condition × SO
interaction effect, and additionally a significant Condition × Need for approval
interaction effect. There were no main effects, except for a main effect of sadness
(see Table 2.2, right column). Simple slope analyses revealed again only an effect
of the rejection manipulation among participants with high SO, B= -.47, SE=
.21, t= -2.22, p= .029. As expected, rejected participants with high SO reported
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lower anticipated anger, compared to their non-rejected counterparts. Among par-
ticipants with low SO, the means were in the expected direction, with heightened
anticipated anger among the rejected ones compared to non-rejected ones, but the






Figure 2.2: Anticipated anger to threat scenarios among rejected and non-rejected
participants with high and low levels of Sensitivity to others (+/- 1 standard devi-
ation from the group mean).
Within the rejection and control conditions separately, there was again no
significant effect of SO in the control condition, B= 0.13, SE= 0.14, t= 0.97,
p= .336. But within the rejection condition, there was a marginally significant
negative relationship between SO and anticipated anger B= -0.22, SE= 0.12, t=
-1.80, p= .075. This suggests that among rejected participants the ones with low
SO anticipated higher anger than the ones with high SO.
Finally, subsequent simple slope analyses on the Condition × Need for ap-
proval interaction effect revealed that the rejection only impacted participants
who reported low Need for approval (NA); they anticipated lower anger than their
non-rejected counterparts, B= -0.48, SE= 0.22, t= -2.21, p= .030. But among
participants with a high NA, there was no effect of the rejection manipulation, B=
0.24, SE= 0.22, t= 1.10, p= .276. The simple slope analyses testing the effect of
NA within the rejection and control conditions separately, revealed only a signifi-
cant effect of NA in the control condition, B= -0.30, SE= 0.11, t= -2.65, p= .010;
but there was no association between NA and anger in the rejection condition,






Figure 2.3: Anticipated anger to threat scenarios among rejected and non-rejected
participants with high and low levels of Need for approval (+/- 1 standard deviation
from the group mean).
Discussion
In the present chapter we proposed that levels of sadness and anger in response to
a rejection depend on individual differences in the need for affiliation, as measured
with sensitivity to others in interpersonal relationships. Our reasoning stems from
the idea that the occurence of these emotions follows a pattern which reflects the
social functions of these emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner & Gross, 1999;
Shaver et al., 2001; Tiedens, 2001). The results of our study confirmed our ideas
and showed that participants with a high sensitivity to others anticipated higher
sadness and lower anger in response to social threat scenarios when they were
previously subjected to a rejection, compared to when they were not subjected to
a rejection, and also compared to rejected participants with a low sensitivity to
others. Moreover, among rejected participants sensitivity to others was positively
associated with sadness, and negatively associated with anger.
In sum, sadness seemed to be the primary response to rejection among par-
ticipants with a high sensitivity to others, while anger seemed to be the primary
response among participants with a low sensitivity to others. This pattern of emo-
tional responses in interaction with personality is in line with social-functional
accounts of emotions as a means of coordinating social interactions and relation-
ships (Averill, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008); sadness evokes sympathy in others
and is ultimately directed at restoring trust and affiliation, while anger evokes fear
in others and is ultimately directed at restoring status (Keltner & Gross, 1999;
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Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Shaver et al., 2001; Tiedens, 2001). Possibly, individuals
who are more sensitive to others are more likely to prefer inclusion to be based
on liking and trust. This explains why their primary response is sadness, because
this emotions is more functional in showing others that one is warm and trustable
than anger. Likewise, individuals with a low sensitivity to others probably care
less about being granted inclusion based on trust and liking, and instead are more
used to claiming inclusion, for which showing anger is more effective than showing
sadness. We believe that both the affiliation and status pathways may restore
one’s inclusionary status; sadness through obtaining trust and liking, and anger
through competition and intimidation which can be seen as the quick (er and some-
times dirty) route towards inclusion. In support of this this idea a recent study
by De Waal-Andrews and Van Beest (2012) showed that being granted inclusion,
more than claiming inclusion, leads people to feeling liked.
Strengths and Limitations
Because we found these results in response to hypothetical situations in which
people had to anticipate their emotional responses, these results imply that anger
and sadness are not only pain signals, but presumably also ready the individual for
dealing with the situation. In most rejection experiments emotions are typically
assessed in response to the rejection experience itself to measure the direct impact
of rejection on affect. We used a projection measure, because asking participants
to anticipate how they would feel in a new situation, other than the one that
they are currently in, fits the basic assumptions underlying our hypotheses better;
namely that being rejected not just hurts, but also impacts how one anticipates to
deal with subsequent threat situations. Future research might investigate under
what circumstances these emotional response tendencies lead to actual adaptive
behaviour.
One could question whether in reality people would show the same emotions
that they anticipated in the study. Our results show that at least at the anticipa-
tory level, participants do seem to get in the ‘right’ response mode/action tendency
– they get in the response mode that fits with their sensitivity to others. Under
which circumstances these action tendencies then extend to actual emotional and
behavioural responses in the real world is of course an empirical question, but our
main focus was to determine the initial response tendency.
Unexpectedly, we did not find that among individuals with a low sensitivity to
others being rejected (compared to not being rejected) led to elevated anger. A
possible explanation for might lie in the nature of our control condition. Note that
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our control condition was not a particularly positive experience for participants,
as participants were unexpectedly left alone by their future interaction partners,
albeit with an apology and a message indicating that it was not personal. In many
rejection experiments the control manipulation either consists of a non-rejection
with participants still under the assumption that they will meet their partner
(which can be considered a relatively neutral event), or an inclusion experience
(which can be considered a relatively positive event, compared to a non-rejection).
Thus, whereas in most rejection experiments the control condition varies in valence
between neutral and positive, our control condition probably had a valence below
neutral, and was perhaps experienced by some as an indirect rejection. We like
to see this as a strength of our study, because in this way our test was relatively
conservative. But in hindsight this particular nature of our control condition
might have been partly the reason why regarding our results on anger the effect
of the rejection among individuals with a low sensitivity to others did not reach
significance; it is possible that compared to the rejection condition, the control
condition – due to its relatively ambiguous nature – elicited considerable anger,
rendering the difference with the rejection condition non-significant.
Interestingly, our results also suggested a role for individual differences in need
for approval in sad and angry responses following a rejection. Whereas partici-
pants with a high need for approval did not seem to be affected in their anger in
response to the rejection manipulation, and high need for approval was associated
with higher sadness, irrespective of the rejection experience, interestingly partici-
pants with a low need for approval seemed to be the only ones who were affected
by the rejection; they anticipated lower anger as a consequence of the rejection
manipulation. Also, these participants anticipated higher anger than participants
with high need for approval, but only in the control condition – in the rejection
condition there was no such relationship. One way to make sense of this finding
is by linking need for approval with the anxious/avoidant attachment style: in-
tense fears of being rejected, in combination with a seeming avoidance of close
contact with others (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). People with high need for
approval might be extremely anxious and fearful of rejection in many situations;
perhaps to them our control manipulation was no less threatening than our re-
jection manipulation, because in both conditions participants were unexpectedly
left alone by their partner. But among participants with a low need for approval,
a seeming nonchalance exists when no actual threat of abandonment is present;
in the control condition these individuals responded to the scenario’s with rather
exaggerated anger, perhaps as an expression of their ‘I do not need anybody to
like me’ attitude. But this attitude then seems to dissapear when they experience
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a rejection, as is evident from the steep drop in anger in the rejection condition.
Relationship to literature and future directions
Previous studies have also addressed the question whether there are individual
determinants of anger and sadness to social rejection. Bushman and Baumeister
(1998) argued that narcissistic egotism is especially predictive of anger and ag-
gression after a rejection. Twenge and Campbell (2003) made a similar point and
argued that narcissism leads to direct and displaced aggression (towards an inno-
cent third party) after a rejection. A study conducted by Sommer and Baumeister
(2002) demonstrated that people with low self-esteem automatically respond to
interpersonal rejection with self-deprecation and withdrawal, whereas those with
high self-esteem tend to react with affirmation and perseverance. Although the
authors did not measure emotional reactions, a parallel can be drawn between
sadness and self-depreciation/withdrawal on the one hand, and between anger and
affirmation/perseverance on the other hand. On a general note, the present study
adds to these findings by showing distinct angry and sad responses to rejection
depending on one’s personality.
Recently Çelik, Lammers, Van Beest, Bekker, and Vonk (2013) showed dis-
tinct sad and angry reactions to different types of social rejection. They proposed
that people judge, accept and reject others based on their evaluations of others’
warmth and competence. Warmth and competence are core dimensions on which
people evaluate others’ personality and behavior. Basically, a warm individual is
considered trustable (i.e. having friendly intentions), while a competent individual
is considered intelligent and efficient (Cuddy et al., 2008). In one of their studies
Çelik, Lammers, et al. (2013) showed that interpreting an ambiguous rejection as
a sign that one lacks warmth primarily elicits sadness, whereas interpreting a re-
jection as a sign that one lacks competence primarily elicits anger. The distinction
that we made in the introduction between obtaining inclusion through trust and
status is closely related to the warmth-competence distinction that Çelik, Lam-
mers, et al. (2013) make. Our findings add to their findings by showing that the
differences in sad and angry reactions in response to being rejected are also related
to individual differences in need for affiliation, i.e. need for warmth. Future re-
search might use an additional measure that assesses individuals’ need for status
as well. We would expect that these needs are inversely related, and such the need
for status would predict anger and sadness in an opposite direction as the need for
affiliation.
Related to the above, individual differences in the need for affiliation and status
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might also be related to differences in how people interpret the reason of a rejec-
tion. Future research could investigate whether individuals with a higher need for
affiliation might be more likely to interpret a rejection as a sign that they are per-
ceived as lacking warmth, whereas individuals with a higher need for status might
be more likely to interpret the same rejection as a sign that they are perceived as
lacking competence.
Finally, according to the Needs threat model (Williams, 2007a, 2007b), a dam-
aged sense of control – one of the most basic human psychological needs – is the
prime cause of anger and aggression after a rejection experience. The model con-
siders that in some cases individuals do not seek reinclusion but simply seek to
reassert control. We agree with this, but we would also like to point out that it
may be important to distinguish between angry responses to rejection and aggres-
sive responses to rejection. While aggression is indeed destructive for oneself and
others, and diminishes one’s chances for reinclusion, a healthy level of anger may
be functional in achieving acceptance through obtaining status. As such, we would
like to distinguish between rejections that elicit adaptive responses (responses that
increase one’s chances for reinclusion) and rejections that elicit non-adaptive re-
sponses (responses that diminish one’s chances for reinclusion). Non-adaptive
responses might be more likely to occur when an individual is not able to make
sense of the rejection, i.e. when the rejection is unfair, unexpected, and no rea-
son is given, because in these cases obtaining reinclusion might seem impossible
to the individual. Note that in our paradigm the rejection implied a reason: the
participants’ self-descriptions that were ostensibly read by their partners, who con-
sequently did not want to meet them. Future research might directly compare the
impact of rejections with and without a reason.
Conclusion
The results in this paper show that rejection can elicit two distinct emotional path-
ways in response to subsequent social threats, depending on individual differences
in sensitivity to others. These findings add to the rejection literature in that they
show that the emotional responses to social rejection are not only a signal of social







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Different reasons for rejection elicit different
emotional responses
This chapter investigates angry and sad responses to rejections that are motivated by
perceptions of lack of warmth, and perceptions of lack of competence. I hypothesized
that rejection due to lack of competence would primarily lead to anger, whereas rejection
due to lack of warmth would primarily lead to sadness. Experiment 2 measured sub-
jective perceptions of competence and warmth judgments after an unspecific rejection.
Experiments 3 and 4 manipulated those perceptions. In all studies, rejection that was
perceived to be the result of lack of competence led primarily to anger, while rejection
that was perceived to be the result of lack of warmth led primarily to sadness. In addi-
tion, Experiment 4 showed that rejection that was perceived to be the result of lack of
competence led primarily to self-enhancing behavior, while rejection that was perceived
to be the result of lack of warmth led primarily to affiliative behaviors.
This chapter is adapted from:
Çelik, P., Lammers, J., Van Beest, I., Bekker, M. H. J., & Vonk, R. (2013). Not all
rejections are alike: The fundamental distinction between competence and warmth in





In the past two decades the phenomenon of social rejection has received a lot of
attention (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009;
Williams, 2001, 2007a, 2007b). Among the most contradictory reactions to rejec-
tion are the emotions that people experience when they are rejected. Rejection can
elicit sadness, but it can also lead to anger (Chow et al., 2008; Richman & Leary,
2009; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Van Beest et al., 2011; Gerber & Wheeler,
2009). The fact that rejection leads to both anger and sadness does not appear
puzzling at first sight. After all, both are negative, unpleasant emotions. How-
ever, looking at these emotions from a functional perspective, it is clear that they
are very different from each other, each with different antecedents and behavioral
consequences (Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Keltner & Gross,
1999; Van Kleef et al., 2010; Zeelenberg et al., 2008).
Specifically, sadness is an emotion that is typically part of a ‘horizontal’ manag-
ing of interpersonal relationships. Showing sadness elicits nurturance from others
(Vingerhoets et al., 2000; Zeifman, 2001). Within the individual it leads to feel-
ings of helplessness that can help to motivate the individual to actively reach out
to others (Gray et al., 2011; Shaver et al., 2001). In contrast, anger is part of a
‘vertical’ managing of interpersonal relationships. It signals dominance and tough-
ness, causing others to concede more quickly (Knutson, 1996; Sinaceur & Tiedens,
2006; Van Beest et al., 2008). Anger is an energizing emotion that motivates the
individual to reassert power and status through competition, or frightening others
into compliance (Kassinove et al., 2002; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Lelieveld et al.,
2012; Shaver et al., 2001; Van Kleef, 2010). In line with this Tiedens et al. (2000)
showed that people expressing anger were perceived as being of higher status than
people expressing sadness. Thus, in many ways anger and sadness are opposites,
or even orthogonal to each other. How can rejection have such opposite effects
on emotions? We propose that if we define rejection beyond the mere fact of be-
ing left out and specify the rejection experience we can account for this seeming
contradiction and obtain a clearer image of the consequences of rejection.
Our basic idea builds on the observation that social rejection is not a capricious
behavior that is the result of people’s impulsiveness; people have a reason for
why they reject others. When we take a closer look at the main manipulation
techniques used to induce feelings of rejection, cyberball (Williams & Jarvis, 2006),
the life alone prognosis paradigm (Baumeister et al., 2002) or the get acquainted
paradigm (Nezlek et al., 1997), they all have in common that subjects do not get
much information regarding the possible reason of rejection. Subjects suddenly no
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longer get the ball passed (in the cyberball paradigm), or they are told that they
will lead a lonely life without friends (in the life alone paradigm). Subjects are
either rejected or not, but they are never told why. Although this of course has the
benefit of testing the ‘pure’ effect of rejection without any additional information,
these manipulations ignore the complexity of the experience of rejection. After
all, in practice people are almost never rejected out of the blue. People accept
and reject others based on specific perceptions and judgments of them (Kurzban
& Leary, 2001). Moreover, when people are the victim of rejection themselves
– especially when there is no apparent reason – they will also think about the
possible judgments and perceptions that their rejecters have about them.
Rejection is thus a highly social phenomenon where interpersonal perceptions
and meta-perceptions on why this rejection occurred play a key role. In the current
chapter we aim to demonstrate that people’s perceptions of the reasons why they
are rejected critically shape their emotional reactions. We expect that if people
are rejected, they are highly motivated to find out why. This idea is supported by
the fact that when people are ignored for no apparent reason, they either assume
inadequacies in one’s self, attribute intent to the rejecter, or look for mitigating
circumstances (Geller, Goodstein, Silver, & Sternberg, 1974). Social rejection
often leads to a drop in self-esteem, suggesting that people worry about how they
look in the eyes of their rejecter and others (Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001; Van
Beest & Williams, 2011; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004).
We propose here that perceptions about the reasons of social rejection can be
best understood by relying on the distinction between interpersonal warmth and
competence. In social perception literature, warmth and competence are seen as
core and universal components of interpersonal perception (Cuddy et al., 2008;
Fiske et al., 2007). When people evaluate individuals on competence they rely on
characteristics such as skill, creativity, intelligence, foresight and competitiveness,
whereas when they evaluate individuals on warmth they rely on characteristics
such as friendliness, sincerity, helpfulness, trustworthiness and cooperativeness.
The distinction between these two domains goes back many decennia, and was first
described referring to the orthogonal axes of circumplex models (Leary, 1957). The
vertical axe reflects hierarchical relations involving rank and status whereas the
horizontal axe reflects communal relations involving love and affiliation (Kiesler,
1983; Wiggins, 1979; Wiggins & Broughton, 1985). These axes since then have
been variously labeled as power vs. love, agency vs. communion or dominance
vs. affiliation. Despite the different labels, research suggests a substantial overlap
between these conceptual opposites (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). The dominant
labeling in contemporary research is competence vs. warmth. Recent studies
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have shown that people everywhere differentiate each other by liking (warmth,
trusting) and respecting (competence, efficiency). Moreover, 82% of the variance
in everyday perceptions of others can be accounted for by judgments pertaining
to competence and warmth (Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski,
1998).
In the current chapter, we aim to demonstrate that perceptions of warmth and
competence judgments lye at the core of the rejection experience by showing very
specific and meaningful effects of social rejection on emotions. We base our reason-
ing on the notion that the functional aspects of emotions typically observed after
social rejection – anger and sadness – converge with the vertical and horizontal
aspects of relationships that underlie the warmth-competence model. Based on
the notion that individuals will always seek to understand their social environ-
ment (Kelley, 1973) and will think about ways to undo or repair what has been
damaged by the rejection, we expect that rejection that is (perceived to be) due to
lack of warmth should lead to distinct emotional reactions compared to rejection
that is (perceived to be) due to lack of competence.
Predictions
Specifically, we propose that, if rejected participants perceive that those who re-
jected them believe they lack warmth, they should primarily experience sadness,
while if they perceive that their rejection is due to their lack of competence, they
should primarily experience anger. This reasoning follows from a socialfunctional
account of emotions as a means of coordinating social interactions and relationships
to meet specific problems (Averill, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). A rejection
based on lack of warmth is basically a message that one is not liked. This is asso-
ciated with the appraisal that one cannot do much about this judgment; whether
one is liked or not is outside one’s control and may even induce a sense of helpless-
ness. The consequence is that the individual will seek the specific type of social
resource that will reduce this sense of helplessness. We argue that sadness is an
appropriate response because it evokes sympathy from others. Sadness signals to
the outside world that one is a warm person and in turn elicits the kind of social
support that was damaged by this type of rejection (Vingerhoets et al., 2000; Zeif-
man, 2001). Participants should not experience much anger, because anger does
not signal warmth. In fact, prior research has shown that it may even undermine
social support (Lelieveld et al., 2012; Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009).
Importantly, we do not contend that anger will be totally absent, but this emotion
will mainly emerge because rejections are often perceived as unfair (Lind & Tyler,
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1988).
Conversely, we propose that if participants perceive that their rejection is
caused by the fact that those who rejected them believe they lack competence,
they should primarily experience anger. A lack of competence means that others
are better and higher in rank, which should elicit the desire to compete. We know
from previous research that anger is specically functional in restoring competence
and status anger not only motivates and orients the individual towards action, but
also causes others to concede more quickly (Kassinove et al., 2002; Tiedens, 2001;
Van Kleef, 2010). Participants should experience less sadness, because sadness is
associated with passivity and inhibition (Shaver et al., 2001) and is therefore a
poor aid in restoring competence and status (Tiedens, 2001). Again, we do not
contend that sadness will be totally absent in reaction to a (perceived) competence
rejection, but this emotion will be mainly directed at individuals who are perceived
as supportive in regaining competence, e.g. good friends or family. People will not
show sadness towards the ones who are perceived as the ‘competition’. In sum, we
propose that social rejection should lead to two fundamentally opposite emotional
reactions, depending on whether that rejection is perceived to be due to lack of
warmth or due to lack of competence.
Overview of studies
We tested these predictions in three studies. In Experiment 2 we measured the
perception of an unspecific rejection. That is, in this study, a confederate, for un-
clear reasons, rejected the participant. The rejection was accompanied by mildly
negative warmth and competence judgments, ostensibly coming from the confeder-
ate. We then measured how the target of the rejection perceived those judgments.
We expected that these perceptions would differentially predict feelings of sadness
and anger in the participant. In the next two studies we manipulated the per-
ception of rejection. In Experiment 3, participants were rejected by an ostensible
other participant, but now unambiguously. The participant was either rejected for
lacking competence, or for lacking warmth (in the eyes of the other participant), or
was not rejected. In Experiment 4, we used a selective recall manipulation. Par-
ticipants either recalled an experience of being rejected due to lack of competence,
or due to lack of warmth.
45
Experiment 2
In this study participants were rejected for ambiguous and unclear reasons (or were
accepted), by an ostensible other participant, in reality a confederate. Participants
read simple numerical evaluations of 5 competence and 5 warmth traits presented
in random order, ostensibly filled in by the other participant. Importantly, we did
not tell our participants explicitly that they were judged on these traits, nor that
these were traits were related to competence and warmth. Our main assumption
was that participants would use this information to make sense of the rejection and
that this sense-making would be evident from how they remembered the evaluation
in hind sight. We used the degree to which warmth and competence ratings were
remembered as lower than actual as an indicator of how strongly the participant
believed that he or she was rejected because of lack of warmth and/or competence
(for a similar procedure see, Gotlib, 1983). We expected that the more participants
perceived they were rejected because of lack of competence (i.e. the more they
remembered the competence ratings to be lower than they were in reality) the
angrier they would be, whereas the more they perceived they were rejected because
of lack of warmth (i.e. the more they remembered the warmth ratings to be lower
than they were in reality), the sadder they would be.
Method
Participants and design
In return for course credit, 60 first year psychology students of Tilburg University
(57 women; Mage= 19.68 years; SDage= 1.79) were randomly assigned to one of
two experimental conditions (rejection vs. no rejection).
Procedure
Participants were briefly introduced to a female confederate1 and were told that
they would participate in a study about first impressions. During this brief meet-
ing the confederate made some short neutral remarks. To set the stage for the
rejection manipulation, participants were told that they would meet their partner
(the confederate) for an interview in a second, unrelated study, but that both
would first indicate their impressions of each other (as part of the first study).
The participant and confederate were then seated in individual adjacent cubicles
within hearing range, where both the participant and confederate were instructed
to rate their partner on ten traits according to their first impression. Five of these
1The confederate was always the same person.
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traits were related to warmth (likeable, sympathetic, trustworthy, nice, and kind)
and five to competence (wise, sensible, has a valuable opinion, can be taken seri-
ously, has something useful to say) (Cuddy et al., 2008). Participants were asked
how much they thought each trait fitted their partner on a scale between 1 and
10, with the option to give half marks (e.g. 5.5). We chose this 10 point scale
because it corresponds to the standard Dutch educational grading system (where
everything below 6 is a fail grade) and thus ensured strong evaluative associations.
After about 5 minutes, the experimenter collected participants’ rating form and
handed them the ratings that the confederate had supposedly completed at the
same time about them. In reality all participants received the same ratings that
were prepared in advance. Thus all participants received the same grades inde-
pendent of experimental condition. These ratings ranged between 4.5 and 8. In
the Dutch system, an 8 equals a score that is very good, while a 4.5 equals a score
that would be a clear fail-grade. On both the warmth and competence domains,
the mean rating was 7 (which equals a B or B+ in the US). On both domains
there were low (4.5) and high (8) ratings, to ensure that a rejection on either trait
would be seen as realistic and believable. Note that these traits were presented in
randomized order and were not explicitly labeled with competence and warmth to
ensure the ambivalent nature of the evaluation.
Rejection manipulation. Next, participants in the rejection condition heard
the confederate (in the adjacent cubicle) loudly express to the experimenter her
unwillingness to continue with the interview, pack her belongings and leave. The
confederate made no explicit reference to the participant, to create doubt about
whether the participant was personally rejected or not. We assumed that this
would especially trigger the participant to look for possible explanations, and
examine all available information closely; in this case the peronality ratings os-
tensibly made by their partner. The experimenter then apologized and explained
to the participant that their partner had left unexpectedly without giving further
explanation, but that she did fill out the rating form, and asked whether the partic-
ipant still wanted to continue with the study. All participants indicated that they
wanted to continue. Participants in the control condition did not hear anything
of the above, so they remained under the assumption that they would still meet
their partner. The experimenter then handed the rating form to the participant
and left the cubicle (saying she would get the next set of questionnaires) so that
participants could view the ratings in private. After about 20 seconds the experi-
menter returned to the participant with a booklet containing the main dependent
measures. Before leaving the cubicle she collected all other materials, including
the ratings supposedly given by the confederate.
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Measures
First, we measured our main dependent variables, sadness and anger, by asking
participants to rate their (dis)agreement with two statements: “I feel sad” and
“I feel angry” on two 7-point scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (7).
Next, we measured how participants perceived the rejection experience by ask-
ing them to remember as best as possible the trait ratings they received from the
confederate (i.e. the traits related to competence and warmth). Under the guise
of a study on memory, all participants were asked to recall and write down the
10 ratings that the confederate had previously given them, on an empty rating
form that included the same traits as shown before (likeable, sensible, etc.). Note
that the form containing the ratings was previously collected by the experimenter.
Hence, participants had to guess. For our main analyses we computed difference
scores separately for the warmth and competence items by subtracting the actual
ratings from the recalled ratings, which resulted in 5 difference scores for each
domain. These difference scores were then summed into two composite variables –
recall of warmth ratings and recall of competence ratings – with 0-scores indicating
correct recall, negative scores indicating a lower than actual rating, and positive
scores indicating a higher than actual rating.
Next, as a manipulation check, we asked all participants in the rejection condi-
tion whether they had heard the confederate express the unwillingness to continue
cooperating in the next part of the study. All participants indicated that they in
fact had. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Preliminary analyses
To make sure that our results were not due to differences in partner evaluations,
we first checked whether participants differed in how they rated their partners
depending on condition. Note that these ratings were collected before the rejection
experience and hence we expected no difference between conditions. This was
indeed the case, there was no difference between conditions in how participants
rated their partner on warmth and competence, t(58)= -.84, p= .403. Overall,
participants had a favorable opinion about their partner, with a mean rating of
7.6 on a scale from 1 to 10 (SD= 0.57).
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Effects on emotions
To test our main predictions, we ran two regression analyses. Specifically, we
expected that, compared to respondents in the control condition, in the rejec-
tion condition sadness scores would be exclusively predicted by meta-perceptions
of lack of warmth (i.e. a more negative recall of warmth item ratings), whereas
anger scores would be exclusively predicted by meta-perceptions of lack of com-
petence (i.e. a more negative recall of competence item ratings). In both regres-
sion analyses we entered as predictors Condition (rejection= 0.5; acceptance= -
0.5), Warmth-perception (composite mean of recalled warmth ratings minus actual
warmth ratings), Competence-perception (composite mean of recalled competence
ratings minus actual competence ratings) and their interactions with condition.
For ease of interpretation of the interaction effects, and to reduce multicollinear-
ity, we standardized the Warmth-perception and Competence-perception before
computing the interaction terms with Condition (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). For
subsequent simple slope analyses we created new variables for Warmth-perception
and Competence-perception at one 1 standard deviation above, and 1 standard
deviation below their respective means.
Sadness is predicted by perceptions of lack of warmth. As expected, sadness
scores were only predicted by the Condition × Warmth interaction, B= -0.76, SE=
0.39, t= -1.93, p= .058. The Condition × competence perception interaction was
not significant (B= 0.40, SE= 0.38, t= 1.04 p= .305), and neither were there
any main effects of Condition (B= -0.01, SE= 0.37, t= -0.02, p= .988), warmth
perception (B= -0.16, SE= 0.20, t= -0.79, p= .432) or competence perception






Figure 3.1: A lower warmth interpretation is associated with higher sadness in the
rejection condition (Experiment 2).
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Simple slope analyses revealed that in the rejection condition warmth percep-
tion was negatively related to feelings of sadness B= -0.54, SE= 0.26, t= -2.06,
p= .044; the lower the recall scores of the warmth items were, the higher the
sadness scores were in the rejection condition. In the control condition there was
no relationship between warmth perception and sadness, B= 0.23, SE= 0.30, t=
0.76, p= .449. This means that after a rejection sadness is only predicted by
perceptions of lack of warmth, but not by perceptions of lack of competence.
Anger is predicted by perceptions of lack of competence. The same analysis,
this time with anger scores as the dependent variable, revealed that anger scores
were only predicted by a significant Rejection × Competence-perception effect,
B= -1.07, SE= 0.47, t= -2.29, p= .026. The Condition × Warmth interaction
was not significant (B= -0.40, SE= 0.48, t= -0.83, p= .408). Again, we found
no main effects of Condition (B= -0.20, SE= 0.45, t= -0.44, p= .66), warmth
perception (B= -0.05, SE= 0.24, t= -0.22, p= .825) or competence perception





Figure 3.2: A lower competence interpretation is associated with anger in the
rejection condition (Experiment 2).
Simple slope analyses now showed that in the rejection condition competence-
perception was negatively related to feelings of anger, B= -0.62, SE= 0.31, t=
-2.01, p= .049; The lower the recall scores of the competence items were, the higher
the anger scores were in the rejection condition. In the control condition there was
no relationship between competence-perception and anger, B= 0.45, SE= 0.35,
t= 1.28, p= .21. This means that after a rejection anger is only predicted by
perceptions of lack of competence, but not by perceptions of lack of warmth.
50
Post-hoc analyses
We also checked whether memory was affected by condition. A 2 × 2 (Condition
[between: rejection, acceptance] × Recall [within: competence, warmth]) between–
within mixed ANOVA revealed no main effect of Condition F (1, 58)= 1.60, p=
.211, nor a Condition × Recall effect, F (1, 58)= 1.09, p= .302. This means
that rejection did not affect memory; between conditions participants were fairly
equal in how they remembered the warmth and competence ratings. We did
find a non-interesting main effect of Recall, F (1, 58)= 18.86, p< .001, η2p= .245,
showing that participants underestimated competence ratings (M = -1.54, SD=
2.03) more than warmth ratings (M = -0.29, SD= 1.66). This makes sense, given
that our participants were students and therefore perhaps more pre-occupied with
competence than with warmth.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 showed that exposing participants to an ambiguous
rejection experience is related to different emotional reactions, depending on why
participants thought they were rejected; the part of the rejection that participants
attributed to lack of warmth, uniquely predicted sadness, whereas the part of the
rejection that participants attributed to lack of competence uniquely predicted
anger. These results could not be explained by memory, as participants who were
rejected did not make more or less mistakes in remembering the ratings they
received. Yet these results rely on observing (random) differences in perceptions
of competence and warmth. To gather more direct, causal evidence, Experiment
3 therefore manipulated the type of rejection.
Experiment 3
In this study, participants were exposed to a warmth or competence rejection
manipulation, or to an acceptance condition. They read an unambiguous clear
reason of why they were rejected, ostensibly by another participant. In reality
there was no other participant. The experimental set up was similar to our previous
study, however this time participants received negative evaluations either on all
of the warmth traits, or on all of the competence traits, while in the acceptance
condition participants received positive evaluations on all traits. We expected that
a rejection due to lack of competence would lead to anger (and less to sadness);
while a rejection due to lack of warmth would lead to sadness (and less to anger).
Furthermore, in the present study we sought to increase the reliability of our
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measurement of anger and sadness by including additional externalizing (anger-
related) and internalizing (sadness-related) emotion items.
Note that we did not hypothesize on differences between the two types of
rejection, e.g. whether a rejection due to lack of warmth would lead to more
sadness and less anger than a rejection due to competence. Our main point is
that within the two types of rejection, one type of emotion will be more prominent
than the other one.
Method
Participants and design
In return for course credit, 67 first year psychology students of Tilburg univer-
sity (55 women; Mage= 19.30 years, SDage= 2.92) were randomly assigned to one
of three experimental conditions (competence rejection, warmth rejection, accep-
tance).
Procedure
Participants were told that they were participating in a study on indirect impres-
sion formation that investigated the ways in which impressions were formed in the
absence of face-to-face interaction. They were told that their (ostensible) partner
was already working in a different cubicle (in this study there was no confederate
physically present). It was explained that they would exchange written informa-
tion with each other, which they would use to form an impression of each other
(for a similar procedure see, Mallott, Maner, DeWall, & Schmidt, 2009). To make
the rejection manipulation possible participants were told that they could meet
their partner afterwards if desired.
Next, participants started working (in individual cubicles) on the forms that
would ostensibly be delivered to their partner by the experimenter as part of the
study on impression formation. They received a booklet containing a bogus per-
sonality test and bogus open ended questions about four hypothetical but realistic
social situations. We included these items to boost realism of the experiment
(i.e. that participants could form an actual opinion of each other, on the basis of
which they could either reject or not). Participants believed that their partner was
already filling out the same booklet. After about 10 minutes (during which par-
ticipants had ample time to complete the booklet) the experimenter collected the
booklet, supposedly brought it to the partner and came back delivering the book-
let that was supposedly filled out by their partner, together with an empty rating
form. The rating form contained the same ten warmth and competence items used
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in Experiment 2. The experimenter instructed participants to carefully read the
information their partner had provided them and then indicate their impression
of their partner using the rating form. Similar to procedures in Experiment 2, all
items on the form were randomized and completed on a scale between 1 and 10.
Rejection manipulation. Next, participants were asked to indicate whether
they wanted to meet their partner, with a “yes-no” checkbox. In addition, par-
ticipants were given the option to write a short personal message to explain their
choice, if desired. After about 5 minutes, the experimenter picked up participants’
ratings about their partner and gave them the rating form that their partner had
supposedly completed about them.
In both rejection conditions, participants read that their partner did not want
to meet them. In addition, in the rejection due to lack of competence condition
the form contained negative ratings (scores between 4 and 5) on all competence
traits and positive ratings (scores between 7 and 8) on all warmth traits. In the
rejection due to lack of warmth condition, the ratings were in the opposite direc-
tion: the competence ratings were positive and the warmth ratings were negative.
We avoided extremely low and extremely high ratings to bolster credibility. In
addition to this, in the rejection due to lack of competence (warmth) condition,
their partner had supposedly written in the optional space for personal messages:
“You seem a very warm and likeable (intelligent and competent) person
to me! But on the other hand, you don’t come across as very clever
(friendly), sorry!”
In the control condition, the checkbox indicated that the partner wanted to meet
the participant. Also, the form contained positive ratings (between 7 and 8)
on both the competence and warmth traits. Attached was a personal message,
supposedly written by the participant’s partner that said:
“You seem a very intelligent and likeable person to me. I would like to
meet you!”
Measures
After participants read how their partner evaluated them and that their partner
was or was not interested in meeting them afterwards, we measured sadness (sad,
gloomy, plaintive, down & lonely; α= .93) and anger (angry, irritated, insulted,
annoyed & hostile; α= .85). Participants were asked to rate their (dis)agreement
with each emotion on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (7). Next, to check that participants had noticed the manipulation, they
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were asked to report their partner’s choice (whether to meet or not). Finally, to
be able to control for the possibility that differences in emotional reactions could
be due to differences in how upset participants felt by the two types of rejection,
we asked them “How do you feel about your partner’s choice?” and “How do you
feel about the evaluation you received from your partner” both on a 7-point Likert
scale between very happy (1), don’t care (4) and very upset (7) (r= .80, p< .001).
All participants were thanked and debriefed after finishing.
Results
Preliminary analyses
All participants successfully indicated the correct answer to the question about
their partner’s choice (i.e. all participants in the rejection conditions indicated
that their partner did not want to meet, while all participants in the acceptance
condition indicated that their partner did want to meet them). We also checked
for possible differences between the rejection and acceptance conditions regarding
participants’ ratings of their partners. As in Experiment 2, these ratings were
collected before the rejection experience. We found no difference between the
rejection and inclusion conditions, t(64)= -1.57, p= .122. Overall, participants had
a favorable opinion about their partner. Mean ratings of warmth and competence
were 7.8 on a scale from 1 to 10 (SD= 0.59). Furthermore, 94% of all participants
indicated that they wanted to meet their partner after the experiment. We did
not exclude participants who did not want to meet their partner as this did not
affect our results.
Second, we checked whether the two rejection types were equally upsetting.
An ANOVA with Condition (competence, warmth, acceptance) as the indepen-
dent variable and the degree to which participants were upset as the dependent
variable, revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F (2, 64)= 100.50, p<
.001, η2p= .760. Simple comparisons showed that participants felt much more upset
in both rejection conditions (Mcompetence= 4.67, SDcompetence= 0.78; Mwarmth=
4.82, SDwarmth= 0.78), compared to the acceptance condition (M = 2.04, SD=
0.69), F (1, 64)= 200.26, p< .001, η2p= .760. Importantly, the two rejection con-
ditions did not differ in the degree to which participants were upset, F (1, 64)=
0.44, p= .510, η2p= .007.
Effects on emotions
Our main prediction was that we expected more sadness than anger in the rejection
due to lack of warmth condition, and more anger than sadness in the rejection
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due to lack of competence condition. A 2 × 2 (Condition [between: warmth,
competence, acceptance] x Emotions [within: sadness, anger]) between–within
mixed ANOVA revealed the expected Condition × Emotions interaction, F (2,
64)= 7.64, p< .001, η2p= .190. As expected, simple within-group comparisons
revealed that participants who were rejected because of lack of warmth reported
significantly higher levels of sadness (M = 3.02, SD=1.47) than anger (M = 2.53,
SD= 1.07), F (1, 64)= 3.67, p= .04, η2p= .054. Conversely, participants who were
rejected because of lack of competence reported higher levels of anger (M = 3.35,
SD=1.16) than sadness (M = 2.45, SD= 1.46), F (1, 64)= 11.66, p= .001, η2p=
.154. Participants who were not rejected reported equal levels of sadness (M =
1.31, SD= 0.54) and anger (M = 1.19, SD= 0.35), F (1, 64)= 0.23, p= .636. See
Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Differences between levels of sadness and anger depending on the rea-
son of the rejection. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean (Experiment
3).
Additionally, we also performed between-group comparisons. These analyses
showed that anger scores were significantly higher in the rejection due to lack of
competence condition compared to the rejection due to lack of warmth condition,
F (1, 64)= 8.70, p= .004, η2p= .120, and acceptance condition F (1, 64)= 62.16,
p< .001, η2p= .490. Also, sadness scores were significantly higher in the warmth
rejection condition compared to the acceptance condition, F (1, 64)= 22.60, p<
.001, η2p= .261, but the difference with the competence rejection condition did not
reach significance, F (1, 64)= 2.27, p= .136.
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Discussion
Experiment 3 supported our predictions and showed that participants who expe-
rienced a rejection due to lack of warmth reported higher levels of sadness than
anger, whereas participants who experienced a rejection due to lack of competence
reported higher levels of anger than sadness. By using a very explicit form of re-
jection that exclusively signalled either warmth or competence as the reason for
the rejection we were able to tease apart the effects of both types of rejection on
emotional reactions.
Experiments 2 and 3 were based on established methods in inducing rejec-
tion. However, one could note that in these studies emotions were measured in
a situation that participants did not anticipate to be excluded and were perhaps
somewhat surprised. Therefore in Experiment 4 we used a different manipula-
tion. More specifically, we asked participants to remember a situation in the past
in which they were either rejected due to lack of competence or due to lack of
warmth.
Experiment 4
In this study we sought to extend our findings by using a different type of ma-
nipulation. We asked individuals about actual competence and warmth-related
rejections that they experienced in the past. Moreover, in the current study we
also expanded the way we assessed emotional responses by asking participants to
remember their emotions directly after the rejection, and after one day of reflec-
tion. We had no direct hypotheses regarding this, but wondered whether emotional
responses might change over time. Finally, the present study adds to our previous
studies by focusing on behavioral coping as well. Specifically, following our rea-
soning in the introduction – that rejected individuals will ultimately try to undo
the consequences of the rejection – we expected that rejection due to perceived
lack of warmth should lead to increased affiliative behavior, whereas rejection due
to perceived lack of competence should lead to increased self-enhancing behavior.
Method
Participants and design
In return for course credit, 52 first year psychology students of Tilburg University
(48 women; Mage= 19.80, SDage= 1.97 years) were randomly assigned to one
of two experimental conditions (competence rejection, warmth rejection). In this
experiment we had no inclusion-condition.
56
Procedure
Participants were seated in separate cubicles and were told that the study was
about how people cope with rejection. Participants were given an empty sheet
of paper with 15 lines and were asked to write about a personal experience of
rejection; half were asked to write about an experience that was due to lack of
competence, the other half about a rejection that was due to lack of warmth.
Measures
After the writing task, participants were first asked to indicate what they thought
the reason for rejection was, as a manipulation check. Specifically they did so with
a checkbox containing two options: “I was rejected because I was not nice enough”
and “I was rejected because I was not competent enough”.
Next, we measured sadness and anger using the same two five-item scales that
we used in Experiment 3, again all on 7-point scales ranging between strongly
disagree (1) and strongly agree (7). Importantly, participants now rated each
item twice. Specifically, they were first asked how they felt immediately after the
rejection and then how they felt one day after the rejection. Reliability of these
scales was good: immediate sadness, α= .88; delayed sadness, α= .96; immediate
anger, α= .81; delayed anger, α= .84.
Next, we measured people’s behavioral coping responses to the rejection. Af-
filiative behavioral coping was measured with the items “I tried to be with other
people more” and “I tried to show that I am a fun and nice person” (r= .46, p<
.001). Self-enhancing behavioral coping was measured with “I made an effort to
prove myself” and “I tried to show that I am a competent person” (r= .72, p<
.001). Both items were administered with 7-point scales ranging from strongly
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Finally, to be able to rule out the alternative explanation that emotional reac-
tions are due to possible differences in how fair participants thought the rejection
was, we asked participants how fair they thought the rejection was on a 7 point
scale ranging from very fair (1) to very unfair (7).
Results
Preliminary analyses
Six participants did not follow experimental instructions and indicated on the di-
chotomous item used as the manipulation check that they wrote about the opposite
type of exclusion than was specified. We excluded these participants from further
analyses.
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To control for the possibility that our results are due to different evaluations
of how fair participants thought the rejection was, we conducted an ANOVA with
rejection (competence vs. warmth) as the independent variable and perceived
fairness as the dependent variable and. This analysis revealed that there was no
difference in perceived fairness between a rejection due to lack of competence (M =
4.64, SD= 1.47) and a rejection due to lack of warmth (M = 5.13, SD= 1.62), F (1,
50)= 1.26, p= .267, η2p= .025.
Effects on immediate emotions
A 2 × 2 (Rejection [between: competence, warmth] × Emotion [within: sadness,
anger]) between–within mixed ANOVA on the immediate emotion measure re-
vealed a marginally significant Rejection × Emotion interaction effect, F (1, 50)=
3.30, p= .075, η2p= .062. See Figure 3.4, left pane. Within-group simple compar-
isons showed that participants in the rejection due to lack of warmth condition
reported higher sadness (M = 5.56, SD= 1.11) than anger (M = 4.73, SD= 1.28),
F (1, 50)= 8.22, p= .006, η2p= .141. Participants in the competence rejection con-
dition did not report more anger (M = 4.85, SD= 1.20) than sadness (M = 4.97,
SD= 0.98), F (1, 50)= 0.18, p= .673. Between-group comparisons showed that
sadness was significantly higher in the rejection due to lack of warmth condition
compared to the rejection due to lack of competence condition, F (1, 50)= 4.19,
p= .046, η2p= .077. Anger did not differ significantly between the two conditions,
F (1, 50)= 0.13, p= .722.
Figure 3.4: Differences between levels of sadness and anger in response to a recalled
competence and warmth rejection, immediately (left figure) and one day after the
rejection (right figure) (Experiment 4).
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Effects on delayed emotions
A second 2 × 2 (Rejection [between: competence, warmth] × Emotion [within:
sadness, anger]) between–within mixed ANOVA on the delayed emotion measure,
revealed again a marginally significant Rejection × Emotion interaction effect, F (1,
50)= 3.48, p= .068, η2p= .065. See Figure 3.4, right pane. Within-group simple
comparisons now showed that participants in the competence rejection condition
reported significantly higher anger (M = 3.80, SD= 1.33) than sadness (M = 2.97,
SD= 1.35), F (1, 50)= 5.79, p= .020, η2p= .104. Participants in the warmth re-
jection condition now did not report more sadness (M = 4.44, SD= 1.68) than
anger (M = 4.33, SD= 1.53), F (1, 50)= 0.10, p= .753. Between-group compar-
isons showed that sadness was significantly higher in the rejection due to lack of
warmth condition, compared to the rejection due to lack of competence condi-
tion, F (1, 50)= 12.04, p= .001, η2p= .194. Anger again did not differ significantly
between the two conditions, F (1, 50)= 1.75, p= .192.
Effects on behavioral coping
A 2 × 2 (Rejection [between: competence, warmth] × Behavior [within: affiliative
behavior, self-enhancing behavior]) between–within mixed ANOVA yielded the
expected Rejection × Behavior interaction effect, F (1, 50)= 5.27, p= .026, η2p=
.096. However, non of the simple comparisons reached significance, except for a
marginally significant effect of condition for affiliative behavior, F (1, 50)= 3.56,
p= .026, η2p= .066. Affiliative behavior appeared higher among participants who
recalled a warmth rejection (M = 4.44, SD= 1.20), compared to participants who
recalled a competence rejection (M = 3.70, SD= 1.57). See Figure 3.5.
Discussion
In this study, using a selective recall manipulation, we found temporal differences
in sad and angry reactions to recalled warmth and competence rejections. Sadness
(more than anger) appeared to be an immediate reaction to rejection due to lack of
warmth, while anger (more than sadness) appeared to be a more delayed reaction
to rejection due to lack of competence. It has to be noted that, although anger was
higher than sadness in the competence rejection (as recalled for one day after the
rejection), it was not higher than in the warmth rejection condition. It is possible
that when people have to rely on their memory they have more difficulty teasing
apart when they exactly felt which emotion. Compared to online reports on emo-
tions, retrospective reports on emotions can be more biased due to their relatively
higher semantic and decontextualized nature (Robinson & Barrett, 2010; Robin-
59
Figure 3.5: Differences between self-reported affiliative behavior and self-assertive
behavior after a real life competence and warmth rejection. Error bars indicate
standard error of the mean (Experiment 4).
son & Clore, 2002). Nonetheless, for both warmth and competence rejections the
expected emotion patterns emerged – for warmth immediately after the rejection,
and for competence one day after the rejection. Finally, although tentative because
the effect was only marginally significant, the present study extended beyond the
previous studies by showing an effect on behavioural coping: a warmth-rejection
seemed to increased affiliative behaviour more than a competence-rejection.
General Discussion
Three studies consistently show that perceptions of warmth and competence judg-
ments in social rejection explain the emotional reactions to rejection. In Exper-
iment 2 a confederate rejected (or accepted) participants for ambiguous reasons
(suggesting it was due to either lack of warmth or lack of competence). Among
those who were rejected, misperceptions of incompetence predicted anger, and
misperceptions of coldness (lack of warmth) predicted sadness. Among those who
were not rejected these effects were absent. In Experiment 3 and 4 we manipulated
perceptions of competence and warmth judgments. In Experiment 3, participants
who were explicitly rejected because they were not warm enough were more sad
than angry, while participants who were explicitly rejected because they were not
competent enough were more angry then sad. The same effect occurred when
people were reminded of such experiences in Experiment 4. Participants recalled
reacting with higher (immediate) sadness to a warmth-based rejection, and with
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higher (delayed) anger to a competence-based rejection.
It is striking to what degree a warmth-rejection selectively increased feelings
of sadness and not feelings of anger – especially in Experiment 3. After all, in
Experiment 3 participants did not have any meaningful exchange with their sup-
posed partner, whom they did not even meet, and whose behavior was scripted
and purely determined by experimental condition. The rejection thus objectively
lacked any legitimacy; participants were objectively not colder or warmer than any
other participant. Hence, participants could have concluded that their partner’s
behavior was more indicative of his/her prejudice and arrogance, than of their
own (lack of) warmth or competence. Objectively, the warmth-rejection showed
that the confederate is a smug. It did not tell anything about the participant.
Yet despite all this, respondents reacted by showing primarily sadness. Why were
they not angrier? These results can be explained by going back to our theoretical
model. They make sense from a functional perspective on emotions. Our findings
are even more compelling considering recent research suggesting that women are
ascribed higher warmth and men are ascribed higher competence (Fiske, Cuddy,
Glick, & Xu, 2002). One could hypothesize that women should be more upset
by warmth rejections than competence rejections (the opposite holds for men),
due to socialization processes. However, note that our sample consisted mainly of
women and still we found strong reactions on competence rejections in the pre-
dicted direction. Thus despite specific gender roles that prescribe anger as a less
acceptable emotion for women than for men, a competence rejection still leads to
considerable levels of anger among our female participants. These findings are in
line with social-functional accounts of emotions as a means of coordinating social
interactions and relationships (Averill, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008); sadness
evokes sympathy in others and is ultimately directed at restoring likeability and
warmth, while anger evokes fear in others and is ultimately directed at restoring
respect and status (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Shaver et al.,
2001; Tiedens, 2001). Our findings demonstrate that in a rejection situation peo-
ple are very sensitive to information that may indicate that they are seen as either
incompetent or cold. Even when this information is presented without explicit
labels (as in Experiments 2 & 3), it is quickly processed and seems to effortlessly
lead to the discrete emotional reactions that, we assume, may be functional in
that setting. In sum, responses to social exclusion seem to fit in the toolbox of
automaticity that allows us to efficiently and effortlessly navigate the social world
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).
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Strengths and limitations
We believe that the three studies reported here offer converging validity for our
predictions, due to their different methodologies. The advantage of Experiment
2 was that participants were never explicitly asked why they thought they were
rejected. Neither were they told that they may lack warmth or competence. In
fact, the words warmth and competence were never mentioned. Participants were
all given exactly the same ratings on traits such as likeable and sympathetic,
and on traits such as wise and sensible. Simply by inferring their perceptions, by
looking at the recalling errors that participants made, we were able to predict their
emotional reactions. In comparison, Experiments 3 and 4 offered the advantage
of experimental control. Here, we unambiguously induced either a rejection due
to lack of warmth, or a rejection due to lack of competence. Between these two
studies, Experiment 3 had the advantage that it offered the highest experimental
control, while Experiment 4 offered the advantage of measuring the effects of
actual experiences of rejection, occurring outside the lab, without confounding
these effects with expectancy violations. Despite the this variety in experimental
techniques, all studies showed the same basic effect: the emotional effects of social
rejection crucially depend on how that rejection is perceived; as due to lack of
warmth, or as due to lack of competence.
A potential limitation is that we focused on emotions and recalled behaviour
as dependent variables. We did not measure actual behavior. However, our main
aim was to show that social rejection at the level of emotions has an initial ‘cor-
rective’ effect on individuals (at least in healthy individuals); individuals who are
rejected because they are (seen as) cold experience emotions directed at becoming
and being seen as nicer individuals, whereas individuals who are rejected because
they are (seen as) incompetent experience emotions directed at becoming and be-
ing seen as more competent. This is an important finding because it puts the
idea that rejection leads to anti-social behavior in perspective (see also, Elshout,
Van Beest, & Nelissen, 2012). Additional research is needed to identify the condi-
tions under which these initial emotional responses to rejection result in adaptive
and inadaptive behaviors, such as making amends (adaptive) vs. becoming overly
dependent and needy (inadaptive) in case of sadness, or working harder (adaptive)
vs. using excessive aggression to be recognized (inadaptive) in case of anger.
One might contend that in real life rejections are often for both reasons. Future
research could focus on this issue. Our first study reflects real life experiences of
rejection quite well, in that both reasons for rejection were equally possible. As
one would expect, we found a mixture of anger and sadness. However, with statis-
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tical modeling it became apparent that these emotions have different antecedents
in terms of appraisal of the rejection. Regardless of antecedents of these emotions
it is interesting to speculate about emotional and behavioural responses following
a rejection on both dimensions. Would people perhaps feel powerless as they are
negatively evaluated on both dimensions, and would this perhaps lead to aggres-
sion? Another interesting question is whether it would make a difference if the
reason for rejection is not made explicit, and people have to rely on their gut feel-
ing. Because in daily life people not always verbalize their reasons for rejecting
or ignoring someone it would be interesting to see whether people can also distin-
guish between competence and warmth rejections when the message is conveyed
non-verbally.
Finally, we have exclusively focused on anger and sadness. We did so by ex-
plicitly using the items anger and sadness in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3
we expanded our anger measurement with other externalizing emotions (hostility,
annoyance, irritation and insult), and our sadness measurement with other inter-
nalizing emotions (gloomy, plaintive, down and lonely). But emotions that are on a
different dimension than the internalizing-externalizing dimension, for example on
the approach-avoidance dimension, could be equally interesting to investigate. For
example the emotion of fear elicits approach-based responses from others (Marsh,
Ambady, & Kleck, 2005) and as such would be expected to follow after a warmth
rejection. This is an interesting venue for future research.
Relationship to literature
The present work adds to previous lines of research that have distinguished between
different experiences of rejection. For example the Multi-motive model (Richman
& Leary, 2009) specifies parameters in the broader social circumstances surround-
ing the experience of the rejection, and describes the source and the implications
of the rejection as predictors of different responses to a rejection. In line with
this model Buckley et al. (2004) hypothesized that angry reactions would be most
intense after being rejected by someone who gradually becomes increasingly neg-
ative over the course an interaction (because of the loss of pride induced by a
rejection following initial acceptance), whereas sad reactions would be most in-
tense following a constant rejection because of the feelings of helplesness that
constant rejection causes. Contrary to their expectations however, their results
indicated that a rejection following initial acceptance (compared to a rejection by
someone who is non-accepting from the beginning of an interaction) lead to both
more anger and sadness. The authors speculated that the particular pattern of
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emotional reactions to a rejection episode might be determined by an individual’s
appraisals regarding the event. Our findings support their speculation and show
that the specific pattern of angry and sad reaction that people show in response
to a rejection can indeed be explained by their perceptions of the reason of the
rejection.
Previously, Leary, Koch and Hechenbleikner (2005) made an elaborate argu-
ment for the role of appraisals in the experience of rejection as well. They argued
that the experience of rejection stems basically from the experience of one’s de-
clining relational value. In their view acceptance and rejection can be considered
opposite endpoints of a continuum of relational evaluation. Moreover, the authors
argue that differing emotional responses to social rejection – sadness, hurt feel-
ings, loneliness, guilt, shame, embarrasment, jealousy, and anxiety – are adaptive
action tendencies in response to a perceived drop in relational value. Accordingly,
one’s emotional reactions and accompanying behaviors after a rejection depend
on one’s specific perceptions of one’s relational value. Our findings add detail to
the reasoning of Leary and his colleagues (2005), in that we suggest that an indi-
vidual’s relational value has two components: one’s perceived warmth and one’s
perceived competence. Moreover, distinguishing between these two components
might shed light not only on sadness and anger, but also on other emotions that
arise in response to rejection.
Our idea that anger and sadness are specific emotional reactions to rejection
depending on the appraisal of the reason of the rejection, could also be linked to the
Needs threat model (Williams, 2009). According to this model peoples’ responses
to rejection not only depend on the extent that they feel that their belongness is
threatened, but also on the extent that they perceive threats to other fundamental
psychological needs: self-esteem, a sense of purpose in life, and control. The model
does not make the same distinction between sad and angry reactions as we propose,
but it does predict that aggression (as opposed to prosocial behavior) is most likely
to follow when a rejection threatens the need for control (see also, Warburton et
al., 2006). If we were to link anger to aggression, we could derive from the above
that a rejection based on lack of competence must be a bigger threat to the need for
control, than a rejection based on lack of warmth, since the former evokes greater
anger. But we agree with the Needs threat model that the threat the rejection
poses to one’s sense of control, and the resulting aggression, primarily results from
the feeling that one cannot alter or regulate one’s outcomes in life. According to
the model the very experience of rejection, especially when it is unfair, unexpected
or chronic, deprives an individual of control, because one is not able to prevent
the rejection from happening. Importantly, this means that a sense of control
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could be threatened by warmth rejections as well. Therefore, in parallel to our
above argument concerning peoples’ relational value, we argue that one may not
only obtain a sense of control through achieving status and respect due to one’s
(real or acclaimed) competence, but also through achieving love/liking and trust
by sharing and cooperating. Consequently, in our view, the role of need for control
in (emotional) responses to rejection is to build social bonds (Maner et al., 2007),
and to direct our efforts toward increasing one’s relational value as a competent
and warm individual. It is only when a rejection deprives the individual from
repairing one’s relational value, that it evokes aggression and destructive behavior
(and eventually desolation and social withdrawal). As such we would like to stress
that we view the anger evoked by competence rejections in our experiments not
as an action tendency to aggress, but rather as the motivation to repair one’s
relational value as a competent individual.
For our studies we have drawn upon knowledge from the fields of person per-
ception and emotion research. But these fields of research could benefit from our
approach as well. Our studies demonstrate that the induction of social rejec-
tion is effective in inducing meaningful processing of socially relevant information
(Sacco, Wirth, Hugenberg, Chen, & Williams, 2011); they also demonstrate the
effectiveness of social rejection in eliciting specific emotions. The stereotype con-
tent model, which also relies on the distinction between warmth and compentence,
describes that individuals feel distinct emotions (pity, envy, contempt and admi-
ration) towards others depending on how they appraise them on their competence
and warmth. For example, stereotyped individuals considered as warm, but lack-
ing competence evoke primarily pity, whereas stereotyped individuals who are
considered lacking both warmth and competence evoke primarily contempt (Fiske
et al., 2002). Our results could be a first steppingstone for researchers interested
in how appraisals shape not only the emotions of the person who engages in the
appraisal, but also of the person whom these appraisals concern. Implementing
social rejection manipulations into person perception and emotion research could
thus be a fruitful way in further investigating the interpersonal consequences of
warmth and competence judgments, but also the mechanisms behind emotions.
Conclusion
To conclude, the work reported here shows that applying social perception research
and emotion research in investigating social rejection offers us a better understand-
ing of social rejection and its downstream effects. It shows that not all experiences
of social rejection are alike. Understanding how people feel after an experience of
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social rejection requires a detailed understanding of the reason of the rejection.
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Chapter 4
Non-verbal expressions of reasons for rejection
The studies in Chapter 3 showed that rejected individuals differentiate between com-
petence and warmth rejections with specific emotional reactions: rejections conveying
a negative apraisal of competence evoked more anger than sadness, whereas rejections
conveying a negative appraisal of warmth evoked more sadness than anger. The present
chapter explored how judgments of competence and warmth are communicated non-
verbally during a face-to-face selection. I expected that targets excluded in the selection
(compared to targets included in the selection) would be more sensitive to the specific
non-verbal cues of negative competence and warmth appraisals. Based on observations
from the targets of the selection, results across two studies showed that selections based
on competence were done more dominantly than selections based on warmth. Selections
based on warmth, on the other hand, were done more coldly compared to selections based
on competence. Contrary to expectations, being excluded in the selection did not enhance
the sensitivy to dominance and coldness; excluded and included targets assigned equal
levels of dominance and coldness to selectors. Additionally, the results provided par-
tial replication of the specificity of angry and sad reactions to competence and warmth
rejections reported in the previous chapter. Targets who were rejected on warmth in
the selection experienced more sadness than anger. And targets who were rejected on
competence experienced more anger than targets who were rejected on warmth.
This chapter is adapted from:
Çelik, P., Van Beest, I. & Lammers, J. (2014). Understanding Non-verbal






In the past 15 years the field of social psychology has acquired many insights in
the human response to social rejection. The method of research has been mainly
focussed on comparing the impact of a non-specific rejection experience to an in-
clusion, or non-rejection experience in controlled experimental settings (for reviews
see, Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006; Williams, 2007a;
Williams, 2007b). Recently Çelik, Lammers, et al. (2013) have argued that, seeing
the various responses to rejection reported in the literature, the experience of being
rejected may be a multifaceted phenomenon, and responses to it may vary with
the perceptions that people can have about the reason of why they were rejected.
After all, there is no instance of social exclusion that occurs without some form
of social motivation or social judgment; people accept and reject others based on
specific perceptions and judgments of them, with the aim of correcting certain
behaviors in the individual (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Yet not all acts of rejection
are explicit in communicating the reason to the individual. In some circumstances
people are simply ignored (i.e. ostracized) and only receive implicit indications
of their lack of social fit without being given an explicitly verbalized reason. The
purpose of the present chapter is to explore how the social appraisals that may
precede a rejection are communicated implicitly.
We present two studies with a relatively naturalistic approach, in which par-
ticipants are included or excluded for warmth or competence reasons, face-to-face
with the person who engages in the selection. We examine whether perceptions of
lack of competence and lack of warmth are accompanied by specific non-verbal cues
in de behaviour of the selector, and whether rejection moderates the sensitivity to
these cues.
Warmth and Competence Evaluations in Social Rejection
Rejection research typically does not investigate the social evaluations that pre-
cede a rejection. Recently there has been attention for the reasons of rejection and
how they may impact peoples’ responses (Çelik, Lammers, et al., 2013). Based
on existing theoretical models Çelik, Lammers, et al. (2013) proposed that people
judge, reject and include others along two primary dimensions: warmth and com-
petence (Asch, 1997; Bales, 1970; Leary, 1957). Warmth and competence have
been identified in the literature as core and universal components of interpersonal
perception (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007).
Studies show that 82 % of the variance in everyday perceptions of others can be
accounted for by judgments pertaining to warmth and competence (Wojciszke,
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2005; Wojciszke et al., 1998). When people evaluate others on competence they
focus on characteristics such as skill, creativity, intelligence and foresight, whereas
when they evaluate others on warmth they focus on characteristics such as friend-
liness, sincerity, helpfulness, and trustworthiness (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et
al., 2007). Thus evaluating another person on competence involves determining
whether someone is capable or incapable, whereas evaluating someone on warmth,
involves determining whether someone is a friend or a foe. This also means that
a competence evaluation inherently involves rank and superiority-inferiority, and
that perceiving someone as incompetent involves appraisals of disrespect and see-
ing oneself as superior to the other. A negative warmth evaluation, on the other
hand, involves appraisals of dislike and distrust, and does not involve rank.
In their studies Çelik, Lammers, et al. (2013) demonstrate that individuals
respond with different emotions to rejections based on perceptions of lack of com-
petence and rejections based on perceptions of lack of warmth. In two studies they
showed that rejected individuals respond with primarily anger (and less sadness)
to a competence rejection and primarily sadness (and less anger) to a warmth re-
jection. The authors explained their findings by referring to the functional aspects
of these emotions (Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Keltner & Gross,
1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2010; Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Sad-
ness elicits specific intra-individual action tendencies and responses from others
which together increase one’s chances to be seen as a warm individual, whereas
anger elicits intra-individual action tendencies and responses from others which
together increase one’s chances to be seen as a competent individual. The reason
of the rejection thus seems to evoke action tendencies that may be functional in
restoring aspects of oneself that lead to the rejection. Importantly, in one of their
studies participants received an ambivalent reason for the rejection (the reason
could be both warmth and competence), and the same emotional response pat-
terns emerged depending on peoples’ interpretation of how they were evaluated
by their rejecter. Thus even in situations in which the reason of the rejection is
difficult to discern, peoples’ responses to the rejection seem to be attuned to the
possible reasons.
It follows from the above that information regarding the reason of a rejection
is very important for rejected individuals. This is not surprising since this infor-
mation could enable them to respond in a way that may potentially regain them
acceptance on the specific domain that they were rejected. Studies show that so-
cial rejection typically leads to a drop in self-esteem, suggesting that people worry
about how they look in the eyes of their rejecter and others (Leary, Cottrell, &
Phillips, 2001; Van Beest & Williams, 2011; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004).
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Possibly this drop in self-esteem is a signal that motivates rejected individuals to
repair their connectedness by working on their shortcomings that led to the rejec-
tion in the first place. Indeed, one of the main functions of social rejection, from
the perspective of the rejecter, is to correct unwanted behavior and avoid poor
social exchange partners (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). For example, in job interviews
applicants may receive an explanation for why they were rejected for the job, or
in romantic relationships lovers may critisize their partner in the hopes that he or
she will change.
Expressing competence and warmth appraisals
Seeing the importance of the reason of a rejection, both from the perspective of
the rejecter, and from the perspective of the target of the rejection, it is interesting
that in daily life people often do not verbalize why they ignore or reject someone.
This may be for several reasons, for example because the individual who engages
in the rejection wants to avoid an awkward situation, or because he or she wants
to spare the person’s feelings. Often people use subtle expressions of disinterest
like frowning, lack of eye contact, distant body language and avoiding, instead of
explaining their reasons explicitly. Supporting this idea a survey study indicated
that people withhold eye contact as a way to exclude others (Williams, Shore, &
Grahe, 1998). Imagine for example that you have a friendly neighbour who offers
his help in fixing your car. Your neighbour however has two left hands and you
believe that entrusting him with your car would surely end in a disaster. But since
he is your neighbour, you might not want to explicitly tell him that you think he
is clumsy and incompetent. Instead you avoid him, and when you do encounter
him, you try to keep the conversation short. Often instances of rejection are of this
kind; they are subtle (not explicitly verbalized) and they do not involve a clear
unambiguous act of full irrevocable rejection. But if rejection has a corrective
function, how do we let others know why we ignore or reject them in the instances
that we do not tell them verbally?
To our knowledge there is no literature that specifically focusses on how exactly
individuals convey the reasons behind a rejection. One exception is a theoretical
paper by Kerr and Levine (2008) who argue that the non-verbal expressions of
ostracism have evolutionary origins. Building on their reasoning, we argue that
peoples’ appraisals of others’ competence and warmth preceding a rejection are
likely to be accompanied by subtle, non-verbal behavioral cues as well. Further-
more, Kerr and Levine (2008) argue that people determine other peoples’ evalua-
tions of them by attending to the same cues that they themselves send out when
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evaluating others. In line with this idea, Leary, Koch and Hechenbleikner (2005)
state that human beings have developed biopsychological mechanisms to fear and
avoid rejection, characterized by an aversion and sensitivity to cues of rejection
and abandonment. For example, diary data suggest that even when strangers fail
to engage in eye contact, people feel ostracized (Williams, Govan, Wheeler, & Ne-
zlek, 2004). A recent field experiment conducted by Wesselmann, Cardoso, Slater,
and Williams (2012) added to these findings by showing that pedestrians who
were given an ‘air-gaze’ by a confederate passing by (i.e., the confederate looked
in their direction, but did not give them direct eye-contact) indicated to feel more
socially disconnected, than pedestrians who did receive acknowledgement from
the confederate (either through neutral eye-contact, or through eye-contact with a
smile). Importantly, excluding participants who had been aware of the eye-contact
from the analyses (45%) resulted in a null-finding, indicating the importance of
awareness of the eye-contact for the found effect. Perhaps not surprisingly, studies
suggest that for an observer a non-verbal message carries more than 4 times the
weight of a verbal message (Argyle, Salter, Nicholson, Williams, & Burgess, 1970).
Because of the vertical/hierarchical nature of competence relations, we expect
that disrespect and perceptions of low competence should be expressed with a su-
perior and dominant demeanor, because dominance communicates an individual’s
(real or acclaimed) superior level of knowledge and competence (Hawley, 1999). In
other words, when people feel capable and superior, they feel dominant (Maslow,
1943). Because of the horizontal nature of warmth relations, we expect that dislike,
distrust and perceptions of low warmth, i.e. coldness, should be expressed with
a distant and cold demeanor. These predictions are consistent with interpersonal
circumplex theorists who posit that along the vertical axe (the dominance/power
axe) peoples’ behavior are often opposite to their interaction partners’ behavior,
while on the horizontal axe (the love/affiliation axe) their behavior is often similar
to their interaction partners’ behavior (Kiesler, 1983). Thus, perceptions of infe-
riority are often met with expressions of superiority, while perceptions of coldness
are often met with expressions of coldness.
Dominance and coldness from the perspective of observers
Expressions of dominance and coldness may be part of a dynamic process between
the sender and the individual to whom this behavior is targeted (Strong et al.,
1988). For example, according to Henley (1977) the expression of dominance
not only signifies the power relationship between individuals, it can also establish
a competitive situation in which two individuals may seek dominance over one
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another. For example, communicating dominance may elicit anger in the target in
return, especially when it is accompanied with hostility (Orford, 1986). Likewise,
the perception of coldness in the behavior of the sender may elicit sadness or fear in
the target (Knutson, 1996). These emotions in turn may facilitate further adaptive
behaviors (Frijda, 1987) depending on the individuals’ motivations in interaction
with the specific relationship between the individual and the other person; the
anger in response to dominance may for example facilitate gaining respect and
competence, whereas the sadness in response to coldness may facilitate gaining
warmth and caring (Leary, Koch, & Hechenbleikner, 2005; Çelik, Lammers, et
al., 2013). Because people not always verbalize their opinions and appraisals of
others, and because competence and warmth judgments make up a large part of
peoples’ opinions about one another (Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke et al., 1998),
targets of these appraisals should be highly motivated and skilled to recognize the
non-verbal expressions of dominance and coldness. But what if an evaluation of
competence or warmth leads to a rejection? Can rejected targets still correctly
recognize dominance and coldness in the behavior of their rejecter?
The literature offers contradictory predictions regarding rejected individuals’
ability to detect cues of dominance and coldness. On the one hand there are
studies that suggests that rejected individuals may not even be interested in un-
derstanding why they are rejected. Several studies show that rejection causes
aggressive and antisocial behavior (Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006; Twenge,
Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). Other studies show that rejection is such a
negative experience that people would probably not be able to process the non-
verbal behavior of others, let alone of their rejecter. Studies for example show
that rejected individuals do not seem to process mitigating social information.
For example, rejected individuals do not take into account factors like the so-
cial categorization of the rejecters (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Gonsalkorale
& Williams, 2007; Van Beest et al., 2012; Williams & Sommer, 1997; Zadro et
al., 2004) or the incentives of the rejecters (Lelieveld et al., 2013; Van Beest &
Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2000); in all of these cases the pain of rejection
seems unmitigated. Other research shows that ostracism distorts peoples’ view on
reality and altogether blocks their ability to process and understand social reality.
Baumeister et al. (2002) showed across three experiments that an experimental
induction of rejection impaired logical reasoning and executive functioning. Thus,
it is possible that rejected observers compared to non-rejected observers, will be
impaired in recognizing non-verbal expressions of negative competence judgments
(dominance) and negative warmth judgments (coldness).
On the other hand, there is a growing body of research that shows that rejected
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individuals, compared non-rejected or included individuals, might be even more
sensitive to the non-verbal behaviour of their rejecter. For example, a recent study
shows that rejection increases peoples’ sensitivity in differentiating Duchenne (real)
smiles from non-Duchenne smiles (Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & Claypool,
2008). Other studies show that rejected individuals have increased attention to
others’ eye gaze (Wilkowski, Robinson, & Friesen, 2009), smiles (DeWall, Maner,
& Rouby, 2009), vocal tone and facial emotion (Pickett et al., 2004), facial ex-
pressions (Gardner, Pickett, & Knowles, 2005), and social information in general
(Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Hess & Pickett, 2010). Moreover, social rejec-
tion seems to increase mimicry (Lakin et al., 2008). It is conceivable that mimicry
is one of the processes through which rejection enhances peoples’ ability to under-
stand non-verbal behavior in general, and possibly also the non-verbal behavior of
their rejecter.
Based on the above we expect that rejected individuals will be more sensitive to
recognize the non-verbal expressions of dominance and coldness in their rejecter,
than non-rejected observers. If this is the case, it may be that in parallel, rejected
individuals’ emotional responses will differentiate between warmth and competence
rejections as well, similar to findings previously reported by Çelik, Lammers, et
al. (2013). Thus competence rejections might primarily evoke anger (and less
sadness), while warmth rejections might primarily evoke sadness (and less anger).
Study overview and hypotheses
We used a paradigm in which some participants were excluded and others were
included in a face-to-face group selection by the same individual – the ‘selector’.
Following random assignment, selectors were either instructed to base their choice
on their personal perceptions of the targets’ competence, or on their personal
perceptions of the targets’ warmth. The main dependent variables were targets’
perceptions of the selectors’ dominance and coldness during the selection proce-
dure and their emotional reactions to the selection outcome (sadness and anger).
We expected that selectors who based their decision on a perceived lack of warmth
would be rated as more cold than selectors who based their decision on a perceived
lack of competence. Conversely, we expected that selectors who based their deci-
sion on a perceived lack of competence would be rated as more dominant, than
selectors who based their decision on a perceived lack of warmth. Furthermore,
we expected that excluded individuals, due to their higher sensitivity to cues of
rejection, should have a more exaggerated perception of the selectors’ dominance
and coldness, than included individuals. Finally, following the findings of Çelik,
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Lammers, et al. (2013) we expected that among excluded individuals anger would
be higher than sadness in response to a competence rejection, and sadness would
be higher than anger in response to a warmth rejection. For included individuals
we did not expect these reactions, as we consider anger and sadness to be action
tendencies that are functional in response to exclusion, but not in response to
inclusion.
Experiment 5
In this study we only measured dominance and not coldness because we first
wanted to establish that competence and warmth rejections can indeed be distin-
guished from each other without making the appraisal process too difficult for the
targets. We reasoned that when targets have to judge selectors’ behavior on more
than one dimension, they might overly rely on heuristic reasoning, which may lead
to incorrect appraisals. For example, it is conceivable that that targets will infer
selectors’ dominance from their coldness (or vice versa), instead of assessing these
behaviors independently from each other.
Method
Participants and design
In return for course credit, 124 psychology students of Tilburg University (98
women; Mage= 19.6 years, SDage= 1.87) participated in 26 groups of four (6
groups) or five participants (20 groups) each. In each group one of the participants
was randomly allocated the role of selector, and groups were randomly assigned to
competence and warmth selection. This means that in the competence condition,
selectors were instructed to exclude and include targets based on their competence,
whereas in the warmth condition selectors were instructed to exclude and include
targets based on their warmth.
Procedure
The experimenter explained that the study was about personality and group inter-
action, and that participants would do several group tasks together. Each session
took place in a room consisting of 5 individual tables and one bigger group table.
In the hallway, right outside the room, another table was placed, intended for the
future selector. To bolster credibility for the cover story, participants started with
filling out a bogus personality questionnaire at their individual tables. Note that
at this point, participants were not aware that later one of them would make a
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selection. Participants then engaged in a group task of building structure with
wooden blocks. They received the following instructions from the experimenter:
“Your assignment as a group is to build something with these blocks.
There are no specific rules; it is totally up to you what you build and
how you do this. But I want you to do this assignment together as a
group.”
The group task was intended to enable participants to form a first impression of
each other. After 5 to 7 min the experimenter announced the end of the group task
and asked participants to return to their individual tables. Next, everybody filled
in a self- and other-rating questionnaire. This questionnaire contained several
items to check for possible a priori individual differences pertaining to self and
other-perceptions in the group between excluded and included individuals.
Manipulation of selection criterion. After participants were finished with filling
in the self- and other-rating questionnaire, the experimenter explained to the group
that only three people would be needed for the second group task, and that one
of the group members would be randomly chosen to select two other people for
the second group task. Next, by means of a lottery, one of the participants was
allocated the role of ‘selector’ and was taken to the hallway by the experimenter.
There, out of the targets’ earshot, the experimenter handed the selector one of two
different instruction sheets, asked him/her to carefully read the information, and
then to knock on the door when ready. After this the experimenter went back into
the room where the remaining group members were seated behind their individual
tables. Depending on the experimental condition, the instructions for the selector
explained that for the next group assignment participants should be decisive and
skillful (or empathic and cooperative) and that he/she should therefore choose the
two most skillful (empathic) individuals in the group. Note, that selectors decided
themselves whom to exclude and whom to include. We did this to evoke natural
and spontaneous non-verbal behavior.
Selection procedure. On average selectors knocked on the door within 30s after
the experimenter returned to the room. The experimenter then let the selector
into the room and guided him/her to a fixed spot facing the 4 (or 3) targets
of the selection, at a distance of approximately 1-1.5 m. The selector remained
in a standing position, while the targets were in a sitting position behind their
individual tables. Next, the experimenter showed 2 small black cards and explained
that two of the targets would receive a card from the selector, and that these two
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individuals would not participate in the second group assignment1. After this
explanation, the experimenter asked whether the selector had made up his/her
mind and gave the cards to the selector – selectors had previously read on the
instruction sheet to not say anything, and simply place the cards on the tables of
the targets with whom they did not want to work with on the second assignment.
All selectors followed this instruction correctly.
After the cards were placed on the tables the experimenter immediately es-
corted the selector back to the hallway and instructed targets to fill in the last
questionnaire on their table. This questionnaire contained the assessment of the
dependent variables and manipulation checks.
Measures
Self- and other ratings prior to the selection. Immediately after the group
task, but before the selection, participants answered questions about themselves
and their group members. This was done to check for possible a priori individual
differences in self and other-perceptions between excluded and included individ-
uals. Note that at this point participants were not aware that a selection would
take place. Participants first indicated how accepted they felt in the group with
the items “I feel part of the group”, “I feel accepted by my group members” and
“I had an equal share in the group task” (α= .78). Next, participants indicated
their agreement with the items “The cooperation with my group members felt
equal” and “The cooperation with my group members felt competitive”. Then,
participants indicated their own self-perceptions of warmth and competence with
the items “During the group task I took a friendly and cooperative attitude”
and “During the group task I performed well”. Finally, participants indicated
how warm and competent they found their group members with respectively the
items “My group members seem to be friendly”, “My group members seem to
be nice”(r= 86, p< .001), and “My group members seem to be intelligent”, “My
group members seem to be sensible” (r= .67, p< .001). All items were assessed
on 7-point Likert scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Dependent variables. After the selection took place targets indicated the extent
to which they felt sad, depressed, gloomy, down, and plaintive (composite variable
“sadness”; α= .93) and angry, irritated, insulted, annoyed, and hostile (composite
variable “anger”; α= .90). Next, targets rated the dominance of the selector on
four items: dominant, assertive, confident and self-conscious (composite variable
“dominance”; α= .76). These items were measured on 7-point Likert scales ranging
1In groups in which there were three targets one individual was included and two were ex-
cluded.
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from not at all (1) to very strongly (7)2.
Manipulation checks. After assessing the main dependent variables we probed
for conscious awareness of the grounds of the selection – warmth or competence –
by asking targets to write down any ideas they had on why they were included or
excluded. None of the targets seemed consciously aware of the true reason behind
the selection. Most of them indicated that they had no idea, with a few indicating
that their being included or excluded was probably done according to instructions
of the experimenter.
Finally, participants indicated their level of belongingness in the group with
the items “I feel part of the group” and “I feel accepted by my group members”
(r= .86, p< .001). These items were measured on 7-point Likert scales ranging
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Results
Targets who were previously acquainted with selectors were removed from analyses.
This led to the removal of 20 targets, leaving a total of 78 targets, and 26 selectors.
Because targets’ responses were assessed in groups, their responses are statistically
nested within the group sessions in which the experiment took place (Bryk &
Raudenbush, 1992). When data is nested in groups, it is possible that there
is significant variance at the group-level, meaning that group means can differ
from one another on the dependent variable(s). In the present studies a large
between-group variance would be undesirable, as it would mean that individual
observations within the same groups are not fully independent. To check for
the existence of between-group variance we used the SPSS Mixed procedure in
2While we assessed the dependent variables for the targets, we also asked several questions
to the selectors, mainly for exploratory reasons. All questions were measured on 7-point Likert
scales ranging from not at all (1) to very much (7). We assessed selectors’ emotional reactions
(positive emotions: relieved, relaxed, peaceful, powerful, energetic, vigorous, proud, confident;
negative emotions: sad, down, plaintive, tired, drained, empty, guilty, ashamed); How dominant
selectors thought they came across during the selection using the same 4 items that the targets
received; Whether selectors had followed the selection instructions that they received (“How
competent do you find the persons that you just choose (rejected)?”, “How nice do you find the
persons that you just choose (rejected)?”); How certain selectors were of their choice depending
on the selection instruction (“My choice was based on a guess” (reverse coded), “My choice was
based on clear ideas that I had about my group members”, “I am certain of my choice”).
There appeared to be no significant differences between competence and warmth selectors
regarding their emotional reactions to the selection instruction. However, competence selectors
seemed to perceive themselves as significantly more dominant (M= 4.15) than warmth selectors
(M= 2.90), F (1, 24)= 8.38, p= .008, η2p= .276. Moreover, regardless of the selection instruction,
selectors evaluated included targets as more competent (M= 5.42) than excluded targets (M=
4.79), F (1, 24)= 12.73, p= .002, η2p= .366, and also as warmer (M= 5.79) than rejected targets
(M= 5.50), F (1, 24)= 6.76, p= .016, η2p= .235. Finally, it appeared that competence selectors
were more certain of their choice (M= 4.06) than warmth selectors (M= 3.10), F (1, 24)= 4.13,
p= .054, η2p= .158.
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SPSS version 17. This procedure tests the so-called null-model – an intercept-
only model with no predictors specified – and allows the total variance to be
partitioned into between- and within-group variance, for each outcome variable
separately. The results of these analyses showed that between-group variances for
each of the outcome variables were smaller than .04, and non-significant (all p’s
> .80). Moreover, the proportion of the total variance that was due to between-
group variance – the intraclass correlation – was negligible. Since the outcomes of
a multi-level analysis would be in this case the same as the outcomes of a standard
analysis of variance (Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2010), we conducted all analyses
using standard regression and variance analysis in SPSS 17.
Manipulation checks
Belongingness. A 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion[between: competence vs. warmth])
× Selection Outcome[between: included vs. excluded]) ANOVA with belonging-
ness scores as the dependent variable, revealed a main effect of Selection Outcome,
F (1, 74)= 17.59, p< .001, η2p= .192. As expected, excluded targets felt less be-
longing (M = 4.51, SD= 1.40) than included targets (M = 5.62, SD= 0.91). There
was no main effect of Selection Criterion, F (1, 74)= 1.13, p= .291, nor was there
an interaction effect, F (1, 74)= 0.98, p= .326.
Self- and other-perceptions prior to selection. Because allocation to exclu-
sion and inclusion conditions was not random, several independent samples t-tests
with Selection Outcome as the between-subjects variable were conducted to check
whether self- and other-perceptions prior to the selection differed significantly be-
tween excluded and included individuals. These analyses revealed only one signif-
icant effect: excluded participants scored significantly lower on other-perceptions
of competence (M = 5.57, SD= 0.62) than included participants (M = 5.90, SD=
0.74), t(76)= 2.07, p= .042 (two-tailed). This suggests that, on average, those tar-
gets who compared to other targets thought that their group members were less
competent, were more likely to get rejected. None of the other analyses produced
significant differences between excluded and included targets. See Table 4.1.
Main analyses
Perceptions of dominance. A 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion [between: competence
vs. warmth] × Selection Outcome[between: included vs. rejected]) ANOVA was
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Table 4.1: General, self- and other-perceptions prior to the selection (Experiment
5).
Excluded Included
M (SD ) M (SD ) t (76)     p
General perceptions of acceptance 5.66 (1.03 ) 5.93 (0.80 ) 1.32 .190
General perceptions of competition 2.46 (1.58 ) 2.14 (1.30 ) - 0.97 .333
General perceptions of equality 5.80 (1.12 ) 5.84 (0.75 ) 0.18 .861
Self-perceptions of warmth 5.48 (0.96 ) 5.78 (0.85 ) 1.42 .161
Self-perceptions of competence 5.09 (0.92 ) 5.12 (1.43 ) 0.11 .913
Other-perceptions of warmth 6.11 (0.79 ) 6.31 (0.74 ) 1.15 .253
Other-perceptions of competence 5.57 (0.62 ) 5.90 (0.74 ) 2.07 .042
conducted with dominance scores as the dependent variable3. This analysis yielded
a marginally significant main effect of Selection Criterion, F (1, 74)= 3.46, p= .067,
η2p= .045, which was qualified by a marginally significant Selection Criterion ×
Selection Outcome interaction-effect, F (1, 74)= 3.20, p= .078, η2p= .041. Selection
Outcome had no significant effect on dominance scores, F (1, 74)= 1.99, p= .162,
η2p= .026.
Simple comparison tests revealed that included targets assigned higher dom-
inance to competence selectors (M = 3.45, SD= 1.06) than to warmth selectors
(M = 2.46, SD= 1.19), F (1, 74)= 10.56, p= .008, η2p= .090. Included targets also
assigned lower dominance to warmth selectors than excluded targets did, F (1,
74)= 5.49, p= .022, η2p= .069. Excluded targets, however, did not assign higher
levels of dominance to competence selectors (M = 3.36, SD= 1.30), compared to
warmth selectors (M = 3.33, SD= 1.25), F (1, 74)= .003, p= .962. Thus, con-
3All of the sessions were filmed as well to obtain an outsider’s perspective on the the selectors’
behavior. The camera was zoomed in on the selector, but participants were led to believe that
the whole group was being filmed. All of the participants gave their consent for filming. Two
independent raters, blind to experimental condition, watched all 26 video fragments (each lasting
between 1 and 1.5 min, showing a full body image of the selector entering and placing the cards
on the tables, and leaving the room). We had no a priori hypotheses regarding this measure. We
deemed it possible that raters would be unable to correctly decode the non-verbal behavior of the
selectors, due to the relatively short lenght of the video fragments. Dominance (feet/shoulder
width, general body expansiveness, intrusive hand gestures and overall dominance), and coldness
(body orientated towards targets, openness of body, eye contact, duchenne smile and overall
warmth) (Gifford, 1991), were coded on 7-point Likert-scales, with higher scores indicating higher
dominance and higher coldness (after reverse coding the coldness items). Only the feet/shoulder
width and general body expansiveness for dominance, and body orientation, eye contact and
overall warmth for coldness reached acceptable interrater consistency (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979),
with interrater correlations of >.30 (fair agreement or higher; Landis & Koch, 1977). These
items were combined into new variables, respectively “dominant behavior” and “cold behavior”.
A 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion[between: warmth vs. competence) × Behavior[within: dominant
behavior vs. cold behavior]) between–within mixed ANOVA, revealed no significant effects (p’s>
.174).
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trary to our expectations, while included targets did recognize the relatively more
dominant behavior of the competence selectors compared to the warmth selectors,












Figure 4.1: Included targets assigned higher dominance to competence selectors
compared to warmth selectors. Excluded targets did not make this differenatiation
(Experiment 5). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Emotions. A 2 × 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion[between: competence vs. warmth]
× Selection Outcome[between: included vs. rejected]) × Emotion[within: sadness
vs. anger]) between–within mixed ANOVA was conducted. The analysis revealed
a main effect of Selection Outcome, F (1, 74)= 31.12, p< .001, η2p= .296, with ex-
cluded targets reporting higher sadness and anger (M = 2.21, SD= 1.10) than in-
cluded targets (M = 1.30, SD= 0.49). This effect was qualified by a marginally sig-
nificant Selection Criterion × Emotion interaction, F (1, 74)= 3.49, p= .066, η2p=
.045. However, non of the simple effects were significant, except for a marginally
significant effect of Emotion among participants excluded on warmth; they re-
ported more sadness (M = 2.39, SD= 1.05) than anger (M = 2.04, SD= 0.91),
F (1, 74)= 3.22, p= .077, η2p= .042. The Selection Criterion × Selection Outcome
× Emotion effect was not significant, F (1, 74)= 1.14, p= .239. See Table 4.2 for
all means.
Experiment 6
The results of Experiment 5 showed that included targets differentiated between
selectors who were instructed to base their decision on the competence of targets
(‘competence selectors’) and selectors who were instructed to base their decision
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Table 4.2: Sadness and anger among included and excluded targets (Experiment
5).
Sadness Anger
M (SD ) M (SD )
Warmth Inclusion 1.36 (0.64 ) 1.20 (0.39 )
Competence Inclusion 1.34 (0.46 ) 1.31 (0.46 )
Warmth Exclusion 2.39 (1.20 ) 2.04 (1.17 )
Competence Exclusion 2.09 (1.11 ) 2.32 (0.87 )
on the warmth of targets (‘warmth selectors’). They assigned higher dominance
to competence selectors than to warmth selectors. But excluded targets did not
make this differentiation. Additionally, excluded targets reported higher anger and
sadness than included targets, and similar to the findings of Çelik, Lammers, et
al. (2013) targets excluded on warmth seemed to report more sadness than anger,
although this effect was only marginally significant.
The results of this study confirmed our idea that competence selectors would
behave more dominantly during the selection procedure than warmth selectors.
Unexpectedly however, only included targets were able to see this. Possibly, our
rejection manipulation was too confrontational and ‘in-your-face’, because the se-
lector made a direct gesture of rejection by handing the cards to the individuals
whom they wanted to exclude. The direct and active fashion in which the rejection
took place might have caused participants to withdraw and may have discouraged
them from social contact to prevent any further pain. Consistent with this rea-
soning Molden, Lucas, Gardner, Dean, and Knowles (2009) have shown across
four studies that active rejection led to a prevention focus, including withdrawal
from social contact, thoughts about regretting one’s actions, and agitation, while
passive rejection (being ignored) led to reengagement in social contact, thoughts
about regretting the actions that one should have taken, and dejection. A rejec-
tion that is more indirect and passive – because subjectively it is more a failure to
be included, than an active personal rejection – could thus enhance eagerness for
social contact. Therefore, we designed a second study in which the rejection was
the consequence of the inclusion of others in the group. This form of exclusion is
more indirect and passive than the direct rejection manipulation in Experiment 5,
while still resulting in being excluded. We expected that this time excluded partic-
ipants would be at least as capable as included participants to correctly recognize
the non-verbal behavior of the selector. In this study we also included selector




In return for course credit, 124 psychology students of Tilburg University (98
women; Mage= 20.02 years, SDage= 2.77) participated in 27 groups of four (11
groups) or five (16 groups) participants each. The design of this study was identical
to the design of the previous study, with selectors being randomly chosen in each
group, and groups being randomly allocated to competence and warmth selection.
Procedure
The procedure of this experiment was identical to the procedure of the previous
experiment, with the exception that selectors now engaged in an indirect act of
exclusion. They did this by putting the cards on the tables of the targets whom
they wanted to include, instead of on the tables of the targets whom they wanted
to exclude4.
Measures
Self- and other ratings prior to the selection. Immediately after the group task,
participants answered the same questions about themselves and their group mem-
bers as in the previous study. Internal consistency was sufficient for all composite
items: “I feel part of the group”, “I feel accepted by my group members”, and “I
had an equal share in the group task as the others” (α= .75); “My group members
seem to be friendly”, “My group members seem to be nice”(r= .97, p< .001); “My
group members seem to be intelligent”, “My group members seem to be sensible”
(r= .78, p< .001).
Dependent variables. After the selection took place, participants filled in the
same anger (α= .87) and sadness items (α= .94) as in the previous study, followed
by the dominance items (α= .83). Importantly, we now added a measure for per-
ceived coldness as well, using the items “cold”, “distant”, “closed” and “negative”
(α= .89). This new measure followed immediately the dominance measure.
Manipulation checks. After assessing the dependent variables, we probed for
conscious awareness of the selection criterion – warmth or competence – this time
using a dichotomous measure, instead of an open-ended question. Specifically, we
asked targets to guess what they thought the reason behind the selection was.
Next, as in the previous study, participants indicated their level of belongingness
in the group with the items “I feel part of the group” and “I feel accepted by my
4Like in the previous study, in groups in which there were three targets, one individual was
included, and two were excluded.
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group members” (r= .86, p< .001). We found that in all conditions more than
90% of the targets thought that the reason of the selection was warmth.
Finally, because in this study selectors engaged in a gesture of inclusion (they
gave the cards to the targets that they wanted to include, instead of to the targets
that they wanted to exclude), we wanted to check whether participants were aware
of the indirectness of the rejection. We assessed this by asking participants to what
extent they saw the selector as an includer, and to what extent as an excluder.
At the end of the study targets were therefore asked to indicate their agreement
with the items “The selector had a positive role; he/she choose people” and “The
selector had a negative role; he/she rejected people”, on 7-point Likert scales
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Results
Statistical procedures
There were no previously acquainted participants. The total number of targets was
97. The total number of selectors was 27. We checked again for levels of between-
group variance for each outcome variable separately using the Mixed procedure
in SPSS. These analyses indicated that the ratio of between-group variance to
the total variance – the intra-class correlation (ICC) – was negligible for most
outcome variables (< .05). However, for the variables “perceived coldness in the
selector” and “perceived dominance in the selector”, the ICC’s were respectively
.33 and .22. This means that 33% and 22% of the total variability in the scores
on these measures lies between groups. Therefore, for these dependent measures
we conducted multi-level analyses using Linear Mixed Modeling in SPSS 17. For
all other analyses we conducted standard regression and variance analysis using
SPSS 17. We conclude the results section with an overall analyses on the two data
sets collapsed with Experiment as a between-subjects factor.
Manipulation checks
Belonging. A 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion[between: competence vs. warmth) ×
Selection Outcome [between: included vs. excluded]) ANOVA with belongingness
scores as the dependent variable revealed only a main effect of Selection Outcome,
F (1, 93)= 17.15, p< .001, η2p= .157. As expected, excluded targets felt less be-
longing (M = 4.83, SD= 1.32) than included targets (M = 5.77, SD= 0.85). We
found no main effect of the Selection Criterion, F (1, 93)= 0.30, p= .586, nor an
interaction-effect F (1, 93)= 0.75, p= .389
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Self- and other-perceptions prior to selection. We again checked whether self-
and other-perceptions prior to the selection differed between rejected and included
individuals. Independent samples t-tests with Selection Outcome as the between-
subjects variable and the different measures of self- and other-perceptions prior
to selection as the dependent variables revealed no significant differences between
rejected and included individuals. See Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: General, self- and other-perceptions prior to the selection (Experiment
6).
Excluded Included
M (SD ) M (SD ) t (95)     p
General perceptions of acceptance 5.89 (1.19 ) 5.66 (1.17 ) - 0.96 .341
General perceptions of competition 2.15 (1.61 ) 2.30 (1.50 ) 0.47 .642
General perceptions of equality 5.96 (0.99 ) 5.96 (0.88 ) 0.02 .985
Self-perceptions of warmth 5.71 (0.97 ) 5.75 (0.89 ) 0.19 .848
Self-perceptions of competence 5.21 (1.09 ) 5.40 (0.97 ) 0.87 .388
Other-perceptions of warmth 6.33 (0.73 ) 6.20 (0.75 ) - 0.91 .368
Other-perceptions of competence 5.77 (0.96 ) 5.73 (0.83 ) - 0.23 .821
Perceptions of the selector’s role. a 2 × 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion[between:
competence vs. warmth] × Selection Outcome[between: included vs. excluded]
× Perceived Role[within: includer vs. excluder]) between–within mixed ANOVA
revealed a main effect of Selection Criterion, F (1, 71)= 9.01, p= .004, η2p= .113,
and a main effect of Perceived Role, F (1, 71)= 5.31, p= .024, η2p= .070. It ap-
peared that targets subjected to a competence selection gave higher ratings on
both questions (M = 4.12, SD= 1.70), than targets subjected to a warmth selec-
tion (M = 3.70, SD= 1.57). But as expected, targets indicated that they saw the
selector as being more an includer (M = 4.35, SD= 1.56) than an excluder (M =
3.56, SD= 1.76)5. This suggests that targets correctly perceived that the rejection
manipulation was indirect, and that they probably felt not included, instead of re-
jected. The Selection Outcome, F (1, 71)= 0.13, p= .425, and Selection Criterion
× Selection Outcome × Role interaction-effect, F (1, 71)= 0.06, p= .814, were
5Not all targets answered this question, because it was added later to the study. For the
selectors this question was present from the beginning. Similar to the findings for the targets,
competence selectors gave higher ratings on both questions (M= 4.86) than warmth selectors
(M= 3.85), F (1, 25)= 8.65, p= .007, η2p= .257. But contrary to the targets’ opinions, selectors
saw themselves more as excluders (M= 4.81) than as includers (M= 3.93), F (1, 25)= 5.59, p=
.026, η2p= .183. (Selectors indicated their agreement the items: “I had a positive role; I choose
people” and “I had a negative role; I rejected people” on Likert scales ranging from strongly




Perceptions of selector dominance and coldness. We conducted a 2 × 2 (Selec-
tion Criterion[between: competence vs. warmth) × Selection Outcome[between:
included vs. excluded]) Linear Mixed analysis; first with dominance scores as the
dependent variable, and then with coldness scores as the dependent variable. The
analysis with dominance as the dependent variable yielded as expected a signifi-
cant main effect of Selection Criterion, B= -0.60, SE= 0.28, t= -2.12, p= .044.
Inspecting the means revealed that, regardless of the Selection Outcome, all tar-
gets assigned higher dominance to competence selectors (M = 3.71, SD= 1.11),
than to warmth selectors (M = 3.10, SD= 1.27). The main effect of Selection
Outcome (B= -0.09, SE= 0.23, t= -0.37, p= .714), and Selection Criterion × Se-
lection Outcome interaction-effect (B= -0.05, SE= 0.23, t= -0.23, p= .821) were












Figure 4.2: Targets’ perceptions of dominance in selectors (Experiment 6). Error
bars indicate standard error of the mean.
The analysis with coldness as the dependent variable yielded a marginally
significant main effect of Selection Criterion, B= 0.57, SE= 0.30, t= 1.93, p=
.066. Regardless of the Selection Outcome, all targets assigned higher coldness to
6In contrast to the previous study, selectors evaluated included and excluded targets now as
equally competent, F (1, 25)= 2.11, p= .159, (included: M= 5.30; excluded: M= 5.00), and
equally warm (included: M= 5.70; excluded: M= 5.41), F (1, 25)= 2.82, p= .106. Also in
contrast with the previous study, competence selectors did not feel more certain of their choice
(M= 3.41) than warmth selectors (M= 4.15), F (1, 25)= 2.04, p= .166. In this study we did not
make video recordings of the selectors.
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warmth selectors (M = 2.75, SD= 1.06), than to competence selectors (M = 2.18,
SD= 1.13). The main effect of Selection Outcome, B= -0.04, SE= 0.20, t= -0.19,
p= .853, and the Selection Criterion × Selection Outcome interaction-effect, B=












Figure 4.3: Targets’ perceptions of coldness in selectors (Experiment 6). Error
bars indicate standard error of the mean.
In sum, these results suggest that now excluded targets seemed equally able to
differentiate between competence and warmth rejections as included targets7.
Emotions. A 2 × 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion[between: competence vs. warmth]
× Selection Outcome[between: included vs. excluded] × Emotion[within: sadness
vs. anger]) between–within mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of Selection Out-
come, F (1, 92)= 9.47, p= .003, η2p= .093, and a marginally significant main effect
of Emotion, F (1, 92)= 3.07, p= .083, η2p= .032. These effects were qualified by a
significant Selection Criterion × Selection Outcome × Emotion interaction, F (1,
92)= 5.33, p= .023, η2p= .055. We explored the three-way interaction-effect fur-
ther by conducting simple comparison tests. As expected, these analyses revealed
no significant differences between anger and sadness depending on the selection
criterion among included targets. But among excluded targets a warmth rejection
led to higher levels of sadness (M = 1.83, SD= .97) than anger (M = 1.37, SD=
0.60), F (1, 92)= 10.48, p= .002, η2p= .102. Also, anger was higher among targets
who were excluded on competence (M = 1.83, SD= 1.16), compared to targets
who were excluded on warmth (M = 1.37, SD= 0.60), F (1, 92)= 2.35, p= .035,
7In contrast to the previous study, selectors now thought they came across as more dominant
(M= 3.52) than cold (M= 2.46), F (1, 25)= 17.97, p < .001, η2p= .418, irrespective of the
instruction that they received. (We measured selectors’ self-perceptions of coldness (α= .86) and
dominance (α= .88) again with the same items that the targets rated them on.)
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η2p= .047. But among targets who were excluded on competence anger was not
higher than sadness, F (1, 92)= 0.04, p= .853, and sadness did not differ between
targets excluded on warmth and targets excluded on competence F (1, 92)= 0.01,
p= .9068. See Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Impact of competence and warmth rejection on sadness and anger
among included and excluded targets (Experiment 6). Error bars indicate standard
error of the mean.
Overall analyses across Experiments 5 & 6
Perceptions of selector dominance. We conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 (Selection
Criterion [between: competence vs. warmth] × (Selection Outcome[included vs.
rejected] × Study[Experiment 5 vs. Experiment 6]) Linear Mixed analysis with
dominance scores as the dependent variable. Similar to the results in Experiment 6,
this analysis only yielded a significant main effect of Selection Criterion, B= -0.57,
SE= 0.20, t= -2.91, p= .005. The main effect of Selection Outcome (B= -0.23, p=
.205), the Selection Criterion × Selection Outcome interaction-effect (B= 0.23, p=
.199), and the Selection Criterion × Selection Outcome × Study interaction-effect
(B= -0.28, p= .126), were all non-significant. Inspecting the means revealed that,
irrespective of Study and Selection Outcome, included and excluded targets from
both studies assigned higher dominance to competence selectors (M = 3.57, SD=
1.14), than to warmth selectors (M = 3.00, SE= 0.98).
Emotions. A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 (Selection Criterion[between: competence vs.
8In this study warmth selectors (M= 3.55), compared to competence selectors (M= 2.80),
reported the most pronounced emotions, F (1, 25) = 6.86, p= .015, η2p= .215, but on average,
positive emotions were felt stronger (M= 3.95) than negative emotions (M= 2.40), F (1, 25) =
21.93, p ¡ .001, η2p= .467 (α’s resp. .86 & .93).
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warmth] × (Selection Outcome[between: included vs. excluded] × Emotion[within:
sadness vs. anger]) × Study[Experiment 5 vs. Experiment 6]) between–within
mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of Selection Outcome, F (1, 167)= 39.52,




targets felt both emotions stronger than included targets. And Experiment 5
elicited a higher intensity in emotions than Experiment 6.
Above effects were also qualified by a significant Selection outcome × Study
interaction-effect, F (1, 167)= 5.24, p= .023, η2p= .031, and a significant Selection
Criterion × Selection Outcome × Emotion interaction-effect, F (1, 167)= 5.61, p=
.019, η2p= .033. The Selection Criterion × Selection Outcome × Study × Emotion
interaction-effect was not significant, F (1, 167)= 0.162, p= .688. Exploring the
two-way interaction revealed that especially among excluded targets, the selection
in Experiment 5 led to stronger anger and sadness (M = 2.21, SD= 1.09), than
the selection in Experiment 6 (M = 1.71, SD= 0.98), F (1, 167)= 10.54, p= .001,
η2p= .060. Among included targets the selection in Experiment 5 did not lead to
stronger anger and sadness (M = 1.30, SD= 0.49) compared to the selection in
Experiment 6 (M = 1.28, SD= 0.45), F (1, 167)= 0.02, p= .897. Thus the direct
rejection in Experiment 5 was apparently experienced as more negative than the
indirect rejection in Experiment 6.
Exploring the three-way interaction-effect revealed no significant differences
between anger and sadness among included targets. But among excluded targets
a warmth rejection led to higher levels of sadness (M = 2.08, SD= 1.10) than anger
(M = 1.68, SD= 0.95), F (1, 167)= 11.79, p< .001, η2p= .066. Among targets who
were excluded on competence anger was not significantly higher than sadness, F (1,
167)= 1.15, p= .286. But anger was higher among targets who were excluded
on competence (M = 2.03, SD= 1.07), compared to targets who were excluded
on warmth (M = 1.68, SD= 0.95), F (1, 167)= 4.81, p= .030, η2p= .028. Finally,
sadness was not significantly higher among targets excluded on warmth, compared
to targets excluded on competence F (1, 167)= 0.75, p= .388. See Figure 4.5.
In sum, the overall analysis suggests that competence selectors behaved more
dominantly than warmth selectors, and both included and excluded targets were
able to see this. We found however no indications that excluded targets were more
sensitive than included targets in distinguishing between competence and warmth
selectors, due to the indirectness of the rejection manipulation in Experiment 6.
The directness of the rejection also did not seem to impact the pattern of emotional
9There was also a marginally significant main effect of emotion F (1, 167)= 3.04, p= .083, η2p=
.018, suggesting that overall sadness was felt stronger than anger. The main effect of Selection
Criterion was non-significant, F (1, 166)= 0.17, p= .684.
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Figure 4.5: Impact of competence and warmth rejections on sadness and anger
across Experiments 5 & 6. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
reactions to the rejection; across both studies a warmth rejection led to higher
levels of sadness than anger, and anger was higher in response to a competence
rejection, compared to a warmth rejection. The directness of the rejection only
impacted the intensity of emotions, with intenser emotions among participants
who were excluded in a direct fashion (this was not the case among included
participants). Thus, although the directness of the exclusion seemed to moderate
the intensity of emotions in response to exclusion, it did not moderate excluded
targets ability to distinguish between competence and warmth selectors, and it
also did not moderate how the reason of the rejection (warmth or competence)
affected anger and sadness separately.
General discussion
The aim of this chapter was to investigate how warmth and competence appraisals
that precede a rejection are communicated non-verbally to targets of a selection,
and whether rejected targets would be more sensitive to recognize the non-verbal
of the person who engages in the selection than non-rejected included targets.
We conducted two experiments in which some participants were included and
others were excluded in a face-to-face group selection. The selector was always one
of the group members, who was randomly allocated this role. In both experiments
selectors were either instructed (out of targets’ earshot) to base their choice on
their evaluations of the targets’ competence, or on their evaluations of the targets’
warmth.
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We hypothesized that selectors who were instructed to make their choice based
on their subjective evaluation of the targets’ competence (‘competence selectors’)
would behave more dominantly, compared to selectors who were instructed to make
their choice based on their subjective evaluation of the targets’ warmth (‘warmth
selectors’). Conversely, we expected that warmth selectors would behave colder
than competence selectors. Furthermore, we hypothesized that both included and
excluded targets would be able to see this difference between competence and
warmth selectors, with more exaggerated perceptions among excluded targets due
to their heightened sensitivity to non-verbal and social cues in general. Finally,
based on previous findings by Çelik, Lammers, et al. (2013) we also expected that
among targets excluded because of their (perceived lack of) competence, feelings
of anger would be more pronounced compared to feelings of sadness. Conversely,
among targets excluded because of their (perceived lack of) warmth, we expected
that feelings of sadness would be more pronounced, compared to feelings of anger.
We did not expect these patterns for included individuals.
In Experiment 5 the observations of included targets indicated that competence
selectors indeed behaved more dominantly than warmth selectors. But contrary
to our expectations, excluded targets did not demonstrate a magnified percep-
tion of dominance; they did not make a differentiation between competence and
warmth selectors at all. Also regarding excluded targets’ emotional reactions to
the selection, we did not find support for our hypotheses – except for a weak rela-
tionship between a warmth rejection and higher sadness compared to anger. We
found however no evidence for the other expected effects. We speculated that one
explanation for these findings could have been been the direct and active fashion
in which the rejection took place in this study – selectors directly indicated whom
they wanted to exclude, and the inclusion of the other targets followed from this
as a consequence – which could have caused excluded targets to withdraw from
social contact. Therefore, we designed a second study, Experiment 6, in which we
altered the rejection manipulation such that selectors now rejected targets indi-
rectly and in a more passive fashion – selectors only indicated whom they wanted
to include, thus exclusion was now the indirect consequence of others being in-
cluded. We anticipated that this type of rejection would be experienced more as
a failure to obtain inclusion, than as an overt act of rejection. Consequently we
reasoned that this type of rejection should mitigate social withdrawal, and per-
haps even heighten social engagement (see also: Molden et al., 2009). Partially
consistent with this reasoning, the results now indicated that both included and
excluded targets observed that competence selectors behaved more dominantly
than warmth selectors, and that warmth selectors behaved colder than compe-
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tence selectors. But contrary to our expectations, excluded targets (compared to
included targets) did not have exaggerated perceptions of the selectors’ dominance
and coldness. Finally, regarding excluded targets’ emotional reactions to the se-
lection, results were now more consistent with our expectations as well; targets
excluded on warmth reported more sadness than anger, and targets excluded on
competence reported more anger, than targets excluded on warmth. As expected,
among included participants these effects were absent.
The overall analysis on the two datasets combined yielded the same results as
Experiment 6 regarding targets’ observations of the selectors’ behavior, and their
emotions in response to the selection. Additionally, this analysis showed that the
direct rejection in Experiment 5 caused a higher intensity in feelings of anger and
sadness among excluded targets, than the indirect rejection in Experiment 6. But
the directness of the rejection did not seem to impact targets’ observations of the
selectors’ behavior, nor the direction of their emotional responses to the rejection.
Note, that targets of the selection did not explicitly know on what grounds the
selection took place. They also did not know that their competence and warmth
were part of the selection at all; they had no explicit information what so ever.
Still they were able to correctly recognize dominance and coldness in the selectors.
This suggests that people are highly attuned to signs of competence and warmth
evaluations. But interestingly, included targets were as sensitive to the selectors’
behavior as excluded targets (in Experiment 6, and also according to the overall
analysis), while we had initially expected that the experience of a rejection would
function as a magnifier on excluded targets’ perception of the selectors’ behavior;
we had implicitly assumed that the included targets are in essence ‘bystanders’,
observing a rejection taking place. Seeing our results, we are now inclined to
conclude that it is perhaps more about being the target of a selection (vs. not
being the target of a selection), rather about being excluded (or included), which
determines an individual’s sensitivity for the selector’s behavior. In a face-to-face
live selection all targets (at least from their own subjective experience) face an
equal threat of possible exclusion. This might have rendered everybody equally
sensitive for the non-verbal behavior of the selector, from the moment that the
selection was announced until it actually took place.
Nevertheless, among excluded targets their emotional responses suggest that
they did respond to the reason of the rejection. Moreover, because their emotional
reactions can not be the result of explicit inference or appraisals regarding the
reason of the rejection, anger and sadness seem to be the direct – i.e. cognitively
unmitigated – result of the selectors’ behavior. This further bolsters credibility
of our idea that sad and angry responses to respectively warmth and competence
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rejections are indeed functional and help us to navigate the social world. Sadness
evokes sympathy and is ultimately more functional in restoring likeability and
warmth than anger, while anger evokes fear and is ultimately more functional
in restoring respect and status (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner & Gross, 1999;
Shaver et al., 2001; Tiedens, 2001).
Strengths and Limitations
With our paradigm we managed to simulate a real life experience of a selection
procedure, both from the perspective of the targets of the selection, as from the
perspective of the person who does the selection. Our paradigm is one of the first
to investigate the impact of ostracism in a group setting (but see also, Poulsen
& Kashy, 2012; Sommer, Williams, Ciarocco, & Baumeister, 2001; Williams et
al., 1998; Zadro et al., 2005). Moreover, it extends previous paradigms because
we not only assess intrapersonal, but also interpersonal processes between the
selectors and targets of the selection. Our results show that even in minimal group
interactions, and in the absense of verbal communication, appraisals of warmth
and competence are swiftly communicated and picked up.
Note, that based on the results of the overall analysis that we did across both
experiments, we concluded that the directness of the rejection did not moderate
the impact of the rejection on targets’ ability to recognize the selectors’ non-verbal
behavior, and on the direction of their emotional responses. However, we realize
that our sample size may have been too small to render enough statistical power
to result in a significant 4-way interaction-effect. Therefore, we think it is in place
to elaborate more on the differences between the findings of both studies, espe-
cially the findings concerning the excluded targets’ observations of the selectors’
behavior. It may be that excluded targets in Experiment 5 were indeed unable to
recognize the behavior of the selector because they withdrew from social contact
due to the overly direct way they were rejected. But an alternative explanation is
that those who were rejected systematically differed from those who were included,
seeing that being included or excluded was not the result of random assignment,
but the choice of the selector. It is possible that rejected individuals were tru-
ely less competent and had less (dispositional) capacity to understand non-verbal
behavior than included participants, and that selectors made their choice based
on the (conscious or unconscious) detection of this difference. Yet from the selec-
tors own reports their choice to exclude some participants and not others was not
the result a conscious weighing of their opinions about the targets. Recall that
in Experiment 5 selectors evaluated included targets as both warmer and more
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competent than excluded targets, and in Experiment 6 they did not have differing
opinions about excluded and included targets at all. Therefore, we believe that it
is more likely that selectors formed an implicit and fully subjective opinion (i.e.
not based in reality) about the targets competence and warmth, experienced as a
‘wild guess’, that expressed itself non-verbally, but did not cristallize in clear ver-
ballizable opinions about the targets. Another possibility is that selectors had no
opinion about the targets what so ever, and that simply following the task at hand
was enough to activate the behavioral pose. Imagine for example a school teacher
who has to expel one of his pupils for bullying another kid. The teacher might not
necessarily dislike the bully, yet his non-verbal behavior might still (consciously or
unconsciously) express coldness to convey his message more effectively. In other
words, the very instruction to select on competence or warmth might have caused
selectors to adopt a slighty more dominant or cold body posture. In any case, also
considering the fact that participants were drawn from a homogeneous sample of
first year psychology students and the measurements on self- and other perceptions
prior to the selection not indicating large systematic differences between included
and rejected participants, we deem it highly unlikely that excluded targets differed
in any systematic way from included targets. Moreover, even if there were any
differences between individuals, the group task was likely to be too short for se-
lectors to be able to detect any real differences between individuals. Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that we could have avoided this potential confound by assigning
participants randomly to inclusion and exclusion conditions, but we decided to
sacrifice part of our experimental control to allow the non-verbal behavior of the
selectors to emerge naturally, i.e. as a consequence of their own choices.
Finally, one may also question whether selectors truly behaved according to the
targets’ observations, because ratings of our objective observers did not corrabo-
rate the observations of the targets (see Experiment 5). One may speculate that
participants had already formed a quick first impression about each other’s warmth
and competence during the group task (and collectively agreed on this first impres-
sion), and that they imposed/projected dominance and coldness to the selectors
behavior. Note that this explanation only holds under the assumption that targets
were indeed selected based on their (perceived) competence and warmth, and that
selectors did made their choice according to the instructions that they received.
Thus, this alternative explanation implies that implicitly targets associated a lack
of warmth with a coldness response, and a lack of competence with a dominance
response. Under this reasoning, we argue that it is more likely that selectors in-
deed showed dominance and coldness, than that this was just in the eye of the
targets. On a more general note, perceptions of non-verbal expressions of interper-
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sonal appraisals may be highly dependent on the course of a specific interaction
between individuals. In other words, targets may have assessed the selectors’ dom-
inance and coldness relative to their own dominance and coldness, and perhaps
even relative to the selectors own behavior prior to the selection. As such, ob-
taining a truely objective measure of the selectors’ behavior could have only been
approximated by observing the complete group interaction, and each individuals’
(including the targets’) dominance and coldness relative to one another.
Taken together, our results suggest that selectors were affected by the selection
instructions in a way that was consistent with our expectations. Whether their
dominance and coldness were the concequence of their (explicit or implicit) opin-
ions about the targets, or the direct cause of the instruction (unmediated by any
personal opinions about the targets), remains in the middle. But what is clear
is that competence rejections are conducted in a more dominant manner than
warmth rejections, and warmth rejections are conducted in a colder manner than
competence rejections. Moreover, excluded targets are not only able to see these
differences in behavioral pose, they also respond with adaptive emotions to the
reason of the rejection (at least when the rejection takes place in an indirect way).
Relationship to literature and future directions
The present findings add to studies in the literature showing the effect of rejection
on social sensitivity and basic early-stage perceptual processing of others behav-
iors (Bernstein et al., 2008; Wilkowski et al., 2009; DeWall et al., 2009; Pickett
et al., 2004; Gardner et al., 2005, 2000; Hess & Pickett, 2010; Lakin et al., 2008).
These studies show that rejected individuals engage in more social mimicry, have
increased attention to others’ eye gaze, smiles, vocal tone, facial emotion and ex-
pressions, and social information in general. Interestingly, in our studies included
individuals seemed to display the same level of sensitivity as excluded individuals.
Possibly, being the target of a selection enhances the sensitivity to social infor-
mation, regardless of the outcome of the selection. Future studies using a similar
paradigm could include non-target observers (who are physically present during
the selection, yet not a target of the selection), to investigate this possibility.
Notwithstanding, if we were to disregard the results of the overall analysis,
the results of Experiment 5 suggest that a selection situation does not enhance
sensitivity to social information under all circumstances. Possibly an active and
personal rejection might hamper sensitivy to social information because it causes
the individual to disengage from their rejecter. Prior research found that being
actively rejected, compared to being ignored and passively excluded, results in dif-
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ferent motivational states (Molden et al., 2009). While an active rejection seemes
to stimulate a prevention focus, ignoring (presumably because it is experienced as
a failure to obtain acceptance) seems to stimulate a promotion focus (see Higgins,
1997). Because in a prevention mode people are in a more vigilant state, an active
rejection might primarily direct attention to cues of social threat, or even cause a
complete withdrawal from social contact all together. A promotion focus on the
other hand is associated with an enhanced eagerness, and might primarily direct
attention to cues of social acceptance, resulting in increased social engagement in
response to being ignored. Importantly, future research might look into how these
responses might differ depending on the identity of the social interaction partner.
After a direct rejection, the individual might refrain from social contact with his
rejecter (as seemed to be the case in Experiment 5), but might not refrain from
social contact with unknown outsiders, even if it is in a more vigilant and cautious
manner. Our studies were initially not designed to study the impact of direct
vs. indirect rejections on social sensitivity. But future research could employ a
paradigm that is better tailored at investigating this (i.e. a paradigm in which in-
clusion and exclusion are randomized and do not occur in a group setting, and in
which the social cues to be rated are standardized), and could distinguish between
different interaction partners as well (DeWall et al., 2009).
The current studies are relevant to the emotion literature as well, as they
suggest that adaptive emotional responses can arise in isolation from cognitive
appraisals. In neither of the studies in this chapter, targets explicitly seemed to
know on what grounds – competence or warmth – the selection took place. Yet
their emotional responses were adaptive. This finding is interesting for the current
discussion about whether appraisals are necessary for the emergence of emotions or
not (Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007; Zajonc, 1997; Lazarus, 1997, 1991). Related
to this, the finding that individuals were able to correctly read the selectors non-
verbal behavior, raises the question how emotions and the perception of non-
verbal behavior may be intertwined. Future research might investigate whether
the emergence of emotions shape our inferences about others’ behaviour, and/or
the other way around. Post hoc analyses testing both options, yielded no evidence
for a relation between participants’ observations of the selectors’ behavior and
their emotional responses to the rejection. Related to this, it would be interesting
to see if, and how this form of implicit understanding leads to subsequent intra-
and interindividual behavior that impacts an individual’s inclusionary status.
Finally, our findings might be of interest to non-verbal communication re-
searchers as well because the paradigm we used is very similar to the often used
zero-acquaintance paradigm in that field. But whereas in the zero-acquaintance
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paradigm participants rate stable personality variables (Albright, Kenny, & Malloy,
1988; Kenny, Horner, Kashy, & Chu, 1992; Passini & Norman, 1966; Paunonen,
1989), in our paradigm, the ratings concerned fleeting displays of dominance and
coldness as a function of an experimental manipulation. The results of our stud-
ies suggest that even under these circumstances fleeting behavioral poses are in
essence observable. It is interesting to see that, in a minimal group setting with
interactions of less than 1.5 minutes, individuals were able to pick up on how the
selector was feeling. These findings thus extend earlier findings in the field showing
that people are able to make fairly accurate judgments of others personality based
on very short and minimal interactions (Albright et al., 1988; Ambady, Bernieri,
& Richeson, 2000; Ambady & Gray, 2002; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992, 1993; Am-
bady & Weisbuch, 2010; Kenny et al., 1992; Passini & Norman, 1966; Paunonen,
1989) because they show that even momentary differences in behavioral posture
caused by a specific situation are easily picked up.
Conclusions
Undoubtedly many of us have had the occasional silent wish to be able read the
mind of others. The studies in this chapter show that, when we take into account
the distinction between competence and warmth, humans appear to be very sen-
sitive to understanding how they are being evaluated in crucial circumstances like
selection situations, even when they are not explicitly told so.
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Chapter 5
Anti-social personality disorder and reactions to
social rejection
The studies this far in this thesis have all been conducted among a student population.
The last empirical chapter investigates reactions to social rejection among an extreme
group of individuals: violent offenders diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder
(ASPD). The characteristics of this disorder suggest that these individuals might be es-
pecially controlling in their need to be respected as a competent individual. I investigated
the role of exerting social control in their reaction to being rejected, and compared this to
individuals from a normal population without a known history of violence, or diagnosis
of ASPD. Participants played an altered version of the Cyberball game in which they
could control the actions of the other players or not. The results showed that having
control (compared to having no control) prior to rejection mitigated the impact of rejec-
tion among violent offenders diagnosed with ASPD, but not among individuals from a
normal population. This suggests that control needs are crucial in the typology of ASPD,
to such an extent that they may hinder adaptive responding to social rejection.
This chapter is adapted from:
Çelik, P., Van Beest, I., Lammers, J., & Bekker, M. H. J.(2013). Implicit threat
vigilance among violent offenders diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder:
The impact of ostracism and control threat. International Journal of





One of the most typical characteristics of individuals with an antisocial personality
disorder (ASPD) is their violent and aggressive behavior in social relationships.
Importantly, their behavior is not only destructive for the individuals around them,
but also for themselves. These individuals alienate themselves from friends, fam-
ily members and society in general, and often find themselves rejected for their
disruptive behavior. Many end up in penitentiaries, which can be considered the
ultimate form of social rejection.
In the current chapter we aim to show that male violent offenders diagnosed
with ASPD are acutely responsive to short experiences of interpersonal control
in a game of Cyberball (Williams & Jarvis, 2006), more so than individuals from
a normal population without a known history of violence, or diagnosis of ASPD.
More specifically, we hypothesize that for violent offenders with ASPD possessing
control is so important, that a short experience of interpersonal control will be
enough to break down their normal response to ostracism. For normal individuals
we expect that the same control experience will have less impact on their response
to ostracism.
The need for control and ostracism
The need for control is theorized to be one of the basic needs that is thwarted by
ostracism (Williams, 2007a, 2007b). As such, one would expect that satisfying this
need should offer relief from the immediate negative consequences of ostracism.
Paradoxically, this seems not to be the case, at least not for individuals from
a normal population; in a study conducted by Warburton et al. (2006), giving
normal individuals (students) control after a rejection experience, did not seem
to mitigate the immediate social pain caused by social rejection. Only the more
delayed response of aggression was mitigated by the control manipulation.
Many other studies show similar unmitigated stress responses towards social
rejection among normal individuals. For example, the ostracizer can be a member
of a despised out group like the Ku Klux Klan, a stranger, or even a computer –
in all of these situations ostracism is always equally threatening (Gonsalkorale &
Williams, 2007; Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004). Even when the ostracizer
had no choice in doing so (Zadro et al., 2004), or when being ostracized pays off
financially (Lelieveld et al., 2013; Van Beest & Williams, 2006), or when ostracism
is shared, being rejected and ostracized hurts (Van Beest et al., 2012). Finally, also
when participants themselves are responsible for their own exclusion, ostracism
still hurts (De Waal-Andrews & Van Beest, 2012). These findings underscore
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how important belonging is for human beings; rejection leads to immediate and
unmitigated social pain, which is not easily soothed by potentially mitigating
factors, not even by control.
Most reported studies on ostracism have been conducted among the typical stu-
dent samples (with the exception of: Abrams, Weick, Thomas, Colbe, & Franklin,
2011; Masten et al., 2009; Moor et al., 2012; Sebastian, Viding, Williams, & Blake-
more, 2010; Wölfer & Scheithauer, 2013). Whether individuals with ASPD will
show the same unmitigated response towards ostracism the way normal individ-
uals do is therefore unknown. There is evidence that individuals from a normal
population who score higher on traits related to ASPD – psychopathy, machiavel-
lianism, and narcissism – are not less affected by ostracism (Williams, 2007a). On
the other hand, there is also evidence that normal individuals with traits related to
Schizotypical personality disorder seem relatively less affected by ostracism. This
effect is largely due to deceitfulness, a trait that is also related to ASPD (Wirth,
Lynam, & Williams, 2010).
These observations raise the question whether individuals with ASPD would
behave differently to ostracism than normal individuals. One reason why this may
be the case is that ostracism undermines a personal sense of control over one’s
social relations, while this sense of control has a central role in ASPD.
The need for control and antisocial personality disorder
Individuals with ASPD show many problems associated with social malfunction-
ing: repeated acts of aggression, selfishness, deficient moral reasoning, and a gen-
eral under-socialization with a failure in maintaining meaningful relationships with
others (Hare, 2011). We propose that one way to conceptualize this disorder is in
terms of interpersonal circumplex models (Leary, 1957). The vertical axe reflects
hierarchical relations involving rank and status whereas the horizontal axe reflects
communal relations involving love and affiliation (Kiesler, 1983; Wiggins, 1979;
Wiggins & Broughton, 1985). These axes since then have been variously labeled
as power vs. love, agency vs. communion or dominance vs. affiliation. Despite the
different labels, research suggests a substantial overlap between these conceptual
opposites (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). The dominant labeling in contemporary re-
search is competence vs. warmth (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke,
2005; Wojciszke et al., 1998). Possibly, individuals with ASPD have a lower than
normal need for affiliation, or warmth in their relationships (Bekker, Bachrach,
& Croon, 2007), while having a higher than normal need for power, respect and
competence. For example, aggression has been related to control needs (Depret
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& Fiske, 1993; Frieze & Boneva, 2001; Mueller, 1983). More specifically, some
acts of aggression may be used as a means to restore a sense of interpersonal con-
trol or power (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Williams & Warburton, 2003).
Furthermore, dysfunctional thought patterns about wanting to control one’s en-
vironment and specifically other people have been found to predict antisocial and
criminal behavior (Mandracchia, Morgan, Garos, & Garland, 2007). For example,
low perceived control has been found to be related to more violent abuse in rela-
tionships (Prince & Arias, 1994). Possibly, in social relationships individuals with
ASPD often revert to control, claiming respect and acceptance, which sometimes
escalates in more rejection and in turn elicits aggression and even more attempts
at controlling the other person(s) in the relationship.
Under-socialization has also been related to an external locus of control (Rain,
Roger, & Venables, 1982). Locus of control refers to an individual’s basic belief
system about the determinants of outcomes in his or her life (Rotter, 1975). Indi-
viduals with an external locus of control believe that the outcomes of their behavior
are determined by luck or fate, by powerful others, or that their life outcomes are
simply unpredictable. These individuals often have the feeling that ‘things just
happen’ to them. In contrast, individuals with an internal locus of control be-
lieve that the outcomes of their behavior are contingent on their own behavior
or personal characteristics. From a developmental perspective, locus of control
results from the process of learning associations between one’s own behaviour,
and reinforcements of that behavior over time. Individuals who are exposed to a
chronic inconsistency in parental discipline and reward at a young age are more
likely to develop an external locus of control (Carton & Nowicki, 1994; Epstein &
Komorita, 1971; Krampen, 1989; Levenson, 1973).
In sum, we propose that individuals with ASPD overly rely on control for their
sense of belongingness and at the same time experience a chronic feeling of control
deprivation in social situations. This means that any threat to their sense of
control due to rejection should be experienced as a disproportionately hard blow.
However, this also means that a temporary gain in control should result in an
equally strong positive experience as well. To explain this reasoning, consider the
following analogy. An individual who is hungry and has not eaten for days would
be extremely grateful for every bit of food he could obtain and would also react
strongly if food would be taken away. We reason that violent offenders with ASPD
are hungry for control. They therefore react strongly to both obtaining and losing
control. It is exactly this that we aim to demonstrate with our studies; if it is true
that criminal offenders with ASPD are hungry for control, compared to normal




We tested a group of male violent offenders who are clinically diagnosed with
ASPD, and a control group consisting of males from the normal population with-
out a known history of violence, or diagnosis of ASPD. The control group was
sampled from the non-scientific staff of Tilburg University. This group was com-
parable to our patient population regarding age and education level. At the time
of the experiment all participants diagnosed with ASPD were placed under an en-
trustment order in the Netherlands (Terbeschikkingstelling or TBS). Under Dutch
law, the entrustment order holds that offenders undergo involuntary treatment
at a forensic psychiatric hospital for a fixed period of time, with the option for
prolongation if there is still considerable risk for recidivism.
In order to induce control and ostracism we used the Cyberball paradigm
(Williams & Jarvis, 2006). Our dependent variable was implicit threat vigilance,
measured with a dot probe task (Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). Prior research
typically uses self-reported explicit need threats to measure immediate responses
to ostracism. We used an implicit measure of threat vigilance because we wanted
to tap into a more immediate and cognitively unmitigated response to rejection.
With this measure we aimed to uncover basic cognitive processing following os-
tracism and directly measure threat vigilance. These basic processes are ultimately
thought to shape higher order responses that may follow the ostracism experience
(DeWall et al., 2009). Our choice for this measure is also in line with the rea-
soning that cues of rejection should automatically activate a defensive response
system that heightens vigilance for subsequent cues of rejection (Downey, Mou-
gios, Ayduk, London, & Shoda, 2004; Williams, 2001, 2007a, 2007b). Rejected
individuals often want to avoid potentially hurtful social situations (MacDonald
& Leary, 2005), including getting too close or trustfull to others.
In sum, we expected that among male violent offenders with ASPD short ex-
perience of control in the game would mitigate threat vigilance in response to
ostracism. For normal individuals we expected that the same control experience




Participants were 33 male criminal offenders diagnosed with ASPD (Mage= 40.33,
SDage= 10.22) recruited at the Van Mesdag Clinic in Groningen and 35 male
Tilburg University service staff members (Mage= 42.77, SDage= 12.01)
1. All
participants signed a consent form and received a monetary compensation for
participating in the study2.
Procedure
The two samples were tested at different locations and in different periods in time.
Therefore, we analyzed our patient and control population separately. Impor-
tantly, the experimental procedure was identical for both groups of participants
– each participant sat in a private room and received oral instructions regarding
the Cyberball game. They were told that they would play a ball tossing game on
the computer, followed by another computer task that would measure their ability
to respond qiuckly to several pictures. After Cyberball the computer program
automatically switched to the dot probe task that we used to measure implicit
threat vigilance. The specific instructions regarding this task were provided by
the computer program.
Cyberball. Cyberball is a computerized online ball tossing game (Williams &
Jarvis, 2006). In our version of the game participants played with three other
computer generated players. Participants knew they were playing against the
computer (See for a similar procedure: Zadro et al., 2004). Each computer gener-
ated player had its own unique picture of a male face. Participants could pass the
ball to another player by pressing certain keys. All participants played two rounds
of Cyberball, of each 5 minutes. In the first round, depending on experimental
condition, participants either played a low control game, or a high control game.
In the low control game participants were instructed that they could only pass the
ball after they received it from one of the other players. In the high control game
participants were instructed that they could also determine for the other players
to whom they should pass the ball, including to themselves. Thus, they could
determine the entire course of the game themselves. Then, in the second round all
1University service staff members were restaurant and general maintance personel, mailmen,
and library and ICT workers. Although many of these participants’ education level matched the
ASPD population, due to the library and ICT workers, on average the education level of the
normal population was somewhat higher.
2Before we approached the individuals with ASPD, we consulted two other researchers at the
clinic to ascertain that our experiment would cause no harm. In case of non-intended psycholog-
ical or emotional harm, individuals had the possibility to consult a counselor who was informed
about the content of the study.
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participants played a low control game. After 1 minute into the second round, all
participants experienced the same exclusion in which the other players completely
stopped passing the ball to the participant for 4 minutes.
Relative Game inclusion. Due to the specific set up of our study – in the
high control game participants could determine themselves how many times they
received the ball, and both games were set to run a specific amount of time, instead
of a specific number of ball tosses – we obtained between subject variations in how
many ball tosses participants received (or claimed) during the first round of the
game (in which the control manipulation took place), as well as in the second
round of the game. We used this variation as a continuous independent variable
and operationalized it as level of game inclusion; the more balls were obtained
by the participant relative to the total amount of ball tosses in both rounds of
the game, the higher the game inclusion for that participant. We used game
inclusion as a continuous independent variable in our analyses. In this way we
could analyze the impact of game inclusion on threat vigilance and also whether
control moderated this effect.
Attention to threat. Directly after Cyberball, participants completed the dot-
probe task that we used as an implicit measure of threat vigilance. The dot-probe
task is a computerized reaction time task that measures attention to specific target
stimuli. The task requires participants to respond to a dot probe, a small black
dot (3 mm’s in diameter), that is initially hidden from view behind one of two
target stimuli.
The target stimuli consisted of pictures of 20 different males. Each picture had
a version showing a neutral expression and a version showing an angry expression.
These were novel faces – not those used in the Cyberball part of the experiment.
At the start of each trial a small fixation cross appeared for a random duration
between 1000 and 1500 ms and was followed by a blank screen for 200 ms. This
was followed by the presentation of a picture pair, for the duration of 500 ms,
just above and below this fixation point. Each picture pair consisted either of
angry/neutral expression pictures (32 threatening trials), or neutral/neutral ex-
pression pictures (32 control trials). After the pictures disappeared, immediately
a small black dot was revealed at the previous location of one of the pictures. In
half of the threatening trials the dot appeared at the same location as the angry
face (congruent trials), whereas in the other half of the threatening trials the dot
appeared at the location of the neutral face (non-congruent trials). In the control
trials the dot appeared randomly behind one of the two neutral faces. The trials
were presented in a randomized order.
Participants were instructed to ignore the pictures, and to keep their attention
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focused on the fixation cross. They were instructed that their job was to indicate
the location of the dot as quickly and as accurately as possible by pressing “Q”
for top and the “P” for bottom. When participants pressed the wrong key, the
word “Fout!” (False!) flashed shortly on their screen before the fixation cross
reappeared. Then, after pressing one of the two keys the dot disappeared, the
fixation cross reappeared, and a new trial started.
Following Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, and De Houwer (2004) we compared
reaction times (RT’s) on congruent trials (the dot appearing at the same location
as the angry face) with RT’s on the control trials. Vigilance for threat should
lead to faster responses on congruent threatening trials compared to control trials.
This would indicate that attention is faster drawn to the threatening faces than




Relative game inclusion. Among the participants with ASPD the total number
of ball tosses in the two rounds of Cyberball ranged between 56 and 202 (M =
114.70, SD= 23.88). Our control manipulation did not affect the total number
of ball tosses, t(31)= .43, p= .667, nor the relative number of balls participants
themselves received t(31)= -.36, p= .721. Among normal participants the total
number of ball tosses ranged between 81 and 148 (M = 115.56, SD= 18.73). Again,
our control manipulation did not affect the total number of ball tosses, t(32)= 1.34,
p= .188, nor the relative number of balls participants received t(32)= 1.65, p=
.108. See Table 6.1.
These findings show that in the low and high control games participants had a
similar inclusionary status in the game. That is, independent of whether partici-
pants had control over their inclusion or exclusion, they had the ball equally often
in their possession. This was the case for both the ASPD and normal populations.
Dot probe task. Trials in which the dot was falsely located were discarded (5.5%
for the participants with ASPD, and 1.8% for the individuals without ASPD).
Reaction times (RT’s) faster than 300 ms and slower than 3000 ms were elimi-
nated (3.7% for the participants with ASPD and 0.7% for the participants without
3After completing the dot probe task, we also assessed threats to fundamental needs
(Van Beest & Williams, 2006), among the participants without ASPD: threat to belonging-
ness (α= .46), self-esteem (α= .45), meaningful existence (α= .59) and control, (α= .20). We
found no effects of game inclusion or the control manipulation on these measures and will not
mention them further in our results section. After the dotprobe task we administered a measure
of interpersonal closeness and status perception as part of a different study.
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Table 6.1: Total number of ball tosses, and mean percentage of balls received by
participants, in the low and high control game conditions (in both rounds of Cy-
berball) (Experiment 7).
Low control High control Low control High control









Mean % of balls received (SD ) 16% (1.78 ) 16% (3.28 ) 15% (1.63 ) 16% (2.65 )
ASPD participants Normal participants
ASPD) (Ratcliff, 1993)4. Following Koster et al. (2004) we defined threat vigilance
as faster response latencies on congruent trials (where the dot appeared behind
the angry face) compared to control trials (which contain two neutral faces). To
this end we computed threat vigilance scores by subtracting average RT’s on the
control trials from average RT’s on the congruent trials5. A Shapiro-Wilk’s test
of normality (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) revealed non-normal distributions of threat
vigilance scores in both our ASPD as well as normal population (p< .001). Be-
cause our data was not normally distributed, we subjected the raw data to a log
transformation to conform to the normality assumptions of statistical analyses.
Main analyses
To test our main predictions, we ran separate regression analyses for participants
with ASPD and participants without ASPD. In both regression analyses we en-
tered Game type (high control game= 0.5; low control game= -0.5), Relative game
inclusion (continuous predictor), and their interaction with Game type as predic-
tors. The dependent variable was the log transformed threat vigilance scores. For
ease of interpretation of the interaction effects, and to reduce multicollinearity,
we standardized the Relative game inclusion scores before computing the interac-
tion terms with Game type (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). For subsequent simple slope
4We consider RT’s faster than 300 ms and slower than 3000 ms to be response times generated
by processes other than the one that we are interested in. Sometimes participants do not remove
their finger from the key in between two trials, resulting in extremely fast RT’s. Or they are
temporarily distracted from the task, resulting in extremely slow RT’s. In literature different
cut-off point are chosen, ranging between 200 and 2000 ms (see for example Koster et al., 2004).
We choose a higher upper-limit of 3000 ms because our patient population was on average slower
than our normal population, probably due to less experience with computers. Many of them
indicated to never have used a computer.
5Another possibility is that RT’s on the incongruent threatening trials (the dot appearing at
the location of the neutral face) are slower than RT’s on the neutral trials. This would indicate
a difficulty in disengaging from threat considering the time needed to shift attention from the
threatening to the neutral location. We only found results on the vigilance measure.
109
analyses we created new variables for Relative game inclusion at one 1 standard
deviation above, and at 1 standard deviation below their respective means.
ASPD population. The regression analyses for the ASPD patient population
revealed a marginal Game type × Relative game inclusion interaction-effect on
threat vigilance, B= 0.03, SE= 0.01, t= 1.94, p= .062. Main effects of Game
type B= -0.01, SE= 0.01, t= -0.91, p= .371, and Relative game inclusion B=
-0.01, SE= 0.01, t= -0.15, p= .883 were not significant.
As expected, simple slope analyses showed that in the low control game, Rel-
ative game inclusion was negatively related to threat vigilance, B= -0.01, SE=
0.01, t= -2.14, p= .041, suggesting that the less participants were included in the
low control game (the less ball tosses they received from the other players) the
more vigilant they became for the threatening faces in the dot probe task. In the
high control game, Relative game inclusion was not related to threat vigilance,
B= 0.01, SE= 0.01, t= 1.03, p= .313. This means that in the condition in which
participants could control their own inclusion in the game we found no evidence
that lower game inclusion led to heightened threat vigilance; only in the condition
in which participants could not control their own inclusion we found evidence that










Figure 5.1: Among individuals with ASPD exclusion is only related to heightened
threat vigilance if it occurs outside individuals’ control (Experiment 7).
Normal population. The regression analyses for the normal population revealed,
as expected, only a main effect of Relative game inclusion on threat vigilance, B=
-0.03, SE= 0.02, t= -2.05, p= .049, suggesting that regardless of Game type, the
less participants were included in the game (the less ball tosses they received or
claimed from the other players) the more vigilant they became for the threatening
faces in the dot probe task. As expected, the main effect of Game type, B=
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0.02, SE= 0.02, t= 1.041, p= .304, and the Game type × Relative game inclusion
interaction-effect, B= 0.01, SE= 0.03, t= 0.29, p= .774, on threat vigilance were










Figure 5.2: Among normal participants lower game inclusion is related to height-
ened threat vigilance regardless of control in the game (Experiment 7).
General Discussion
In the present chapter we tested whether exerting control over others would reduce
the immediate impact of ostracism on threat vigilance among violent offenders
with an antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). We conducted a Cyberball ex-
periment (Williams & Jarvis, 2006) among clinically diagnosed criminal offenders
with ASPD and normal individuals, who either received high control or low con-
trol over the players in the game before they were ostracized. Corroborating our
hypotheses, results revealed that having control over players in the game prior to
exclusion mitigated threat vigilance only among the ASPD population, but not
among the normal population. As expected, normal individuals only responded to
their level of inclusion in the game; the less they were included, the more vigilant
they became for threat. In other words, when exposed to a Cyberball-induced
experience of rejection, individuals with ASPD reacted similarly as normal indi-
viduals, but with one important exception: when ASPD patients experienced a
sense of control over the other players before they were ostracised, they no longer
showed increased threat vigilance. These results suggest that having control over
others is more important for individuals with ASPD than it is for normal individ-
6In an overall analysis of both datasets combined, only the main effect of Relative game
inclusion remained significant; the less participants were included in the game, the more threat
vigilance they displayed.
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uals. That normal individual did not benefit from the control experience as much
as the individuals with ASPD, could perhaps be best interpreted in terms of the
distinction between claiming inclusion and being granted inclusion. Our control
manipulation was a form of social control. In the high control game participants
essentially claimed their place in the game, while in the low control game partic-
ipants had to be granted a place in the game. Recent research among a normal
population shows that claiming inclusion is not as beneficial for basic need sat-
isfaction as being granted inclusion (De Waal-Andrews & Van Beest, 2012). It
is possible that individuals with ASPD are more used to claiming inclusion, and
therefore benefit more from this than normal individuals.
We believe that our findings might be an interesting addition to Williams’
model of ostracism (Williams, 2007a, 2007b). An important argument of this
model is that immediate responses to ostracism are hard-wired and difficult to
override by potentially mitigating factors. From a functional perspective this
makes sense, because an immediate stress response to ostracism is necessary to
maximally motivate reconnection behaviors (Bernstein et al., 2008). Our results
show that, individuals who have a chronically high need for control are less af-
fected by ostracism when they temporarily gain control. This means that they
will probably be less motivated to rebuild connections with others. Ironically, re-
connection is exactly what these individuals (should) need. We believe that the
same mechanism could apply for other basic psychological needs that are thwarted
by ostracism as well: self-esteem and meaningful-existence. For example, we would
expect that an individual who suffers from extreme low self-esteem will be less af-
fected by ostracism when he or she temporarily gains self-esteem, than somebody
who does not suffer from extreme low self-esteem. In other words, an individual
who craves the liking and approval of others is so concerned with his or her self-
esteem that, if an opportunity to gain self-esteem arises, he or she will be less
affected by ostracism. Whether our findings on control also extend to other needs
is an interesting question that can be addressed in future research.
Our findings may be of interest to clinicians treating patients with ASPD.
Patients with ASPD are known for their temper, especially in social situations.
They are easily provocated by others and quickly revert to aggression (Walker,
Thomas, & Allen, 2003). Possibly they over interpret provocations and rejection as
threats to control. Even though reasserting control through aggression offers than
the advantage of being less affected by ostracism, this decreases these individuals’
chances to build lasting relationships with others. Asserting control over others
at all cost fuels antagonistic responses from others and thus may not always be a
solution to every problem. In therapy these individuals could learn that not every
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criticism can be dealt with by asserting control, and that affiliating with others
and working on one’s self-esteem are beneficial alternatives.
Important to note is that our results on control needs among individuals with
ASPD might be relevant for the ongoing debate on how ASPD should be classified.
More specifically, the DSM-IV only describes behaviors that accompany the dis-
order, mainly violent, impulsive and selfish behavior. It does not mention possible
underlying psychological mechanisms. To the extent that therapists might rely
solely on this characterization of ASPD, by focusing for example only on reducing
impulsivity, our results suggest that taking into account disordered control needs
could be an important addition to the classification of ASPD and the treatment
of individuals.
Strengths, limitations and future directions
A potential limitation of our study is that we only focused on implicit threat
vigilance as a dependent variable. We did not assess social pain or its proxy,
fundamental needs and mood. Future research could thus focus on these other
measures to capture the immediate response to ostracism. We expect that for
individuals with ASPD control will also mitigate these other, often called, reflexive
measures (Williams, 2007a, 2007b).
Our paradigm enabled us to show that control is very important in the typology
of ASPD. Future research could investigate whether disordered control needs are
perhaps part of a psychological defense mechanism among patients with ASPD.
Much like the narcissist’s delusion of grandiosity, it may be the case that these
patients delude themselves into thinking they will not feel hurt by rejection because
they have power over others.
Finally, our findings on threat vigilance are interesting in itself, because implicit
measures have been relatively scarce in ostracism research. Recently, some research
is done on basic attentional processes in reaction to ostracism (Bernstein, Sacco,
Brown, Young, & Claypool, 2010; Bernstein et al., 2008). Specifically, DeWall et al.
(2009) did a study which shows that after an experience of ostracism individuals
had an automatic preference for smiling over angry faces (i.e. a preference for
acceptance cues). In our study we also focused on faces that were not associated
with the rejection experience. Future research could also assess reactions to faces
of the source of rejection. We would predict that, irrespective of whether the face
is novel or belongs to the source, patients with ASPD would solely focus on angry
faces but not on happy faces, as they are too concerned with regaining control and
less with rebuilding reconnection.
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Conclusion
This research is one of the first to complement literature on ASPD with experimen-
tal evidence that control is very important for individuals with ASPD. Possibly,
individuals with ASPD interpret social exclusion mainly as a control breach. Iron-
ically, this may further thwart their acceptance by others and their maintenance
of meaningful relationships. After all, as unwanted as rejection may be from the
individuals’ perspective, rejection and reactions towards it have a functional char-
acter as well (Stormshak, Bierman, Bruschi, Dodge, & Coie, 1999; Brewer, 2005).
It helps to correct dysfunctional and unwanted behaviors. The excessive control
needs that individuals with ASPD have jeopardize this functional aspect of rejec-
tion. One could say that these individuals are trapped in a vicious circle in which
their excessive control needs lead them to be rejected by society, which they try
to solve by asserting even more control over others.
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The aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that the reason of a rejection – warmth
or competence – has to be taken into account when investigating the responses
to social rejection. I argued that being rejected is not a uniform experience, but
depends on the distinct perceptions that people can have about the reason of why
they were rejected. Based on the person perception literature I also argued that
basic social motivations to exclude and reject others are related to interpersonal
warmth and competence. I proposed to differentiate between rejections motivated
by a perception of lack of warmth in the target and rejections motivated by a
perception of lack of competence in the target. A series of studies were conducted
in which warmth and competence based rejection was investigated. In these stud-
ies emotional reactions to being rejected were the main dependent variables. I
reasoned that if competence and warmth rejections are indeed distinct forms of
rejection, they should lead to distinct socially adaptive emotional reactions. This
final chapter highlights the main outcomes of the studies and discusses the impli-
cations for theory concerning social rejection.
Overview of the study outcomes
The literature often reports an impact of rejection on both anger and sadness, and
considers these emotions mainly as expressions of social pain. Chapter 2 aimed
to demonstrate that although rejection impacts these emotions, anger and sad-
ness need not be impacted with the same intensity, because these emotions have
distinct social functions, and their emergence might therefore depend on specific
needs that people have. More specifically, this chapter investigated whether a re-
jection can cause different levels of sadness and anger, depending on individual
differences in need for affiliation, as measured with sensitivity to others in inter-
personal relationships. The results indicated that in response to a recent rejection
experience, people with a high sensitivity to others’ needs anticipated higher levels
of sadness, and lower levels of anger in response to a series of hypothetical nega-
tive social scenarios, compared to their non-rejected counterparts, and compared
to rejected participants with a low sensitivity to others. Moreover, among rejected
individuals, sensitivity to others seemed positively associated with sadness and
negatively associated with anger.
Next, Chapter 3 investigated whether an ambiguous rejection can cause dif-
ferent levels of sadness and anger, depending on the subjective interpretations
of the social motivations behind the rejection. It appeared that interpreting an
ambiguous rejection as indicating a lack of competence predicted anger, whereas
interpreting an unspecific rejection as indicating a lack of warmth predicted sad-
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ness. Next, in a second study I investigated whether clearly communicating the
motivation for the rejection – warmth or competence – impacted anger and sad-
ness in the same manner as well. The same emotional response patterns emerged
in response to clear and unambiguous warmth and competence rejections. In the
final study of this chapter people were asked to remember their emotional and
behavioural reactions to past competence and warmth rejections, and the same
findings emerged again. Participants remembered that after a warmth rejection
they felt more sad than angry; and they remembered that after a competence re-
jection, they felt more angry than sad. These findings show that although sadness
and anger are both negative emotions that express social pain, their emergence
crucially depends on the (subjective and objective) reason behind the rejection.
Then, Chapter 4 again investigated sad and angry responses to rejection de-
pending on warmth and competence motivations for the rejection, but this time
in an actual face-to-face selection situation. During the selection, the selection
criterion – warmth or competence – was clear to the selector, but was not verbally
communicated to the targets of the selection. As observed by the targets of the se-
lection, the results indicated that competence selections were conducted in a more
dominant way than warmth selections, and warmth selections were conducted in
a colder way than competence selections. The results also provided evidence for
the specificity of sad and angry reactions to competence and warmth rejections.
People who were rejected on warmth, experienced more sadness than anger. And
people who were rejected on competence experienced more anger than people who
were rejected on warmth. Together, these results suggest that rejected individuals
are able to differentiate between competence and warmth rejections at the level of
emotions, and at the level of the non-verbal behavior of the person who rejected
them.
The last empirical chapter of this thesis, Chapter 5, investigated reactions to
social rejection among an extreme group of individuals: violent offenders diagnosed
with anti-social personality disorder (ASPD). The characteristics of this disorder
suggest that these individuals might be especially controlling in their need to be
respected as a competent individual. Using a computerized ball tossing game I
investigated how giving these individuals the opportunity to exert social control
over the other players in the game might impact their reaction to being excluded
from the game, and compared this to individuals from a normal population without
a known history of violence, or diagnosis of ASPD. Results showed that normal
individuals became more vigilant for signs of social threat as they were more
excluded in the game. This was regardless of whether they had the opportunity to
exert control (or not) prior to the rejection experience. Individuals with ASPD on
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the other hand, did not show this heightened threat vigilance in response to being
excluded, when earlier in the game they had the opportunity to control the actions
of the other players; they only showed the same response to the rejection when
they did not have the opportunity to exert social control. These findings suggest
that individuals with ASPD benefit from exerting control over others to such an
extent that their normal stress response to rejection is temporarily blocked.
Warmth and competence matter for the experience of rejection
From the research that is described in this thesis it is evident that warmth and
competence do matter for rejected individuals. This is because people respond
with distinct emotions and behaviours depending on what they thought the reason
was, and also depending on the objective the reason of the rejection. Second, these
responses did not only emerge in controlled laboratory settings in which individuals
were provided with (possible) reasons for the rejection, they were also suggested
by autobiographical memory, and they emerged in natural group interactions in
which the reason of the rejection was not verbalized, but instead conveyed non-
verbally. Moreover, in the latter situation people also recognized the non-verbal
cues of competence and warmth rejections. Together, these findings suggest that
people are very sensitive to the distinction between warmth and competence based
rejections. A more recent study confirmed that when people had to recall being
rejected and name the reason, the reason was either a lack of warmth or a lack of
competence (Çelik, Van Geffen, Van Beest, & Lammers, 2013).
From emotions to behavior
To show that warmth and competence are distinct social motivations for social
rejection I relied mainly on the emotional consequences of these two types of
rejection. Basically I employed anger and sadness as a tool in showing that com-
petence and warmth rejections are fundamentally different. I built my argument
around the functionalist assumption that sadness and anger reflect two distinct
action tendencies (Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989). More specifically, in Chapter
2 I speculated that sadness is a strategy that is aimed at being granted inclusion
based on obtaining trust and liking, whereas anger is a strategy that is aimed at
claiming inclusion. And related to this in Chapter 3 I argued that sadness is espe-
cially functional when one is motivated to repair one’s social image as a loving and
caring individual, while anger is especially functional when one is motivated is to
repair one’s social image as a respectable and competent individual. A straight-
forward question that comes to mind is whether these action tendencies always
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lead to their concurrent behavioural outcomes. More specifically, does sadness in
response to social rejection always lead to actually engaging in behaviour that is
aimed at attaining love, care and trust–thus to affiliatory behaviour? And does
anger in response to rejection always lead to engaging in behaviour that is aimed
at attaining respect for being competent – thus to self-enhancing behaviour?
Many studies in social rejection literature failed to find mediation by emotions
in the link between rejection and behavioural outcomes (Buckley et al., 2004;
Twenge et al., 2001, 2003). Perhaps, another way to look at the function of emo-
tions in response to rejection (but maybe also in general) is that they serve an
informational purpose eliciting certain action tendencies, but that they do not
necessarily lead to specific behaviours (Van Kleef et al., 2010). In other words,
emotions might be experiential states that inform individuals about possible chal-
lenges, opportunities, threats, and rewards in their social environment. This means
that there need not always be a direct link between emotions and behaviours (see
also, Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). In this sense, in Chapter 4, I treated
emotional responses to rejection and the ability to recognize non-verbal behaviour
as equivalent indicators of the same process: whether rejected individuals were
able to process the information that was out there.
Nonetheless, it would be interesting to investigate more in depth whether com-
petence and warmth rejections lead to distinct behaviors, and whether these behav-
iors are predicted by specific emotions. In Experiment 4 (Chapter 3 ) I attempted
to test whether being rejected for lacking warmth was related to engaging in af-
filiatory behaviour more strongly than in self-enhancing behaviour, and whether
being rejected for lacking competence was related to engaging in self-enhancing
behaviour more strongly than in affiliatory behaviour. The results did not pro-
vide evidence for such a relationship. This could have been due to the fact that
participants had to recall from memory how they had behaved following the rejec-
tion. In a more recent study we investigated actual social behavior after a warmth
and competence rejection (Çelik, Van Ginneken, Van Beest, & Lammers, 2013).
We used the same paradigm as in Experiment 3 (participants were either rejected
because of lack of warmth, or competence, or were included), and assessed their be-
havior in an altruistic punishment and compensation game game (Lelieveld et al.,
2012). In our version of the game participants observed person A (the ‘dictator’)
dividing a certain amount of chips between himself and person B (the receiver).
The dictator always made an unfair division, taking more chips for himself. The
participant also had an amount of chips and could use these chips to either punish
the dictator, or compensate the victim. For each chip that the participant put in
3 chips were taken away from the dictator (punish), or 3 chips were given to the
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receiver (compensate). The results suggested that after a competence rejection
people were more likely to punish the dictator, but after a warmth rejection they
were more likely to compensate the receiver. Note that both punishing the dic-
tator, and compensating the receiver can be seen as altruistic behaviors, because
participants could have also chosen to do nothing and keep their chips. However,
punishing the dictator is a demonstration of one’s power and targets the cause
of the injustice, while compensating the receiver is a demonstration of empathy.
These findings suggest that depending on the reason of the rejection people do en-
gage in specific behaviors that are aimed at repairing the specific damage that was
caused by the rejection. More research is needed to investigate what exactly the
role of emotions is in the link between rejection and distinct behavioural outcomes.
When are responses to rejection not adaptive?
In Chapters 2 to 4 the emotional responses to warmth and competence rejections
made sense from a functional perspective. Moreover, the ability to correctly rec-
ognize dominance and coldness in competence and warmth rejections in very short
interactions suggests that people are highly tuned into understanding how they are
being evaluated by others. It seems plausible that emotional responses that match
the reason of the rejection, and the ability to recognize the specific non-verbal cues
of competence and warmth rejections, improve one’s chances to be (re)included.
Most findings in this thesis suggest that the basic perceptual response to social
rejection is adaptive. But other findings in this thesis also suggest non-adaptive
responses to rejection. First, the directness of the rejection might be a factor in
contributing to non-adaptive responses. Comparing the results of Experiment 5
(direct rejection manipulation) and 6 (indirect rejection manipulation) suggests
that when a rejection is overly personal and direct, this is so overwhelming that
it seems to hamper functional responding to the rejection. More specifically, par-
ticipants in Experiment 5 did not show the expected emotion patterns as in the
studies in Chapter 3, and Experiment 6, and they also saw equal levels of dom-
inance in competence and warmth selectors. These findings suggest that when a
rejection is too much in-your-face, people might not be able to adaptively respond
to rejection anymore. This idea is in line with previous findings in the rejection
literature and specifically with Ostracism theory (Williams, 2001). Nevertheless,
this conclusion has to be taken with caution as I found no moderation by the di-
rectness of the rejection; although indirect rejection was perceived as less negative
than the direct rejection, the directness of the rejection statistically did not mod-
erate the specific pattern of the emotional reactions to the rejection, and also not
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rejection individuals ability to recognize dominance and coldness in the selector.
Second, certain personality traits could also cause non-adaptive responding
to rejection. In Chapter 5 I tested responses to ostracism among violent offend-
ers with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). These individuals are relatively
insensitive to others’ needs and wishes, and are controlling in their need to be
respected as a competent individual. Because of their incapacity or unwillingness
to build relationships based on love and warmth, I reasoned that these individu-
als should rely more on acquiring control to satiate their belongingness needs. I
expected that because of their disproportionate high need for control, individuals
with ASPD would feel less threatened by ostracism when they have the oppor-
tunity to exert control over others. The results indicated that individuals with
ASPD can be threatened by ostracism the way normal individuals do. But when
they receive an extra satiation of their control needs (i.e. a buffer) – they appear
to be less threatened by ostracism than normal individuals. Possibly, these indi-
viduals are in a vicious circle of controlling others by claiming their place in social
groups and relationships, then getting rejected for their unadaptive behavior, and
as a response reverting to even exerting more control.
Finally, although it was beyond the scope of the present thesis, I expect that
competence and warmth rejection can also elicit perceptions of threat to such an
extent, that the anger that is elicited by a competence rejection can turn into
its non-adaptive counterpart of aggression, and the sadness that is elicited by a
warmth rejection can turn into its non-adaptive counterpart of helplessness and
depression. Stated differently, I would expect that anger and sadness are more
likely to result in adaptive responding (i.e. resulting in reinclusion), when the
individual sees also a challenge in the rejection, and not only a threat. I believe
that this might depend on specific aspects of the rejection concerning its unfairness,
unexpectedness and chronicity. According to the biopsychosocial model of self-
regulation (Blascovich, Seery, Mugridge, Norris, & Weisbuch, 2004; Blascovich
& Tomaka, 1996) motivational states of threat and challenges are the result of
evaluating a certain event in terms of its demands (e.g., required effort, danger,
uncertainty) and whether the person possesses the resources to deal with these
demands (e.g., skills, support, dispositions). According to the model a threat
motivational state emerges when demands outweigh resources, whereas a challenge
motivational state emerges when resources approach or exceed the demands. Thus
to understand adaptive and unadaptive behaviors in response to rejection I believe
we need to develop more elaborate models that not only incorporate warmth and
competence and differences in personality, but also the specific characteristics of
the rejection episode in terms of demands and resources.
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Relationship with the Needs threat model
According to the Needs threat model (Williams, 2009) the experience of social
rejection and ostracism threatens four psychological needs – the need to belong,
meaningful existence and self-esteem and control. A rejection experience often
leaves people feeling worthless, that life has lost purpose and meaning, and devoid
of control. The studies in this dissertation suggest that being rejected at least
leads to two distinct psychological experiences: the experience that one is not
loved, liked and trusted, and the experience that one is not respected. How do the
four fundamental psychological needs described in the needs threat model relate
to the warmth-competence distinction that I put forward in this dissertation and
what are theoretical implications?
According to Williams (2009) the need to belong and need for self-esteem form
a cluster together, and the need for control and meaningful existence also form
a cluster. One way to link the warmth-competence distinction to this model is
by proposing that threats to belongingness and self-esteem are essentially threats
to one’s warmth, while threats to control and meaningful existence are essentially
threats to one’s competence. Belongingness and self-esteem are indeed closely
related to social relationships between people (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), while
control and meaningful-existence are perhaps less related to social relationship
and more closely related to competence. But I believe that it makes more sense
that all four needs that are described in the needs threat model have warmth and
competence aspects in them. Thus people can loose their sense of belongingness,
self-esteem, control and meaningful existence, because they were withheld love and
trust due to perceptions of lack of warmth, but also because they were withheld
respect due to perceptions of lack of competence.
The reasoning above raises the question what the social nature of the need for
control is. The needs threat model does not explicitly describe this. It merely
describes that when people feel thwarted in their need for control because of a
rejection, they become aggressive. But what exactly is the purpose of these acts
of aggression? If it is to obtain control, then control over what exactly? I would
like to put forward the idea that these acts of control through aggression may be
reflections of claiming inclusion; thus using force to obtain love and/or respect.
Thus the social nature of control is basically control over one’s inclusionary sta-
tus. The implication is that – if we may assume that claiming love and respect
is probably more successfully accomplished with force and anger, than with sad-
ness – sometimes warmth rejections can also trigger mainly anger. This should
be especially the case among individuals with a controlling nature, thus among
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individuals who prefer to claim inclusion. This idea fits nicely with the studies in
Chapter 5 in which individuals were given the option to control the course of a
game of Cyberball. The control manipulation in these studies is essentially giving
people the option to claim their place in the game. Recall, that these studies
demonstrated that individuals diagnosed with ASPD benefitted much more from
claiming inclusion than normal individuals. Probably this was the case because
they prefer claiming inclusion, while normal individuals usually prefer inclusion to
be granted to them willingly (see also, De Waal-Andrews & Van Beest, 2012).
Previously I argued that warmth rejections should primarily lead to sadness,
and competence rejections should primarily lead to anger. The studies in this
thesis indeed support this idea. However, the above reasoning suggests that some
personality types might be more prone to claiming inclusion. The consequence
of this could be that among these individuals even warmth rejections could elicit
primarily anger instead of sadness. This is an interesting venue for future research.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the studies presented in this thesis demonstrate that distinguishing
between different reasons for rejection is important as it may bring us closer to
understanding why people respond to rejection the way they do. Rejection is part
of life; it communicates social norms and values, and people have an array of
coping mechanisms to deal with it. It seems that the two most reported emotions
in response to social rejection – anger and sadness – may be in fact directly related
to the values that a rejection conveys.
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English Summary
The experience of being rejected is painful. Several studies have already shown
this. However, there are no studies that distinguish between different forms of
rejection. The focus of interest in existing rejection studies is mainly on the ‘pure’
effect of a general and unspecific experience of rejection. In Chapter 1 I propose
that the experience of being rejected might not be a uniform experience, but varies
with the distinct perceptions that people can have about the reason of why they are
rejected. I rely on the existing knowledge that people judge each other on warmth
and competence to shed light on the distinct experiences people can have of being
rejected. More specifically, I argue to distinguish between rejections motivated by
a perception of lack of warmth and rejections motivated by a perception of lack
of competence in the target. I then introduce a series of studies in which angry
and sad reactions to being rejected are the main dependent variables. My aim was
to show that targets of a rejection recognize warmth and competence rejections
as different types of rejection and respond to them in emotionally distinct ways.
Below I give a summary per chapter.
The aim of Chapter 2 was to show that anger and sadness are differentially
impacted by an experience of social rejection. More specifically, I investigated
whether an unspecific rejection manipulation (a rejection without a reason) can
cause different levels of sadness and anger, depending on individual differences in
need for affiliation as measured with sensitivity to others. I reasoned that if the
regulation of sadness and anger in response to rejection is associated with sen-
sitivity to others (SO), this is an indication that anger and sadness are not just
pain signals, but have a distinct a social function in the context of social rejection.
Participants were led to believe that they were paired with another (non-existing)
participant that they would meet later. After an exchange of personal messages
with their partner, participants in the rejection condition learned that their part-
ner no longer wanted to meet them. Participants in the control condition learned
that their partner had to leave due to an unexpected phone call. Dependent
variables were anticipated sadness and anger in response to several hypothetical
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negative social scenario’s. The results showed that rejected participants with high
SO, anticipated higher levels of sadness and lower levels of anger in response to the
negative social scenario’s, compared to their non-rejected counterparts, and com-
pared to rejected participants with low SO. Moreover, among rejected participants
SO was positively associated with sadness, and negatively associated with anger.
These results imply that anger and sadness are indeed differentially impacted by
rejection, and that these emotions might be useful to demonstrate the distinction
between competence- and warmth-rejections as well.
The aim of Chapter 3 was to show that people respond with different emotions
to warmth- and competence-rejections. The first study assessed participants’ sub-
jective interpretations of the reason behind an ambiguous rejection. I assessed
whether participants interpreted this rejection in terms of warmth and compe-
tence. I expected that interpretations of a warmth reason would predict sadness,
whereas interpretations of a competence reason would predict anger, in response
to the rejection. To suggest a reason for the rejection, just before the rejection
manipulation took place, the participant and confederate exchanged a written per-
sonal evaluation about each other’s personality regarding one’s competence and
warmth traits. Participants received a previously prepared evaluation which sug-
gested that a rejection on either trait could be possible. I then assessed how
participants interpreted this ambiguous information. The results indicated that
the more participants thought they were rejected because of lack of competence,
the angrier they were, whereas the more they thought they were rejected because
of lack of warmth, the sadder they were. In the second study participants were
either rejected on competence, or on warmth, or accepted. This time rejected
participants received negative evaluations either on their competence, or on their
warmth, while included participants received positive evaluations on all traits. The
results indicated that a rejection due to lack of competence leads to anger (and less
to sadness); while a rejection due to lack of warmth leads to sadness (and less to
anger). Next, the third study investigated how people remember their emotional
reactions to past competence and warmth rejections. Participants were asked to
write about a personal experience of rejection that was due to lack of competence,
or due to lack of warmth. The results replicated the previous study. These studies
show that the experience of rejection depends on the reason of the rejection.
Chapter 4 investigated whether people also differentiate between warmth- and
competence-rejections in a setting in which there is no explicit information about
the reason of the rejection. I attempted to simulate real life in which people often
have their private reasons for ignoring or rejecting someone, and targets have no
information other than the non-verbal behaviour of the person who engages in
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the rejection. Thus the reason of the rejection was unclear from the perspective
of the targets, yet it was clear from the perspective of the selector. Selectors
were real participants who were privately instructed to either make a selection
based on competence, or based on warmth. I assessed targets’ emotional reactions
to the rejection, and whether they were able to pick up the non-verbal cues of
competence and warmth judgments – respectively dominance and coldness – from
the behaviour of the selector. I expected that selectors who based their decision
on the targets’ competence would exhibit stronger displays of dominance than
selectors who based their decision on warmth. Conversely, I expected that selectors
who based their decision on the targets’ warmth would exhibit stronger displays
of coldness than selectors who based their decision on the targets’ competence.
The results provided again evidence for the specificity of angry and sad reactions
to competence and warmth rejections. Moreover, targets of the rejection were
also able to differentiate between competence and warmth rejection on the level of
nonverbal behavior of the selector. Both included and excluded targets assigned
higher dominance to competence selectors than to warmth selectors, and higher
coldness to warmth selectors than to competence selectors. Together these results
suggest that people can differentiate between competence- and warmth-rejections
even when the reason is only conveyed non-verbally.
In Chapter 5, the focus was not on the distinction between competence and
warmth anymore, but on a specific population of individuals: violent offenders with
antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). The aim was to show that among these
individuals an experience of interpersonal control would lead a dysfunctional re-
sponse to rejection. I investigated whether exerting control over the actions of
others could break down the stress response to rejection. Participants played a
digital game of ball toss with three others. Some participants had the opportunity
to determine the course of the game and the actions of the players. Other par-
ticipants did not have this opportunity. Then, in a second round of the game all
participants were ostracized by the other players and excluded from the game. The
dependent variable was social threat vigilance. Results showed that normal indi-
viduals became more vigilant for signs of social threat as they were more excluded
from the game. This happened irrespective of whether they had experienced con-
trol prior to the rejection or not. But as expected, ASPD’ers only showed the
same threat vigilance when they had previously not exerted control over the other
players. The one’s who experienced control prior to the rejection did not show
vigilance to social threat. These results suggest that ASPD’ers place so much
importance on having control that they become insensitive to rejection when they
experience control.
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Finally, in Chapter 6, I conclude that people are very sensitive to warmth
and competence in a context of social rejection. I also discuss implications for
existing insights and questions in the literature. More specifically, I discuss the
role of emotions in behavioral responses to social rejection; when responses to
social rejection are not adaptive; and how the warmth-competence model could be
related to the existing needs-threat model.
Nederlandse Samenvatting
De ervaring van afgewezen worden is pijnlijk. Verschillende studies hebben dit
inmiddels laten zien. In deze studies wordt echter nooit onderscheid gemaakt
tussen verschillende vormen van afwijzing. Men is vaak gëınteresseerd in het ‘pure’
effect van een algemene en niet-specifieke afwijzing. In Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijf ik dat
de wijze waarop mensen afwijzing ervaren waarschijnlijk geen uniforme ervaring
is, maar bepaald wordt door de reden die mensen aan een afwijzing toeschrijven.
Ik maak gebruik van het inzicht dat mensen elkaar beoordelen op competentie en
warmte en pas dit inzicht toe om de ervaring van exclusie beter te begrijpen. Ik
maak een onderscheid tussen twee vormen van afwijzing: afwijzing gemotiveerd
door de perceptie van gebrek aan competentie, en afwijzing gemotiveerd door
de perceptie van gebrek aan warmte. Ik stel vervolgens een aantal studies voor
waarin boosheid en verdriet de belangrijkste afhankelijke maten zijn. Mijn doel
is om te laten zien dat mensen het onderscheid tussen competentie- en warmte-
afwijzingen herkennen en er met specifieke emoties op reageren. Hieronder geef ik
per hoofdstuk een samenvatting.
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 2 was om te laten zien dat boosheid en verdriet ver-
schillend worden bëınvloedt door de ervaring van afwijzing. Ik onderzocht of een
afwijzing zonder reden verschillende maten van boosheid en verdriet teweeg kan
brengen, afhankelijk van individuele verschillen in relatiestijl. Als de regulatie van
boosheid en verdriet na afwijzing afhangt van relatiestijl, kan dit gezien worden
als een indicatie dat deze emoties waarschijnlijk een sociale functie hebben in de
context van de afwijzing. Proefpersonen werd verteld dat ze gekoppeld waren aan
een andere proefpersoon die ze later zouden ontmoeten (in werkelijkheid bestond
deze andere persoon niet). Na een uitwisseling van een persoonlijk bericht met hun
‘partner’, kregen proefpersonen in de exclusie-conditie te horen dat deze persoon
hen niet meer wilde ontmoeten. Proefpersonen in de inclusie-conditie kregen te
horen dat hun partner onverwacht het onderzoek moest verlaten vanwege een tele-
foontje. Afhankelijke maten waren geanticipeerde boosheid en verdriet in respons
op verschillende negatieve sociale scenario’s. De resultaten lieten zien dat onder de
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mensen met een hoge sensitiviteit voor anderen, de afgewezen proefpersonen meer
verdriet en minder boosheid anticipeerden in respons op de negatieve scenario’s,
vergeleken met de niet afgewezen proefpersonen, en vergeleken met afgewezen
proefpersonen met een lage sensitivititeit voor anderen. Bovendien bleek sensi-
tiviteit voor anderen onder afgewezen proefpersonen positief samen te hangen met
verdriet en negatief samen te hangen met boosheid. Deze studie laat zien dat
verdriet en boosheid inderdaad verschillend kunnen worden bëınvloed door een
afwijzing.
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 3 was om te laten zien dat mensen met verschillende
emoties reageren op warmte- en competentie-afwijzingen. De eerste studie onder-
zocht hoe mensen een ambigue afwijzing interpreteren; namelijk of ze de afwijzing
interpreteren als teken dat men een gebrek aan competentie heeft, of dat ze de afwi-
jzing interpreteren als teken dat men een gebrek aan warmte heeft. Ik verwachtte
dat de interpretatie van een gebrek aan warmte verdriet zou voorspellen, terwijl
de interpretatie van een gebrek aan competentie boosheid zou voorspellen. Ook
in deze studie werden proefpersonen gekoppeld aan een andere persoon. Om de
indruk te wekken dat de afwijzing een reden had, ontvingen proefpersonen vó’ó’r
de exclusie-manipulatie eerst een persoonlijke evaluatie over hun warmte en com-
petentie van hun ‘partner’. In werkelijkheid kreeg iedereen dezelfde evaluatie te
zien. Deze evaluatie suggereerde dat de afwijzing zowel zou kunnen liggen aan een
lage beoordeling van competentie, als aan een lage beoordeling van warmte. De re-
sultaten lieten zien dat hoe sterker proefpersonen dachten dat ze waren afgewezen
vanwege gebrek aan competentie, hoe bozer ze werden, en hoe sterker ze dachten
dat ze waren afgewezen vawege gebrek aan warmte, hoe verdrietiger ze werden.
In de tweede studie werden proefpersonen of afgewezen vanwege een gebrek aan
competentie, of afgewezen vanwege een gebrek aan warmte, of ze werden niet
afgewezen. Dus deze keer ontvingen afgewezen proefpersonen een heldere negatieve
evaluatie van hun competentie, of van hun warmte. Niet afgewezen proefperso-
nen ontvingen positive evaluaties van hun competentie en warmte. De resultaten
lieten zien dat een competentie-afwijzing voornamelijk tot boosheid leidt en min-
der tot verdriet, terwijl een warmte-afwijzing voornamelijk tot verdriet leidt en
minder tot boosheid. Hierna onderzocht de derde studie hoe mensen zich herin-
neren dat ze hebben gereageerd op eerdere ervaringen van competentie- en warmte-
afwijzingen. De mensen die zich een warmte-afwijzing moesten herinneren gaven
aan meer verdriet dan boosheid te hebben gevoeld, terwijl de mensen die zich een
competentie-afwijzing moesten herinneren aangaven meer boosheid dan verdriet
te hebben gevoel. Deze studies laten zien dat de ervaring van afwijzing afhangt
van de reden van de afwijzing.
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Hoofdstuk 4 had als doel om te onderzoeken of mensen het onderscheid tussen
warmte- en competentie-afwijzingen ook herkennen in een setting waarin geen ex-
pliciete informatie beschikbaar is over de reden van de afwijzing. Mijn doel was om
het dagelijkse leven te simuleren waarin mensen vaak hun eigen redenen hebben
om iemand af te wijzen of te negeren, en de afgewezen persoon geen expliciete
informatie heeft over de reden van de afwijzing. In dit soort situaties kan de
afgewezen persoon alleen afgaan op het non-verbale gedrag van de afwijzer. In
twee studies werd afwijzing gëınduceerd in het kader van een selectie. De reden
van de afwijzing was onduidelijk voor de targets van de selectie, maar voor degene
die de selectie maakte – de selector – was de reden wel helder. De selectie vond
plaatst middels een face-to-face procedure zonder verbale communicatie. De selec-
tors waren proefpersonen (en geen acteurs) en werden vooraf gëınstrueerd om hun
keuze te baseren op hun eigen inschatting van de competentie of warmte van de
targets. Targets waren niet op de hoogte van deze instructies. Ik onderzocht op-
nieuw de emotionele reacties van de targets op de selectie, en onderzocht ook of ze
in staat waren het non-verbale gedrag van de selector te herkennen. Ik verwachtte
dat selectors die hun keuze moesten baseren op de competentie van de targets
zich dominanter zouden opstellen tijdens de selectie, dan selectors die hun keuze
moesten baseren op de warmte van de targets. Ook verwachtte ik dat selectors
die hun keuze moesten baseren op de warmte van de targets zich kouder zouden
opstellen dan selectors die hun keuze moesten baseren op de competentie van tar-
gets. De resultaten ondersteunden de eerdere bevindingen wat betreft specifieke
emotionele reacties in respons op competentie- en warmte-afwijzingen. Bovendien,
bleken targets van de selectie ook te kunnen differentiëren tussen competentie- en
warmte-afwijzingen op basis van het vertoonde non-verbale gedrag van de selec-
tor. Zowel de gëıncludeerde als de geëxcludeerde targets schreven meer dominantie
toe aan competentie-selectors dan aan warmte-selectors. Ook werd aan warmte-
selectors meer koudheid toegeschreven dan aan competentie-selectors. Deze resul-
taten suggereren dat mensen in staat zijn om het onderscheid tussen een warmte-
en competentie-afwijzing waar te kunnen nemen, ook wanneer de reden van de
afwijzing alleen non-verbaal wordt gecommuniceerd.
In Hoofdstuk 5 lag de focus niet meer op het onderscheid tussen competentie-
en warmte-afwijzingen, maar lag deze op een specifieke populatie: geweldadige
delinquenten met een anti-sociale persoonlijkheidsstoornis. Het doel was om te
laten zien dat onder deze mensen een ervaring van interpersoonlijke controle leidt
tot een dysfunctionele reactie op afwijzing. Ik heb onderzocht of het uitoefenen
van controle over het gedrag van anderen de stress-respons op afwijzing te niet
kan doen. Proefpersonen speelden een digitaal bal-overgooi-spel met drie anderen.
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Een deel van de proefpersonen kreeg hierbij de mogelijkheid om het verloop van
het spel en de acties van de andere spelers zelf te bepalen. Een ander deel van de
proefpersonen kreeg deze mogelijkheid niet. In een tweede ronde van het spel wer-
den proefpersonen vervolgens genegeerd door de andere spelers en op die manier
buitengesloten van het spel. De afhankelijke variabele was de alertheid op sociale
dreiging. De resultaten lieten zien dat proefpersonen uit de normale populatie
alerter werden voor sociale dreiging naarmate ze minder in het spel werden be-
trokken, ongeacht of ze eerder in het spel controle hadden over de spelers, of
niet. Echter, proefpersonen met ASPD, vertoonden deze reactie alleen als ze geen
controle ervoeren over de andere spelers; wanneer zij eerder in het spel controle
hadden over de spelers, vertoonden zij geen alertheid meer voor sociale dreiging.
Deze resultaten suggereren dat mensen met een anti-sociale persoonlijkheidsstoor-
nis controle dusdanig belangrijk vinden dat ze ongevoelig worden voor afwijzing
wanneer ze controle ervaren.
In Hoofdstuk 6, tenslotte, concludeer ik dat mensen heel gevoelig zijn voor
het onderscheid tussen competentie en warmte in de context van afwijzing. Ook
bediscussieer ik de implicaties voor bestaande inzichten en vraagstukken in de
literatuur. Meer specifiek, bespreek ik de rol van emoties in het tot stand komen
van gedragsmatige reacties op afwijzing; wanneer reacties op afwijzing niet adaptief
zijn; en hoe het warmte-competentie-model gerelateerd zou kunnen worden aan het
reeds bestaande Needs threat model van afwijzing.
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in onderling overleg natuurlijk. Jij wilde namelijk niet tegen een lelijk schilderij
aankijken, begrijpelijk! Je was altijd precies, en niet alleen wat betreft de inricht-
ing van onze kamer. Je scherpe inzichten hebben mij in meer dan één opzicht
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